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Florian Holzbauer

Publications and source records attributed to Florian Holzbauer.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Context Matters: Repository-Aware Security Analysis of the Agent Skill Ecosystem

Agent skills extend local AI agents, such as Claude Code and OpenClaw, with additional functionality. Their growing popularity has led to dedicated marketplaces resembling mobile app stores, as well as automated scanners that assess whether skills are benign or malicious. However, scanner reports from individual marketplaces classify up to 46.8% of skills as malicious, raising concerns about false positives. We present the largest empirical security analysis of the AI agent skill ecosystem to date. We collect 238,180 unique skills from three major distribution platforms and GitHub, and analyze their contents, behavior, and repository context. Unlike existing scanner-based assessments, which evaluate skills largely in isolation, our repository-aware analysis checks whether a flagged skill is consistent with its surrounding GitHub project. This context substantially reduces the number of suspicious skills: only 0.52% remain suspicious after repository-aware analysis. Our results show that existing scanners can substantially overestimate maliciousness when repository context is ignored. At the same time, we identify previously undocumented real-world attack vectors, including the hijacking of skills hosted in abandoned GitHub repositories. Overall, our findings provide a more robust view of the agent-skill ecosystem's current risk surface and highlight the need for context-aware security evaluation.

cs.CR

A Relay a Day Keeps the AirTag Away: Practical Relay Attacks on Apple's AirTags

Apple AirTags use Apple's Find My network: when nearby iDevices detect a lost tag, they anonymously forward an encrypted location report to Apple, which the tag's owner can then fetch to locate the item. That encryption protects privacy -- neither the finder nor Apple learns the owner's identity -- but it also prevents Apple from validating the correctness of received reports. We show that this design weakness can be exploited: using a relay attack, we can inject manipulated location reports so the Find My service reports a false position for a lost AirTag. The same technique can be used to deny recovery of a targeted tag (a focused DoS), since the owner is misled about its whereabouts.

cs.CR

Careless Whisper: Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Monitor Users on Mobile Instant Messengers

With over 3 billion users globally, mobile instant messaging apps have become indispensable for both personal and professional communication. Besides plain messaging, many services implement additional features such as delivery and read receipts informing a user when a message has successfully reached its target. This paper highlights that delivery receipts can pose significant privacy risks to users. We use specifically crafted messages that trigger delivery receipts allowing any user to be pinged without their knowledge or consent. By using this technique at high frequency, we demonstrate how an attacker could extract private information such as the online and activity status of a victim, e.g., screen on/off. Moreover, we can infer the number of currently active user devices and their operating system, as well as launch resource exhaustion attacks, such as draining a user's battery or data allowance, all without generating any notification on the target side. Due to the widespread adoption of vulnerable messengers (WhatsApp and Signal) and the fact that any user can be targeted simply by knowing their phone number, we argue for a design change to address this issue.

cs.CR

Diffie-Hellman Picture Show: Key Exchange Stories from Commercial VoWiFi Deployments

Voice over Wi-Fi (VoWiFi) uses a series of IPsec tunnels to deliver IP-based telephony from the subscriber's phone (User Equipment, UE) into the Mobile Network Operator's (MNO) core network via an Internet-facing endpoint, the Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG). IPsec tunnels are set up in phases. The first phase negotiates the cryptographic algorithm and parameters and performs a key exchange via the Internet Key Exchange protocol, while the second phase (protected by the above-established encryption) performs the authentication. An insecure key exchange would jeopardize the later stages and the data's security and confidentiality. In this paper, we analyze the phase 1 settings and implementations as they are found in phones as well as in commercially deployed networks worldwide. On the UE side, we identified a recent 5G baseband chipset from a major manufacturer that allows for fallback to weak, unannounced modes and verified it experimentally. On the MNO side -- among others -- we identified 13 operators (totaling an estimated 140 million subscribers) on three continents that all use the same globally static set of ten private keys, serving them at random. Those not-so-private keys allow the decryption of the shared keys of every VoWiFi user of all those operators. All these operators deployed their core network from one common manufacturer.

cs.CR

An Extended View on Measuring Tor AS-level Adversaries

Tor provides anonymity to millions of users around the globe which has made it a valuable target for malicious actors. As a low-latency anonymity system, it is vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks from strong passive adversaries such as large autonomous systems (ASes). In preliminary work, we have developed a measurement approach utilizing the RIPE Atlas framework -- a network of more than 11,000 probes worldwide -- to infer the risk of deanonymization for IPv4 clients in Germany and the US. In this paper, we apply our methodology to additional scenarios providing a broader picture of the potential for deanonymization in the Tor network. In particular, we (a) repeat our earlier (2020) measurements in 2022 to observe changes over time, (b) adopt our approach for IPv6 to analyze the risk of deanonymization when using this next-generation Internet protocol, and (c) investigate the current situation in Russia, where censorship has been intensified after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to our results, Tor provides user anonymity at consistent quality: While individual numbers vary in dependence of client and destination, we were able to identify ASes with the potential to conduct deanonymization attacks. For clients in Germany and the US, the overall picture, however, has not changed since 2020. In addition, the protocols (IPv4 vs. IPv6) do not significantly impact the risk of deanonymization. Russian users are able to securely evade censorship using Tor. Their general risk of deanonymization is, in fact, lower than in the other investigated countries. Beyond, the few ASes with the potential to successfully perform deanonymization are operated by Western companies, further reducing the risk for Russian users.

cs.NI