Harm Is Behavioural, Moderation Is Lexical: How Language and Culture Decide Whom Automated Safety Systems Protect and Whom They Silence
Content warning: this paper quotes slurs and hateful statements from published test suites; the racial slur among them is masked. Automated systems decide at scale which messages are harmful, and they decide unevenly. Classifiers label African American English as offensive up to twice as often as other English, the accounts of prominent drag queens can score as more toxic than those of white nationalists, and safety behaviour that holds in English collapses in low-resource languages. We argue that over-flagging and under-protection share one cause: deciding harm from vocabulary and surface form rather than from what a message does. We organise the evidence into seven failure modes and argue, as testable hypotheses, that harmful behaviours (a request for secrecy, a demand for payment, an attempt to isolate someone) travel across languages better than the words that express them. We propose an evaluation protocol that makes the gap between the best- and worst-served language communities a headline result, and show that the naive gap is inflated under equal service and that its usual bootstrap interval is unreliable. Applied to five open systems in eleven languages, from a keyword lexicon to two current multilingual guard models, the protocol finds that none reaches native-speaker accuracy at separating harmful function from harmless form (51 of 55 system-language pairs fall short); that greater capability raises discrimination in nine languages while leaving Arabic and romanised Hindi near chance, so the gap between the best- and worst-served languages grows with capability; that one system both over-flags and under-protects the same language most; and that a language a system reads worst can look the most fairly treated when only false positives are reported.