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Gao Yuze

Publications and source records attributed to Gao Yuze.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

SoK: Are LLMs Reliable at Source Code Recovery? A Taxonomy and Empirical Evaluation

Effective source recovery is critical to security applications such as malware analysis, vulnerability assessment, and legacy maintenance. Large Language Models (LLMs) are reshaping this field, shifting the paradigm away from rule-based heuristics to probabilistic and high fidelity semantic recovery of source code from assembly or classical decompiler-derived pseudo-C. However, despite rapid progress, the field suffers from fragmentation across numerous approaches as well as their non-unified evaluations, limiting objective comparisons. Further, existing works have limited coverage of embedded, IoT architectures and source languages beyond C/C++. In this work, we present the first Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) focused specifically on LLM-assisted binary-to-source recovery. We provide a granular design-centric taxonomy of LLM-assisted source recovery methods and systematic evaluations using seven key metrics along six evaluation dimensions. We evaluate state-of-the-art methods on 45,000 test samples derived from four standard and five embedded architectures, five optimization levels, and symbol stripping. We ablate the impact of design choices on recovery performance, including input representation, contextual enrichment, model scale, iteration and review roles using controlled in-house recovery pipelines and three off-the-shelf models. Finally, we test same-language and cross-language recovery capability covering four mature and two legacy languages. Our systematization and comprehensive evaluations provide key insights that guide future directions in this field.

cs.CR↗

The Distributed Detectability Band Against Marginal-Preserving Attacks

AI-control monitors score individual agent actions to detect misbehavior, but real harm can be distributed across many benign-looking steps, each individually below any per-step alarm. We construct a marginal-preserving, correlation-encoded distributed-sabotage attack using a Gaussian-copula AR(1) construction: the per-step monitor-score marginal is held exactly equal to benign, so mean, max, top-k tail, and threshold monitors (Monitor A) are defeated by construction, while harm is encoded in the temporal correlation structure. We sequence the paper around three reviewer-mandated gates. (1) Realizability gate: the stealthy attack achieves KS-distance to benign of 0.013 (effectively zero) at all tested harm levels up to 3.0, confirming that harm is fully decoupled from the per-step marginal and realizability is not harm-limited. (2) Monitor-A-vs-B reconciliation: we show formally that the attack, built against Monitor A's score marginal, remains marginal-preserving under a different-score Monitor B (the correlation/sequence family: CUSUM, SPRT, HMM-LR, runs test, autocorrelation, windowed logistic), and scope worst-case claims to score functions that admit a temporal signature. (3) Non-empty detectability band: Monitor A achieves AUC 0.52 (chance); Monitor B spans AUC 0.79-0.97 at the same 1% FPR target, and as harm is amortized over more steps Monitor A collapses to chance while Monitor B holds at AUC ~0.95. These results demonstrate a non-empty detectability band and characterize the sub-threshold sabotage frontier: distribution-shape monitors fail by construction; temporal-correlation monitors can detect but are not trivially optimal.

cs.CR↗