arXiv subjects

Francesco Feri

Publications and source records attributed to Francesco Feri.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The friendship paradox: Causal evidence of its behavioral consequences

We provide a first causal analysis of the behavioral consequences of the friendship paradox-the fact that people's friends in a network have more connections than average. We find that people's behavior is biased by their network position: they do not best respond to what they should infer the average behavior of the population to be, but instead simply to the average behavior of their friends. Moreover, we find that they fail to learn to overcome such a bias when relocated within the network, varying their observational environment. In these games of complements, the friendship paradox generates a systematic upward distortion in actions, increases behavioral dispersion, and persists despite learning opportunities.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Can the decoy effect increase cooperation in networks? An experiment

This paper investigates whether the decoy effect - specifically the attraction effect - can foster cooperation in social networks. In a lab experiment, we show that introducing a dominated option increases the selection of the target choice, especially in early decisions. The effect is stronger in individual settings but persists in networks despite free-riding incentives, with variation depending on the decision-maker's strategic position.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Ignorance is Bliss: A Game of Regret

An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information available to each regret averse individual depends both on their own choice and on the choices of others, as others can reveal ex-post information about what might have been. This implies that what appears to be a series of isolated single-person decision problems is in fact a rich multi-player behavioural game, the regret game, where the psychological payoffs that depend on ex-post information are interconnected. For an open set of parameters, the regret game is a coordination game with multiple equilibria, despite the fact that all individuals possess a uniquely optimal choice in isolation. We experimentally test this prediction and find support for it.

econ.TH↗