arXiv subjects

Francesca Parise

Publications and source records attributed to Francesca Parise.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Optimal Control of Behavioral-Feedback SIR Epidemic Model

We consider a behavioral-feedback SIR epidemic model, in which the infection rate depends in feedback on the fractions of susceptible and infected agents, respectively. The considered model allows one to account for endogenous adaptation mechanisms of the agents in response to the epidemics, such as voluntary social distancing, or the adoption of face masks. For this model, we formulate an optimal control problem for a social planner that has the ability to reduce the infection rate to keep the infection curve below a certain threshold within an infinite time horizon, while minimizing the intervention cost. Based on the dynamic properties of the model, we prove that, under quite general conditions on the infection rate, the filling the box strategy is the optimal control. This strategy consists in letting the epidemics spread without intervention until the threshold is reached, then applying the minimum control that leaves the fraction of infected individuals constantly at the threshold until the reproduction number becomes less than one and the infection naturally fades out. Our result generalizes one available in the literature for the equivalent problem formulated for the classical SIR model, which can be recovered as a special case of our model when the infection rate is constant. Our contribution enhances the understanding of epidemic management with adaptive human behavior, offering insights for robust containment strategies.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2025

Behavioral-feedback SIR epidemic model: analysis and control

This paper investigates a behavioral-feedback SIR model in which the infection rate adapts dynamically based on the fractions of susceptible and infected individuals. We introduce an invariant of motion and we characterize the peak of infection. We further examine the system under a threshold constraint on the infection level. Based on this analysis, we formulate an optimal control problem to keep the infection curve below a healthcare capacity threshold while minimizing the economic cost. For this problem, we study a feasible strategy that involves applying the minimal necessary restrictions to meet the capacity constraint and characterize the corresponding cost.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2025

Optimal interventions in opinion dynamics on large-scale, time-varying, random networks

We consider two optimization problems in which a planner aims to influence the average transient opinion in the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics on a network by intervening on the agents' innate opinions. Solving these problems requires full network knowledge, which is often not available because of the cost involved in collecting this information or due to privacy considerations. For this reason, we focus on intervention strategies that are based on statistical instead of exact knowledge of the network. We focus on a time-varying random network model where the network is resampled at each time step and formulate two intervention problems in this setting. We show that these problems can be casted into mixed integer linear programs in the type space, where the type of a node captures its out- and in-degree and other local features of the nodes, and provide a closed form solution for one of the two problems. The integer constraints may be easily removed using probabilistic interventions leading to linear programs. Finally, we show by a numerical analysis that there are cases in which the derived optimal interventions on time-varying networks can lead to close to optimal interventions on fixed networks.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Asymmetric Network Games: $\alpha$-Potential Function and Learning

In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of heterogeneous players. This paper analyzes static network games using the framework of $\alpha$-potential games. Under mild assumptions on the action sets (compact intervals) and the utility functions (twice continuously differentiable) of the players, we derive an expression for an inexact potential function of the game, called the $\alpha$-potential function. Using such a function, we show that modified versions of the sequential best-response algorithm and the simultaneous gradient play algorithm achieve convergence of players' actions to a $2\alpha$-Nash equilibrium. For linear-quadratic network games, we show that $\alpha$ depends on the maximum asymmetry in the network and is well-behaved for a wide range of networks of practical interest. Further, we derive bounds on the social welfare of the $\alpha$-Nash equilibrium corresponding to the maximum of the $\alpha$-potential function, under suitable assumptions. We numerically illustrate the convergence of the proposed algorithms and properties of the learned $2\alpha$-Nash equilibria.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

On the impact of coordinated fleets size on traffic efficiency

We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate this problem as a two-player convex game and we study how the size of the coordinated fleet, measured in terms of share of the total demand, influences the Price of Anarchy (PoA). We show that, for two-terminal networks, there are cases in which the fleet must reach a minimum share before actually affecting the PoA, which otherwise remains unchanged. Moreover, for parallel networks we prove that, under suitable assumptions, the PoA is monotonically non-increasing in the fleet share.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Learning in Time-Varying Monotone Network Games with Dynamic Populations

In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents' participation and connectivity vary over time. We model this changing system with a stochastic network which takes a new independent realization at each repetition. We show that the strategy profile learned by the agents through projected gradient dynamics over the sequence of network realizations converges to a Nash equilibrium of the game in which players minimize their expected cost, almost surely and in the mean-square sense. We then show that the learned strategy profile is an almost Nash equilibrium of the game played by the agents at each stage of the repeated game with high probability. Using these two results, we derive non-asymptotic bounds on the regret incurred by the agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

On the Asymptotic Convergence of Subgraph Generated Models

We study a family of random graph models - termed subgraph generated models (SUGMs) - initially developed by Chandrasekhar and Jackson in which higher-order structures are explicitly included in the network formation process. We use matrix concentration inequalities to show convergence of the adjacency matrix of networks realized from such SUGMs to the expected adjacency matrix as a function of the network size. We apply this result to study concentration of centrality measures (such as degree, eigenvector, and Katz centrality) in sampled networks to the corresponding centralities in the expected network, thus proving that node importance can be predicted from knowledge of the random graph model without the need of exact network data.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

Synchronization in random networks of identical phase oscillators: A graphon approach

Networks of coupled nonlinear oscillators have been used to model circadian rhythms, flashing fireflies, Josephson junction arrays, high-voltage electric grids, and many other kinds of self-organizing systems. Recently, several authors have sought to understand how coupled oscillators behave when they interact according to a random graph. Here we consider interaction networks generated by a graphon model known as a $W$-random network, and examine the dynamics of an infinite number of identical phase oscillators. We show that with sufficient regularity on $W$, the solution to the dynamical system over a $W$-random network of size $n$ converges in the $L^{\infty}$ norm to the solution of the infinite graphon system, with high probability as $n\rightarrow\infty$. We leverage this convergence result to explore synchronization for two classes of identical phase oscillators on Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi random graphs. This result suggests a framework for studying synchronization properties in large but finite random networks.

math.DS↗

arXiv2023

Gradient Dynamics in Linear Quadratic Network Games with Time-Varying Connectivity and Population Fluctuation

In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in which the network of interactions changes with time and agents may not be present at each iteration. To get tractability, we assume that at each iteration, the network of interactions is sampled from an underlying random network model and agents participate at random with a given probability. Under these assumptions, we consider a gradient-based learning algorithm and establish almost sure convergence of the agents' strategies to the Nash equilibrium of the game played over the expected network. Additionally, we prove, in the large population regime, that the learned strategy is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for each stage game with high probability. We validate our results over an online market application.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Estimation of Unknown Payoff Parameters in Large Network Games

We consider network games where a large number of agents interact according to a network sampled from a random network model, represented by a graphon. By exploiting previous results on convergence of such large network games to graphon games, we examine a procedure for estimating unknown payoff parameters, from observations of equilibrium actions, without the need for exact network information. We prove smoothness and local convexity of the optimization problem involved in computing the proposed estimator. Additionally, under a notion of graphon parameter identifiability, we show that the optimal estimator is globally unique. We present several examples of identifiable homogeneous and heterogeneous parameters in different classes of linear quadratic network games with numerical simulations to validate the proposed estimator.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Data-Driven Approximations of Chance Constrained Programs in Nonstationary Environments

We study sample average approximations (SAA) of chance constrained programs. SAA methods typically approximate the actual distribution in the chance constraint using an empirical distribution constructed from random samples assumed to be independent and identically distributed according to the actual distribution. In this paper, we consider a nonstationary variant of this problem, where the random samples are assumed to be independently drawn in a sequential fashion from an unknown and possibly time-varying distribution. This nonstationarity may be driven by changing environmental conditions present in many real-world applications. To account for the potential nonstationarity in the data generation process, we propose a novel robust SAA method exploiting information about the Wasserstein distance between the sequence of data-generating distributions and the actual chance constraint distribution. As a key result, we obtain distribution-free estimates of the sample size required to ensure that the robust SAA method will yield solutions that are feasible for the chance constraint under the actual distribution with high confidence.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Designing for Robustness in Electric Grids via a General Effective Resistance Measure

We propose a mathematical framework for designing robust networks of coupled phase-oscillators by leveraging a vulnerability measure proposed by Tyloo et. al that quantifies how much a small perturbation to a phase-oscillator's natural frequency impacts the system's global synchronized frequencies. Given a fixed complex network topology with specific governing dynamics, the proposed framework finds an optimal allocation of edge weights that minimizes such vulnerability measure(s) at the node(s) for which we expect perturbations to occur by solving a tractable semidefinite programming problem. We specify the mathematical model to high voltage electric grids where each node corresponds to a voltage phase angle associated with a bus and edges correspond to transmission lines. Edge weights are determined by the susceptance values along the transmission lines. In this application, frequency synchronization is increasingly challenged by the integration of renewable energy, yet is imperative to the grid's health and functionality. Our framework helps to alleviate this challenge by optimizing the placement of renewable generation and the susceptance values along the transmission lines.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Lockdown interventions in SIR model: Is the reproduction number the right control variable?

The recent COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need of non-pharmaceutical interventions in the first stages of a pandemic. Among these, lockdown policies proved unavoidable yet extremely costly from an economic perspective. To better understand the tradeoffs between economic and epidemic costs of lockdown interventions, we here focus on a simple SIR epidemic model and study lockdowns as solutions to an optimal control problem. We first show numerically that the optimal lockdown policy exhibits a phase transition from suppression to mitigation as the time horizon grows, i.e., if the horizon is short the optimal strategy is to impose severe lockdown to avoid diffusion of the infection, whereas if the horizon is long the optimal control steers the system to herd immunity to reduce economic loss. We then consider two alternative policies, motivated by government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, where lockdown levels are selected to either stabilize the reproduction number (i.e., "flatten the curve") or the fraction of infected (i.e., containing the number of hospitalizations). We compute analytically the performance of these two feedback policies and compare them to the optimal control. Interestingly, we show that in the limit of infinite horizon stabilizing the number of infected is preferable to controlling the reproduction number, and in fact yields close to optimal performance.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Accelerated consensus in multi-agent networks via memory of local averages

Classical mathematical models of information sharing and updating in multi-agent networks use linear operators. In the paradigmatic DeGroot model, agents update their states with linear combinations of their neighbors' current states. In prior work, an accelerated averaging model employing the use of memory has been suggested to accelerate convergence to a consensus state for undirected networks. There, the DeGroot update on the current states is followed by a linear combination with the previous states. We propose a modification where the DeGroot update is applied to the current and previous states and is then followed by a linear combination step. We show that this simple modification applied to undirected networks permits convergence even for periodic networks. Further, it allows for faster convergence than the DeGroot and accelerated averaging models for suitable networks and model parameters.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2021

Optimal intervention in transportation networks

We study a network design problem (NDP) where the planner aims at selecting the optimal single-link intervention on a transportation network to minimize the travel time under Wardrop equilibrium flows. Our first result is that, if the delay functions are affine and the support of the equilibrium is not modified with interventions, the NDP may be formulated in terms of electrical quantities computed on a related resistor network. In particular, we show that the travel time variation corresponding to an intervention on a given link depends on the effective resistance between the endpoints of the link. We suggest an approach to approximate such an effective resistance by performing only local computation, and exploit it to design an efficient algorithm to solve the NDP. We discuss the optimality of this procedure in the limit of infinitely large networks, and provide a sufficient condition for its optimality. We then provide numerical simulations, showing that our algorithm achieves good performance even if the equilibrium support varies and the delay functions are non-linear.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Fictitious play in zero-sum stochastic games

We present a novel variant of fictitious play dynamics combining classical fictitious play with Q-learning for stochastic games and analyze its convergence properties in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our dynamics involves players forming beliefs on the opponent strategy and their own continuation payoff (Q-function), and playing a greedy best response by using the estimated continuation payoffs. Players update their beliefs from observations of opponent actions. A key property of the learning dynamics is that update of the beliefs on Q-functions occurs at a slower timescale than update of the beliefs on strategies. We show both in the model-based and model-free cases (without knowledge of player payoff functions and state transition probabilities), the beliefs on strategies converge to a stationary mixed Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum stochastic game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Optimal dynamic information provision in traffic routing

We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads (the "risky road") is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite number of atomic) agents to use the risky road even when the expected cost of travel there is high in order to obtain accurate information about the state of the road. Since agents are strategic, we show that in order to generate incentives for experimentation the central planner however needs to limit the number of agents using the risky road when the expected cost of travel on the risky road is low. In particular, because of congestion, too much use of the risky road when the state is favorable would make experimentation no longer incentive compatible. We characterize the optimal incentive compatible recommendation system, first in a two-stage game and then in an infinite-horizon setting. In both cases, this system induces only partial, rather than full, information sharing among the agents (otherwise there would be too much exploitation of the risky road when costs there are low).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in Aggregative Charging Games

Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such game. However, Nash equilibria have been shown to posses desirable system-level properties only in simplified cases. In this work, we use the concept of price of anarchy to analyze the inefficiency of Nash equilibria when compared to the social optimum solution. More precisely, we show that i) for linear price functions depending on all the charging instants, the price of anarchy converges to one as the population of vehicles grows; ii) for price functions that depend only on the instantaneous demand, the price of anarchy converges to one if the price function takes the form of a positive pure monomial; iii) for general classes of price functions, the asymptotic price of anarchy can be bounded. For finite populations, we additionaly provide a bound on the price of anarchy as a function of the number vehicles in the system. We support the theoretical findings by means of numerical simulations.

eess.SY↗