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Garret Castro

Publications and source records attributed to Garret Castro.

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Improving Capstone Team Outcomes through Dynamic Skill Matching and Preference Alignment

Team-based projects are a cornerstone of engineering and computing courses, but unstructured team formation often leads to poor project outcomes due to misaligned student interests and inadequate skill coverage. This paper introduces a novel, three-stage methodology for creating effective student teams by integrating student preferences with project skill requirements. In the first stage, students complete a survey to report their project interests and self-assessed skills. Next, a Large Language Model (LLM) analyzes project descriptions to extract the necessary skills for each project's success. Finally, a dynamic assignment algorithm matches students to projects, simultaneously maximizing skill coverage and preference alignment. The algorithm iteratively prioritizes projects with unfulfilled skill needs to optimize team balance. Preliminary evaluations show our approach produces teams with higher skill coverage and better preference satisfaction compared to random or manual assignment approaches. Our approach also overcomes limitations of widely-used tools like CATME Team-Maker, which do not explicitly account for project skill fulfillment. Our findings point toward an effective and customizable strategy for improving student motivation and learning outcomes in project-based courses.

cs.CY

Location-Restricted Stable Matching

Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching problem (LRSM). We show that finding a feasible matching is NP-hard, making finding a feasible and stable matching automatically NP-hard. We then analyze the subproblem where all the projects have the same capacity, and the applicant population of each location is a multiple of the universal project capacity, which mimics more realistic constraints and makes finding a feasible matching in P. Even under these conditions, a stable matching (a matching without blocking pairs) may not exist, so we look for a matching that minimizes the number of blocking pairs. We find that the blocking pair minimization problem for this subproblem is inapproximable within $|A|^{1-\epsilon}$ for $|A|$ agents and provide an $|A|$-approximation algorithm to show this result is almost tight. We extend this result to show that the problem of minimizing the number of agents in blocking pairs is also inapproximable within $|A|^{1-\epsilon}$, and since there are only $|A|$ agents, this result is also almost tight.

cs.DS