arXiv subjects

Gabriel Y. Weintraub

Publications and source records attributed to Gabriel Y. Weintraub.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Bidders' Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions

We study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions that exploits a staggered adoption by different publishers (sellers) of first-price auctions (FPAs), instead of the traditional second-price auctions (SPAs). We analyze the auction format change using difference-in-differences regressions and a synthetic difference-in-differences estimator, which better handles pre-trends. The results show that revenue per sold impression (price) jumps considerably for treated publishers relative to control publishers, with increases ranging from 25% to 70% of the pre-treatment price level of the treated group. Moreover, for later auction format changes, the increase in price levels under FPAs relative to those under SPAs tends to dissipate over time, reminiscent of the revenue equivalence theorem, although the extent of this reversion depends on the specification. We view these results as suggestive of initially insufficient bid shading following the format change, as opposed to an immediate transition to a new Bayesian Nash equilibrium, with prices tending to decline in several specifications in a manner consistent with gradual adjustment in bidding behavior as bidders learn to shade their bids. Our work constitutes one of the first field studies on bidders'responses to auction format changes, providing an important complement to theoretical model predictions. As such, it provides valuable information to auction designers when considering the implementation of different formats.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2026

Price Experimentation and Interference

In this paper, we examine the biases that arise when firms run A/B tests on continuous parameters to estimate global treatment effects on performance metrics of interest; we particularly focus on price experiments to measure the price impact on quantity demanded, and on profit. In canonical A/B experimental estimators, biases emerge due to interference between market participants. We employ structural modeling and differential calculus to derive intuitive characterizations of these biases. We then specialize our general model to the standard revenue-management pricing problem. This setting highlights a fundamental risk innate to A/B pricing experiments: that the canonical estimator for the expected change in profits, counterintuitively, can have the wrong sign in expectation. In other words, following the guidance of canonical estimators may lead firms to move prices (or fees) in the wrong direction, inadvertently decreasing profits. We introduce a novel debiasing technique for these canonical experiments, requiring only that firms equally split units between treatment and control. We apply these results to a two-sided market model, and demonstrate how the "change of sign" regime depends on market factors such as the supply/demand imbalance, and the price markup. We conclude by calibrating our revenue-management pricing model to published empirical estimates from Airbnb marketplaces, demonstrating that estimators with the wrong sign are not a knife-edge issue, and that they may be prevalent enough to be of concern to practitioners.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2025

When Does Interference Matter? Decision-Making in Platform Experiments

This paper investigates decision-making in A/B experiments for online platforms and marketplaces. In such settings, due to constraints on inventory, A/B experiments typically lead to biased estimators because of *interference* between treatment and control groups; this phenomenon has been well studied in recent literature. By contrast, there has been relatively little discussion of the impact of interference on decision-making. In this paper, we analyze a benchmark Markovian model of an inventory-constrained platform, where arriving customers book listings that are limited in supply. We focus on the commonly used frequentist hypothesis testing approach for making launch decisions based on data from customer-randomized experiments, and we study the impact of interference on (1) false positive probability and (2) statistical power. We obtain three main findings. First, we show that for *sign-consistent* treatments -- i.e., those where the treatment changes booking probabilities in the same direction relative to control for all states of inventory availability -- the false positive probability of a test statistic using the standard difference-in-means estimator with a corresponding naïve variance estimator is correctly controlled. Second, we demonstrate that for sign-consistent treatments in realistic settings, the statistical power of this naïve approach is higher than that of any similar pipeline using a debiased estimator. Taken together, these two findings suggest that platforms may be better off *not* debiasing when treatments are sign-consistent. Third, using numerics, we investigate false positive probability and statistical power when treatments are sign-inconsistent, and we show that in principle, the performance of the naïve approach can be arbitrarily worse in such cases.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2024

Switchback Price Experiments with Forward-Looking Demand

We consider a retailer running a switchback experiment for the price of a single product, with infinite supply. In each period, the seller chooses a price $p$ from a set of predefined prices that consist of a reference price and a few discounted price levels. The goal is to estimate the demand gradient at the reference price point, with the goal of adjusting the reference price to improve revenue after the experiment. In our model, in each period, a unit mass of buyers arrives on the market, with values distributed based on a time-varying process. Crucially, buyers are forward looking with a discounted utility and will choose to not purchase now if they expect to face a discounted price in the near future. We show that forward-looking demand introduces bias in naive estimators of the demand gradient, due to intertemporal interference. Furthermore, we prove that there is no estimator that uses data from price experiments with only two price points that can recover the correct demand gradient, even in the limit of an infinitely long experiment with an infinitesimal price discount. Moreover, we characterize the form of the bias of naive estimators. Finally, we show that with a simple three price level experiment, the seller can remove the bias due to strategic forward-looking behavior and construct an estimator for the demand gradient that asymptotically recovers the truth.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

The Social Divide of Social Distancing: Shelter-in-Place Behavior in Santiago during the Covid-19 Pandemic

Voluntary shelter-in-place directives and lockdowns are the main non-pharmaceutical interventions that governments around the globe have used to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. In this paper we study the impact of such interventions in the capital of a developing country, Santiago, Chile, that exhibits large socioeconomic inequality. A distinctive feature of our study is that we use granular geolocated mobile phone data to construct mobility measures that capture (1) shelter-in-place behavior, and (2) trips within the city to destinations with potentially different risk profiles. Using panel data linear regression models we first show that the impact of social distancing measures and lockdowns on mobility is highly heterogeneous and dependent on socioeconomic levels. More specifically, our estimates indicate that while zones of high socioeconomic levels can exhibit reductions in mobility of around 50\% to 90\% depending on the specific mobility metric used, these reductions are only 20\% to 50\% for lower-income communities. The large reductions in higher-income communities are significantly driven by voluntary shelter-in-place behavior. Second, also using panel data methods we show that our mobility measures are important predictors of infections: roughly, a 10\% increase in mobility correlates with a 5\% increase in the rate of infection. Our results suggest that mobility is an important factor explaining differences in infections rates between high and low incomes areas within the city. Further, they confirm the challenges of reducing mobility in lower-income communities, where people generate their income from their daily work. To be effective, shelter-in-place restrictions in municipalities of low socioeconomic levels may need to be complemented by other supporting measures that enable their inhabitants to increase compliance.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2021

Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms

Two-sided marketplace platforms often run experiments to test the effect of an intervention before launching it platform-wide. A typical approach is to randomize individuals into the treatment group, which receives the intervention, and the control group, which does not. The platform then compares the performance in the two groups to estimate the effect if the intervention were launched to everyone. We focus on two common experiment types, where the platform randomizes individuals either on the supply side or on the demand side. The resulting estimates of the treatment effect in these experiments are typically biased: because individuals in the market compete with each other, individuals in the treatment group affect those in the control group and vice versa, creating interference. We develop a simple tractable market model to study bias and variance in these experiments with interference. We focus on two choices available to the platform: (1) Which side of the platform should it randomize on (supply or demand)? (2) What proportion of individuals should be allocated to treatment? We find that both choices affect the bias and variance of the resulting estimators but in different ways. The bias-optimal choice of experiment type depends on the relative amounts of supply and demand in the market, and we discuss how a platform can use market data to select the experiment type. Importantly, we find in many circumstances, choosing the bias-optimal experiment type has little effect on variance. On the other hand, the choice of treatment proportion can induce a bias-variance tradeoff, where the bias-minimizing proportion increases variance. We discuss how a platform can navigate this tradeoff and best choose the treatment proportion, using a combination of modeling as well as contextual knowledge about the market, the risk of the intervention, and reasonable effect sizes of the intervention.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2011

Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players: Existence, Approximation, and Market Structure

In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well known that MPE computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. We instead consider the notion of stationary equilibrium (SE), where players optimize assuming the empirical distribution of others' states remains constant at its long run average. We make two main contributions. First, we provide a rigorous justification for using SE. In particular, we provide a parsimonious collection of exogenous conditions over model primitives that guarantee existence of SE, and ensure that an appropriate approximation property to MPE holds, in a general model with possibly unbounded state spaces. Second, we draw a significant connection between the validity of SE, and market structure: under the same conditions that imply SE exist and approximates MPE well, the market becomes fragmented in the limit of many firms. To illustrate this connection, we study in detail a series of dynamic oligopoly examples. These examples show that our conditions enforce a form of "decreasing returns to larger states"; this yields fragmented industries in the limit. By contrast, violation of these conditions suggests "increasing returns to larger states" and potential market concentration. In that sense, our work uses a fully dynamic framework to also contribute to a longstanding issue in industrial organization: understanding the determinants of market structure in different industries.

cs.GT↗