arXiv subjects

Francisco Rodríguez

Publications and source records attributed to Francisco Rodríguez.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Visual-SLAM for the detection of hidden tomatoes in greenhouses by Hierarchical Localization and GLOMAP for robotized harvesting

Advanced crop monitoring inside greenhouses is becoming one of the primary objectives of research centers. High-performance sensors, such as LiDAR or stereo cameras, have traditionally been employed for this purpose, though these often have a high cost. This work proposes a Visual-SLAM system using a monocular camera, which is significantly more cost-effective and specifically tailored for agricultural applications, such as mapping tomato crops in a greenhouse. Tests were carried out on a real tomato bunch, located in the Agroconnect experimental greenhouse. A ROS 2 Humble node was developed to run on the robot in order to capture images of these crops, which were then stored for offline processing. To generate a 3D mapped model for the crop in the greenhouse, the GLOMAP mapper, based on Structure-From-Motion, was integrated with the Hierarchical Localization toolbox. This initial mapping is a foundation for future, more advanced algorithms to analyze growth patterns, and optimize agricultural management. The system leverages a hierarchical localization paradigm based on a coarse-to-fine strategy: it first performs global retrieval to generate location hypotheses, then combines local features within the identified candidate regions. The results show a correct identification of the tomato cluster, correctly characterising the tomato that is occluded and inaccessible by classical vision technologies. The reconstructed 3D model was further validated against manual ground-truth measurements of fruit size, centroid position, and orientation, confirming the geometric accuracy of the proposed low-cost monocular pipeline.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2026

Comment on "The Forsaken Road: Reassessing Living Standards Following the Cuban Revolution and the American Embargo"

Bastos, Geloso, and Bologna Pavlik (2026) argue that the US embargo explains less than one tenth of the difference in per capita income between Cuba and a counterfactual scenario in which the country did not follow socialist economic policies. We show that their results are driven by the use of an elasticity of income to trade openness that is neither representative nor a reasonable upper bound of the values found in the literature and by their choice to attribute the effect of the interaction between the embargo and other determinants of growth solely to those other determinants. We show that, once these problems are corrected, the embargo can account for a substantial fraction, and in some cases all, of Cuba's post 1959 economic underperformance.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Why Bahar and Hausmann Tell Us Nothing About Venezuelan Migration Flows to the United States

Bahar and Hausmann (2025a) claim to find evidence against the hypothesis that oil sanctions on Venezuela lead to increased migration flows to the United States. We show that their findings derive from applying a nonstandard, misspecified Engle-Granger test to first differences. This specification is incorrect because cointegration tests are designed to evaluate relationships between the levels of variables, not their first differences. Since the residuals from regressions of I(0) variables will, under general conditions, be stationary, testing for cointegration between first differences of I(1) variables virtually ensures a spurious finding of cointegration. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we show that the misspecified Bahar-Hausmann test on first differences exhibits a false positive rate of 100 percent. Once the Engle-Granger test is applied correctly to the logarithms of levels, the evidence of cointegration vanishes. The Bahar-Hausmann regressions therefore provide no valid basis for inference about any underlying relationship between migration and Venezuelan oil revenues.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Sanctions and Venezuelan Migration

This paper examines the potential impact of different US economic sanctions policies on Venezuelan migration flows. I consider three possible departures from the current status quo in which selected oil companies are permitted to conduct transactions with Venezuela's state-owned oil sector: a return to maximum pressure, characterized by intensive use of secondary sanctions, a more limited tightening that would revoke only the current Chevron license, and a complete lifting of economic sanctions. I find that sanctions significantly influence migration patterns by disrupting oil revenues, which fund imports critical to productivity in the non-oil sector. Reimposing maximum pressure sanctions would lead to an estimated one million additional Venezuelans emigrating over the next five years compared to a baseline scenario of no economic sanctions. If the US aims to address the Venezuelan migrant crisis effectively, a policy of engagement and lifting economic sanctions appears more likely to stabilize migration flows than a return to maximum pressure strategies.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2023

Estimating causal effects of sanctions impacts: what role for country-level studies?

This article reviews recent advances in addressing empirical identification issues in cross-country and country-level studies and their implications for the identification of the effectiveness and consequences of economic sanctions. I argue that, given the difficulties in assessing causal relationships in cross-national data, country-level case studies can serve as a useful and informative complement to cross-national regression studies. However, I also warn that case studies pose a set of additional potential empirical pitfalls which can obfuscate rather than clarify the identification of causal mechanisms at work. Therefore, the most sensible way to read case study evidence is as a complement rather than as a substitute to cross-national research.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2023

Political Conflict and Economic Growth in Post-Independence Venezuela

Venezuela has suffered three economic catastrophes since independence: one each in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. Prominent explanations for this trilogy point to the interaction of class conflict and resource dependence. We turn attention to intra-class conflict, arguing that the most destructive policy choices stemmed not from the rich defending themselves against the masses but rather from pitched battles among elites. Others posit that Venezuelan political institutions failed to sustain growth because they were insufficiently inclusive; we suggest in addition that they inadequately mediated intra-elite conflict.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

Sanctions and Imports of Essential Goods: A Closer Look at the Equipo Anova (2021) Results

We revisit the results of a recent paper by Equipo Anova, who claim to find evidence of an improvement in Venezuelan imports of food and medicines associated with the adoption of U.S. financial sanctions towards Venezuela in 2017. We show that their results are consequence of data coding errors and questionable methodological choices, including the use an unreasonable functional form that implies a counterfactual of negative imports in the absence of sanctions, the omission of data accounting for four-fifths of the country's food imports at the time of sanctions and incorrect application of regression discontinuity methods. Once these errors are corrected, the evidence of a significant improvement in the level and rate of change in imports of essentials disappears.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model

In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.

econ.TH↗