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Gangzhen Qian

Publications and source records attributed to Gangzhen Qian.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Trust, but Validate the Instrument: Auditing AI-Generated RTL Verification Plans on Authored Security-Regression Proxies

AI-generated RTL verification plans can satisfy a provider schema yet fail at the boundary to trusted execution. We present SecTB-RTL, an auditable framework covering 31 tasks and 124 authored hardware-security regressions. A deterministic non-AI baseline killed 36, 75, and 78 mutants at increasing resource limits. The first confirmatory run (C1-R2) failed before model execution because the provider rejected its response schema. After a schema-only repair made without viewing outcomes, a separately frozen follow-up run (C1-R3) completed 1,860 calls. The provider accepted 1,857 responses, but only nine passed the production semantic validator. The generation and execution rules did not match. We therefore preserve the run as an instrument-validation incident and report no prompt-effect estimate. This incident shows that provider or schema acceptance does not establish execution validity. Compilation and coverage are only diagnostics; the exact saved artifact must pass the full production path. A subsequent follow-up is excluded because it did not satisfy the preregistered evidence-completeness gate and is treated only as future work. We release the benchmark, failure-preserving contract, incident provenance, and governance controls needed to prevent infrastructure behavior from being misreported as model behavior.

cs.CR

Query-Aware Source-Risk Triage for Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines may omit a source's material relationship to the query. We study a pre-generation triage layer that treats this relationship as query dependent. The method routes canonical query families for enhanced review and assigns retrieved pages to pass, contextualize, exclude, or review. It combines a four-dimension page score, rank-discounted family aggregation, intent-preserving query mutations, and a family-held-out router. A single-coded pilot of 200 real URLs supplies provisional calibration anchors; a 20,000-row scenario with synthetic domain identifiers supports controlled workload analysis. An oracle page gate defines a risk-coverage target for a future learned classifier. The evaluation shows why page-level frequency cannot substitute for family-level exposure and quantifies how calibration changes scenario activation. Annotation reliability remains unmeasured, and synthetic rankings omit real retrieval dynamics. The result is an auditable triage method and validation plan, not an estimate of deployed review workload, live-Web prevalence, or downstream answer-quality gains.

cs.AI

IBBench-Light: A Paired Evaluation of Task-Conditioned Responses to External Directives

An external record may contain a procedure to apply or text to read, depending on the user's request. IBBench-Light tests both uses against the same record. Twelve semantic bases yield 144 matched pairs per model; four quantized instruction models produced 1,152 archived greedy responses. Paired exact-contract accuracy (PECA) requires both members to satisfy their output contracts. Qwen succeeds on 132 execute and 109 process prompts, but only 97 complete pairs, showing what marginal averages omit. We audit literal-target exposure and case normalization, then add 1,722 logged CPU generations to test directive-absent controls, twelve additional semantic bases, within-base wording changes, and generation stopping. In the pinned Phi rerun, changing the end-of-sequence (EOS) set changes exact paired success from 0/144 to 62/144. A bounded IHEval comparison uses the same SmolLM2 checkpoint and output budget while preserving its published instruction roles and scorer. The benchmark measures conditional task and output-contract success. Its task margins and paired count need to be read together with the stopping policy.

cs.AI

Protocol effects on feature-based hardware-Trojan detection across Trust-Hub families

Trust-Hub reuses host circuits: several files differ mainly in the inserted Trojan. When gates from sibling variants enter both training and test folds, a detector can benefit from host logic it has already seen. We measure that effect instead of proposing another classifier. The corpus contains 49,124 gates from 16 netlists grouped into five host families. We left the parser, 36 gate features, class weighting, model settings, threshold, and family-level aggregation unchanged and altered one choice: the test boundary. The three settings draw test gates from the pooled corpus, withhold a complete netlist, or withhold every variant of one host. The choice matters. Random forest records F1/AP of 0.914/0.978 with pooled gates, 0.636/0.851 with one netlist held out, and 0.460/0.577 with a host family held out. XGBoost falls from 0.946/0.976 to 0.464/0.544 across the same comparison. Logistic regression loses AP, although its fixed-threshold F1 is not monotonic. Each family shows the same pooled-to-family direction. Feature removal, repeated model and simulator seeds, score normalization, parser-related exclusions, and a smaller sample change the size of the gap without reversing it. Aggregation also matters: a gate-weighted average is dominated by the larger ISCAS files, so the headline values give each host family one vote. Bootstrap and jackknife summaries keep the gap positive, but their folds reuse training families. We treat the five family rows as descriptive evidence rather than independent trials. Five host families are too few for a population claim, and the experiment says nothing about transfer to a new cell library or an industrial design. It supports a narrower conclusion: sibling benchmark variants can inflate apparent transfer. Benchmarks with several variants of one host circuit should report family-aware holdouts and all five family results beside pooled scores.

cs.LG