arXiv subjects

Genki Ichinose

Publications and source records attributed to Genki Ichinose.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Movement synchronization in complex and dynamic team coordination: Relationship with mutual anticipation

Mutual anticipation of teammates' actions enables efficient interactions in team coordination that achieves a common goal and high performance. In team sports involving direct competition, such implicit and non-verbal interactions within short periods are required. If players begin moving only after observing their teammates, gaps may emerge, allowing opponents to interfere. When mutual anticipation functions properly, players' interactions are smooth without gaps, and their movements are expected to become synchronized. Synchronization represents a temporally stable structure in interactions and its mechanisms have been examined in previous studies. However, few studies have investigated synchronization in real-world coordination involving heterogeneous roles and interactions evolving over time, or quantitatively examined how temporally stable structures differ from a baseline. In our approach, we utilized team sports and introduced a statistical method to probabilistically examine these differences. The purpose of this study was to extract the temporal components of movement using 3-on-3 basketball. We calculated the relative phases in which players approached or moved away from their teammates during mini-games in a field experiment that investigated the effects of advice on offensive coordination. These frequency distributions were estimated using Bayesian inference and were compared before and after advice. The results showed that the probability of a synchronization trend among the offensive players after advice compared with before advice reached 70\% or higher. This may be a typical case that is related to mutual anticipation based on the team strategy established through coaching. These findings contribute to a quantitative understanding of coordination processes.

stat.OT↗

arXiv2026

Effects of personality steering on cooperative behavior in Large Language Model agents

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as autonomous agents in strategic and social interactions. Although recent studies suggest that assigning personality traits to LLMs can influence their behavior, how personality steering affects cooperation under controlled conditions remains unclear. In this study, we examine the effects of personality steering on cooperative behavior in LLM agents using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Based on the Big Five framework, we first measure basic personality scores of three models, GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4o, and GPT-5, using the Big Five Inventory. We then compare behavior under baseline and personality-informed conditions, and further analyze the effects of independently manipulating each personality dimension to extreme values. Our results show that agreeableness is the dominant factor promoting cooperation across all models, while other personality traits have limited impact. Explicit personality information increases cooperation but can also raise vulnerability to exploitation, particularly in earlier-generation models. In contrast, later-generation models exhibit more selective cooperation. These findings indicate that personality steering acts as a behavioral bias rather than a deterministic control mechanism.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Autocratic strategies in Cournot oligopoly game

An oligopoly is a market in which the price of goods is controlled by a few firms. Cournot introduced the simplest game-theoretic model of oligopoly, where profit-maximizing behavior of each firm results in market failure. Furthermore, when the Cournot oligopoly game is infinitely repeated, firms can tacitly collude to monopolize the market. Such tacit collusion is realized by the same mechanism as direct reciprocity in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game, where mutual cooperation can be realized whereas defection is favorable for both prisoners in a one-shot game. Recently, in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game, a class of strategies called zero-determinant strategies attracts much attention in the context of direct reciprocity. Zero-determinant strategies are autocratic strategies which unilaterally control payoffs of players by enforcing linear relationships between payoffs. There were many attempts to find zero-determinant strategies in other games and to extend them so as to apply them to broader situations. In this paper, first, we show that zero-determinant strategies exist even in the repeated Cournot oligopoly game, and that they are quite different from those in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Especially, we prove that a fair zero-determinant strategy exists, which is guaranteed to obtain the average payoff of the opponents. Second, we numerically show that the fair zero-determinant strategy can be used to promote collusion when it is used against an adaptively learning player, whereas it cannot promote collusion when it is used against two adaptively learning players. Our findings elucidate some negative impact of zero-determinant strategies in the oligopoly market.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Analysis of Line Break prediction models for detecting defensive breakthrough in football

In football, attacking teams attempt to break through the opponent's defensive line to create scoring opportunities. This action, known as a Line Break, is a critical indicator of offensive effectiveness and tactical performance, yet previous studies have mainly focused on shots or goal opportunities rather than on how teams break the defensive line. In this study, we develop a machine learning model to predict Line Breaks using event and tracking data from the 2023 J1 League season. The model incorporates 189 features, including player positions, velocities, and spatial configurations, and employs an XGBoost classifier to estimate the probability of Line Breaks. The proposed model achieved high predictive accuracy, with an AUC of 0.982 and a Brier score of 0.015. Furthermore, SHAP analysis revealed that factors such as offensive player speed, gaps in the defensive line, and offensive players' spatial distributions significantly contribute to the occurrence of Line Breaks. Finally, we found a moderate positive correlation between the predicted probability of being Line-Broken and the number of shots and crosses conceded at the team level. These results suggest that Line Breaks are closely linked to the creation of scoring opportunities and provide a quantitative framework for understanding tactical dynamics in football.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Effects of non-uniform number of actions by Hawkes process on spatial cooperation

The emergence of cooperative behavior, despite natural selection favoring rational self-interest, presents a significant evolutionary puzzle. Evolutionary game theory elucidates why cooperative behavior can be advantageous for survival. However, the impact of non-uniformity in the frequency of actions, particularly when actions are altered in the short term, has received little scholarly attention. To demonstrate the relationship between the non-uniformity in the frequency of actions and the evolution of cooperation, we conducted multi-agent simulations of evolutionary games. In our model, each agent performs actions in a chain-reaction, resulting in a non-uniform distribution of the number of actions. To achieve a variety of non-uniform action frequency, we introduced two types of chain-reaction rules: one where an agent's actions trigger subsequent actions, and another where an agent's actions depend on the actions of others. Our results revealed that cooperation evolves more effectively in scenarios with even slight non-uniformity in action frequency compared to completely uniform cases. In addition, scenarios where agents' actions are primarily triggered by their own previous actions more effectively support cooperation, whereas those triggered by others' actions are less effective. This implies that a few highly active individuals contribute positively to cooperation, while the tendency to follow others' actions can hinder it.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2023

Coevolution of social norms and cooperation in public and private situations

Cooperation in human society is sustained by reputation. In general, the reputation of an individual is determined by others who observe his behavior, but this rarely happens in private situations. This may cause people to behave inconsistently, cooperating in public and not cooperating in private. A previous experiment showed that people gave a lower reputation to an individual who cooperated in public but defected in private rather than a consistently uncooperative individual regardless of public and private situations. However, the reason behind this is unclear. Here, we study how cooperation and the reputational mechanism co-evolve on the condition that two types of interaction (public and private) exist. The simulation results show that the evolved social norm is characterized by at least one of the following: preference for consistent or aversion of inconsistent behavior in both interactions when the risk that behaviors in private interactions are observed exceeds a certain threshold. We also find that such social norms promote cooperation in private situations as well as in public ones.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

How Lévy flights triggered by presence of defectors affect evolution of cooperation in spatial games

Cooperation among individuals has been key to sustaining societies. However, natural selection favors defection over cooperation. Cooperation can be favored when the mobility of individuals allows cooperators to form a cluster (or group). Mobility patterns of animals sometimes follow a Lévy flight. A Lévy flight is a kind of random walk but it is composed of many small movements with a few big movements. The role of Lévy flights for cooperation has been studied by Antonioni and Tomassini. They showed that Lévy flights promoted cooperation combined with conditional movements triggered by neighboring defectors. However, the optimal condition for neighboring defectors and how the condition changes by the intensity of Lévy flights are still unclear. Here, we developed an agent-based model in a square lattice where agents perform Lévy flights depending on the fraction of neighboring defectors. We systematically studied the relationships among three factors for cooperation: sensitivity to defectors, the intensity of Lévy flights, and population density. Results of evolutionary simulations showed that moderate sensitivity most promoted cooperation. Then, we found that the shortest movements were best for cooperation when the sensitivity to defectors was high. In contrast, when the sensitivity was low, longer movements were best for cooperation. Thus, Lévy flights, the balance between short and long jumps, promoted cooperation in any sensitivity, which was confirmed by evolutionary simulations. Finally, as the population density became larger, higher sensitivity was more beneficial for cooperation to evolve. Our study highlights that Lévy flights are an optimal searching strategy not only for foraging but also for constructing cooperative relationships with others.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2022

Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Long-term cooperation, competition, or exploitation among individuals can be modeled through repeated games. In repeated games, Press and Dyson discovered zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that enforce a special relationship between two players. This special relationship implies that a ZD player can unilaterally impose a linear payoff relationship to the opponent regardless of the opponent's strategies. A ZD player also has a property that can lead the opponent to an unconditional cooperation if the opponent tries to improve its payoff. This property has been mathematically confirmed by Chen and Zinger. Humans often underestimate a payoff obtained in the future. However, such discounting was not considered in their analysis. Here, we mathematically explored whether a ZD player can lead the opponent to an unconditional cooperation even if a discount factor is incorporated. Specifically, we represented the expected payoff with a discount factor as the form of determinants and calculated whether the values obtained by partially differentiating each factor in the strategy vector become positive. As a result, we proved that the strategy vector ends up as an unconditional cooperation even when starting from any initial strategy. This result was confirmed through numerical calculations. We extended the applicability of ZD strategies to real world problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games

Repeated games are useful models to analyze long term interactions of living species and complex social phenomena. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated games discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 enforce a linear payoff relationship between a focal player and the opponent. This linear relationship can be set arbitrarily by a ZD player. Hence, a subclass of ZD strategies can fix the opponent's expected payoff and another subclass of the strategies can exceed the opponent for the expected payoff. Since this discovery, theories for ZD strategies are extended to cope with various natural situations. It is especially important to consider the theory of ZD strategies for repeated games with a discount factor and observation errors because it allows the theory to be applicable in the real world. Recent studies revealed their existence of ZD strategies even in repeated games with both factors. However, the conditions for the existence has not been sufficiently analyzed. Here, we mathematically analyzed the conditions in repeated games with both factors. First, we derived the thresholds of a discount factor and observation errors which ensure the existence of Equalizer and positively correlated ZD (pcZD) strategies, which are well-known subclasses of ZD strategies. We found that ZD strategies exist only when a discount factor remains high as the error rates increase. Next, we derived the conditions for the expected payoff of the opponent enforced by Equalizer as well as the conditions for the slope and base line payoff of linear lines enforced by pcZD. As a result, we found that, as error rates increase or a discount factor decreases, the conditions for the linear line that Equalizer or pcZD can enforce become strict.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2020

Robustness of football passing networks against continuous node and link removals

We can construct passing networks when we regard a player as a node and a pass as a link in football games. Thus, we can analyze the networks by using tools developed in network science. Among various metrics characterizing a network, centrality metrics have often been used to identify key players in a passing network. However, a tolerance to players being marked or passes being blocked in a passing network, namely the robustness of the network, has been poorly understood so far. Because the robustness of a passing network can be connected to the increase of ball possession, it would be deeply related to the outcome of a game. Here, we developed position-dependent passing networks of 45 matches by 18 teams belonging to the Japan Professional Football League. Then, nodes or links were continuously removed from the passing networks by two removal methods so that we could evaluate the robustness of these networks against the removals. The results show that these passing networks commonly contain hubs (key players making passes). Then, we analyzed the most robust networks in detail and found that their full backs increase the robustness by often invoking a heavier emphasis on attack. Moreover, we showed that the robustness of the passing networks and the team performance have a positive correlation.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2020

Winning by hiding behind others: An analysis of speed skating data

In some athletic races, such as cycling and types of speed skating races, athletes have to complete a relatively long distance at a high speed in the presence of direct opponents. To win such a race, athletes are motivated to hide behind others to suppress energy consumption before a final moment of the race. This situation seems to produce a social dilemma: players want to hide behind others, whereas if a group of players attempts to do so, they may all lose to other players that overtake them. To support that speed skaters are involved in such a social dilemma, we analyzed video footage data for 14 mass start skating races to find that skaters that hid behind others to avoid air resistance for a long time before the final lap tended to win. Furthermore, the finish rank of the skaters in mass start races was independent of the record of the same skaters in time-trial races measured in the absence of direct opponents. The results suggest that how to strategically cope with a skater's dilemma may be a key determinant for winning long-distance and high-speed races with direct opponents.

stat.OT↗

arXiv2020

Cellular automaton model with turning behavior in crowd evacuation

Effective evacuation policies in emergency situations are important to save lives. To develop such policies, simulation models based on cellular automata have been used for crowd evacuation dynamics. In most previous studies of crowd evacuations, an evacuee is represented by a $1 \times 1$ square. However, a rectangle ($1 \times 2$) representation is more suitable for such models than the square representation because of evacuees' shoulder width. The rectangle representation gives two new features to evacuees' behaviors: moving sideways and turning. We study the effects of these behaviors on crowd evacuation dynamics. Hence, we constructed a cellular automaton model where evacuees whose shoulder widths are $1 \times 2$ try to escape from a room in an emergency situation. The simulation results showed that turning behavior can make the evacuation time shorter and there is an optimal turning rate for the crowd evacuation. Our findings contribute to the effective control of evacuees in emergency situations.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2019

Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD) game with no errors, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies allow a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player's own payoff and the opponent's payoff regardless of the strategy that the opponent implements. In contrast, unconditional strategies such as ALLD and ALLC also unilaterally set a linear payoff relationship. Errors often happen between players in the real world. However, little is known about the existence of such strategies in the RPD game with errors. Here, we analytically search for all strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship under observation errors in the RPD game. As a result, we found that, even in the case with observation errors, the only strategy sets that enforce a linear payoff relationship are either ZD strategies or unconditional strategies and that no other strategies can enforce it, which were numerically confirmed.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2018

Reduced mobility of infected agents suppresses but lengthens disease in biased random walk

Various theoretical models have been proposed to understand the basic nature of epidemics. Recent studies focus on the effects of mobility to epidemic process. However, uncorrelated random walk is typically assumed as the type of movement. In our daily life, the movement of people sometimes tends to be limited to a certain direction, which can be described by biased random walk. Here, we developed an agent-based model of susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemic process in a 2D continuous space where agents tend to move in a certain direction in addition to random movement. Moreover, we mainly focus on the effect of the reduced mobility of infected agents. Our model assumes that, when people are infected, their movement activity is greatly reduced because they are physically weakened by the disease. By conducting extensive simulations, we found that when the movement of infected people is limited, the final epidemic size becomes small. However, that crucially depended on the movement type of agents. Furthermore, the reduced mobility of infected agents lengthened the duration of the epidemic because the infection progressed slowly.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2018

How mutation alters the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on networks

Cooperation is ubiquitous at every level of living organisms. It is known that spatial (network) structure is a viable mechanism for cooperation to evolve. A recently proposed numerical metric, average gradient of selection (AGoS), a useful tool for interpreting and visualizing evolutionary dynamics on networks, allows simulation results to be visualized on a one-dimensional phase space. However, stochastic mutation of strategies was not considered in the analysis of AGoS. Here we extend AGoS so that it can analyze the evolution of cooperation where mutation may alter strategies of individuals on networks. We show that our extended AGoS correctly visualizes the final states of cooperation with mutation in the individual-based simulations. Our analyses revealed that mutation always has a negative effect on the evolution of cooperation regardless of the payoff functions, fraction of cooperators, and network structures. Moreover, we found that scale-free networks are the most vulnerable to mutation and thus the dynamics of cooperation are altered from bistability to coexistence on those networks, undergoing an imperfect pitchfork bifurcation.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2018

Evolution of Human-like Social Grooming Strategies regarding Richness and Group Size

Human beings tend to cooperate with close friends, therefore they have to construct strong social relationships to recieve cooperation from others. Therefore they should have acquired their strategies of social relationship construction through an evolutionary process. The behavior of social relationship construction is know as "social grooming." In this paper, we show that there are four classes including a human-like strategy in evolutionary dynamics of social grooming strategies based on an evolutionary game simulation. Social relationship strengths (as measured by frequency of social grooming) often show a much skewed distribution (a power law distribution). It may be due to time costs constraints on social grooming, because the costs are too large to ignore for having many strong social relationships. Evolution of humans' strategies of construction of social relationships may explain the origin of human intelligence based on a social brain hypothesis. We constructed an individual-based model to explore the evolutionary dynamics of social grooming strategies. The model is based on behavior to win over others by strengthening social relationships with cooperators. The results of evolutionary simulations show the four classes of evolutionary dynamics. The results depend on total resources and the ratio of each cooperator's resource to the number of cooperators. One of the four classes is similar to a human strategy, i.e. the strategies based on the Yule--Simon process of power law.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2018

Network flow of mobile agents enhances the evolution of cooperation

We study the effect of contingent movement on the persistence of cooperation on complex networks with empty nodes. Each agent plays Prisoner's Dilemma game with its neighbors and then it either updates the strategy depending on the payoff difference with neighbors or it moves to another empty node if not satisfied with its own payoff. If no neighboring node is empty, each agent stays at the same site. By extensive evolutionary simulations, we show that the medium density of agents enhances cooperation where the network flow of mobile agents is also medium. Moreover, if the movements of agents are more frequent than the strategy updating, cooperation is further promoted. In scale-free networks, the optimal density for cooperation is lower than other networks because agents get stuck at hubs. Our study suggests that keeping a smooth network flow is significant for the persistence of cooperation in ever-changing societies.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2017

Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games, where a player would keep cooperation to avoid being retaliated by a co-player in the future. So-called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies enable a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player's own payoff and the co-player's payoff regardless of the strategy of the co-player. In the present study, we analytically study zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated (two-person) prisoner's dilemma games with a general payoff matrix. Our results are as follows. First, we present the forms of solutions that extend the known results for infinitely repeated games (with a discount factor w of unity) to the case of finitely repeated games (0 < w < 1). Second, for the three most prominent ZD strategies, the equalizers, extortioners, and generous strategies, we derive the threshold value of w above which the ZD strategies exist. Third, we show that the only strategies that enforce a linear relationship between the two players' payoffs are either the ZD strategies or unconditional strategies, where the latter independently cooperates with a fixed probability in each round of the game, proving a conjecture previously made for infinitely repeated games.

q-bio.PE↗