The Switching Lemma shows what the Switching Lemma cannot prove: an unconditional natural-proofs barrier
Razborov and Rudich (JCSS'97) observed that all known lower-bound proofs follow a certain pattern: when showing that a function $F$ is hard, along the way the proof provides us with a distinguisher, namely, an efficient algorithm which can distinguish easy functions from random functions. They called such lower-bound proofs natural proofs. They then showed a natural-proofs barrier: under standard cryptographic assumptions, natural proofs cannot show superpolynomial lower-bounds against Boolean circuits. Along similar lines it can be shown that under a suitable cryptographic assumption, natural proofs cannot significantly improve the current state-of-the-art lower bound against constant depth circuits (AC0). The state of the art, using H\r{a}stad's Switching Lemma (SL), is $2^{n^{1/(d-1)}}$ for depth-$d$ circuits, and (conditionally) no natural proof can prove lower bounds of $2^{n^{c/d}}$ for some large constant $c$. In this paper we revisit the natural-proofs barrier from an $\textit{unconditional}$ perspective. We focus on AC0-natural proofs, i.e. proofs whose distinguishers are computable by AC0 circuits. Razborov and Rudich observed that lower bounds based on SL are AC0-natural. We show that this is true for most known lower-bound techniques against constant-depth circuits. We then establish an unconditional barrier for such proofs. By localizing the Trevisan--Xue pseudorandom generator, we are able to show that no AC0-natural proof can prove a lower bound greater than $2^{n^{7/(d-5)}}$ against depth-$d$ circuits. This is in the same quantitative regime as the SL frontier which instead has $1/(d-1)$ in the power of $n$. The proof has a striking self-referential aspect: the proof of security of the Trevisan--Xue generator crucially relies on SL, and so SL has been used to show that AC0-natural proofs, such as SL itself, cannot prove AC0 lower bounds better than that of SL.