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George Bissias

Publications and source records attributed to George Bissias.

17 recordsLinked to original sources

Contrastive Privacy: A Semantic Approach to Measuring Privacy of AI-based Sanitization

AI-based sanitization can remove concepts from images and text, but privacy evaluation remains largely ad hoc. We propose contrastive privacy, a formal definition that yields a quantitative test with a semantic interpretation. Under formal assumptions, we derive a conditional sufficiency result for a class of sanitized renderings (i.e., media files). We operationalize the definition using imperfect semantic-distance models such as CLIP. The test compares sanitized renderings under audit with both the original and sanitized versions of reference renderings known to contain privacy-relevant properties; if the rendering under audit is semantically closer to the unsanitized reference, then the former might leak private information even after sanitization. Importantly, the test is able to conditionally audit an abstract privacy target without enumerating its constituent properties or requiring per-item ground-truth labels; results remain relative to the chosen models and data. We evaluate 34 image-sanitization configurations, 15 social-media text models and one entity recognizer, and four off-the-shelf PII sanitizers on Enron emails. The tests detect residual semantic associations in every setting, including all four PII tools even when they sanitize every candidate their detectors return. Two further studies examine sensitivity to the semantic-distance model. For a synthetic identity, fine-tuning reveals target associations missed by the base model; after broader sanitization, the adapted test detects none. Across 94 matched image collections sanitized to conceal Leonardo DiCaprio's identity, three models yield broadly correlated assessments but sometimes disagree on which sanitizations appear most private. These findings support using multiple models and show how contrastive privacy can reveal retained identifiers and identity-revealing context across sanitization methods.

cs.CR

On the admissibility of bounds on the mean of discrete, scalar probability distributions from an iid sample

We address the problem of producing a lower bound for the mean of a discrete probability distribution, with known support over a finite set of real numbers, from an iid sample of that distribution. Up to a constant, this is equivalent to bounding the mean of a multinomial distribution (with known support) from a sample of that distribution. Our main contribution is to characterize the complete set of admissible bound functions for any sample space, and to show that certain previously published bounds are admissible. We prove that the solution to each one of a set of simple-to-state optimization problems yields such an admissible bound. Single examples of such bounds, such as the trinomial bound by Miratrix and Stark [2009] have been previously published, but without an analysis of admissibility, and without a discussion of the full set of alternative admissible bounds. In addition to a variety of results about admissible bounds, we prove the non-existence of optimal bounds for sample spaces with supports of size greater than 1 and samples sizes greater than 1.

math.ST

On the Order-Conditional Optimality of Gaffke's Bound

Let $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ be a random vector from any Borel probability law on $\mathbb{R}_+^n$. We revisit the problem of deriving a lower confidence bound (LCB) on a scalar parameter of that law. We recast classical work, beginning with Buehler, in purely probabilistic terms to form a more accessible and extensible framework. We then specialize the framework to the case where the components of $X$ are independent. In this context, we prove that Gaffke's bound is Buehler optimal for the order that it induces with respect to the maximum marginal mean parameter: $max_{i \in [n]} E_Q[X_i]$, which reduces to the common mean when the $X_i$ are independent and identically distributed. That is to say, no other valid LCB that orders samples in the same way as Gaffke's bound can improve on it with respect to this parameter.

math.ST

Algorithms for Approximating Conditionally Optimal Bounds

This work develops algorithms for non-parametric confidence regions for samples from a univariate distribution whose support is a discrete mesh bounded on the left. We generalize the theory of Learned-Miller to preorders over the sample space. In this context, we show that the lexicographic low and lexicographic high orders are in some way extremal in the class of monotone preorders. From this theory we derive several approximation algorithms: 1) Closed form approximations for the lexicographic low and high orders with error tending to zero in the mesh size; 2) A polynomial-time approximation scheme for quantile orders with error tending to zero in the mesh size; 3) Monte Carlo methods for calculating quantile and lexicographic low orders applicable to any mesh size.

stat.CO

Deploying Fair and Efficient Course Allocation Mechanisms

Universities regularly face the challenging task of assigning classes to thousands of students while considering their preferences, along with course schedules and capacities. Ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of course allocation mechanisms is crucial to guaranteeing student satisfaction and optimizing resource utilization. We approach this problem from an economic perspective, using formal justice criteria to evaluate different algorithmic frameworks. To evaluate our frameworks, we conduct a large scale survey of university students at University of Massachusetts Amherst, collecting over 1,000 student preferences. This is, to our knowledge, the largest publicly available dataset of student preferences. We develop software for generating synthetic student preferences over courses, and implement four allocation algorithms: the serial dictatorship algorithm used by University of Massachusetts Amherst; Round Robin; an Integer Linear Program; and the Yankee Swap algorithm. We propose improvements to the Yankee Swap framework to handle scenarios with item multiplicities. Through experimentation with the Fall 2024 Computer Science course schedule at University of Massachusetts Amherst, we evaluate each algorithm's performance relative to standard justice criteria, providing insights into fair course allocation in large university settings.

cs.GT

Tailstorm: A Secure and Fair Blockchain for Cash Transactions

Proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrencies rely on a balance of security and fairness in order to maintain a sustainable ecosystem of miners and users. Users demand fast and consistent transaction confirmation, and in exchange drive the adoption and valuation of the cryptocurrency. Miners provide the confirmations, however, they primarily seek rewards. In unfair systems, miners can amplify their rewards by consolidating mining power. Centralization however, undermines the security guarantees of the system and might discourage users. In this paper we present Tailstorm, a cryptocurrency that strikes this balance. Tailstorm merges multiple recent protocol improvements addressing security, confirmation latency, and throughput with a novel incentive mechanism improving fairness. We implement a parallel proof-of-work consensus mechanism with $k$ PoWs per block to obtain state-of-the-art consistency guarantees. Inspired by Bobtail and Storm, we structure the individual PoWs in a tree which, by including a list of transactions with each PoW, reduces confirmation latency and improves throughput. Our proposed incentive mechanism discounts rewards based on the depth of this tree. Thereby, it effectively punishes information withholding, the core attack strategy used to reap an unfair share of rewards. We back our claims with a comprehensive analysis. We present a generic system model which allows us to specify Bitcoin, $B_k$, and Tailstorm from a joint set of assumptions. We provide an analytical bound for the fairness of Tailstorm and Bitcoin in honest networks and we confirm the results through simulation. We evaluate the effectiveness of dishonest behaviour through reinforcement learning. Our attack search reproduces known optimal strategies against Bitcoin, uncovers new ones against $B_k$, and confirms that Tailstorm's reward discounting makes it more resilient to incentive layer attacks.

cs.CR

Pricing Security in Proof-of-Work Systems

A key component of security in decentralized blockchains is proof of opportunity cost among block producers. In the case of proof-of-work (PoW), currently used by the most prominent systems, the cost is due to spent computation. In this paper, we characterize the security investment of miners in terms of its cost in fiat money. This enables comparison of security allocations across PoW blockchains that generally use different PoW algorithms and reward miners in different cryptocurrency units. We prove that there exists a unique allocation equilibrium, depending on market prices only, that is achieved by both strategic miners (who contemplate the actions of others) and by miners seeking only short-term profit. In fact, the latter will unknowingly compensate for any attempt to deliberately shift security allocation away from equilibrium. Our conclusions are supported analytically through the development of a Markov decision process, game theoretical analysis, and derivation of no arbitrage conditions. We corroborate those results with empirical evidence from more than two years of blockchain and price data. Overall agreement is strong. We show that between January 1, 2018 and August 1, 2020, market prices predicted security allocation between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash with error less than 0.6%. And from the beginning of October 2019, until August 1, 2020, market prices predicted security allocation between Bitcoin and Litecoin with error of 0.45%. These results are further corroborated by our establishment of Granger-causality between change in market prices and change in security allocation. To demonstrate the practicality of our results, we describe a trustless oracle that leverages the equilibrium to estimate the price ratios of PoW cryptocurrencies from on-chain information only.

cs.CR

Radium: Improving Dynamic PoW Targeting

Most PoW blockchain protocols operate with a simple mechanism whereby a threshold is set for each block and miners generate block hashes until one of those values falls below the threshold. Although largely effective, this mechanism produces blocks at a highly variable rate and also leaves a blockchain susceptible to chain death, i.e. abandonment in the event that the threshold is set too high to attract any miners. A recent innovation called real-time block rate targeting, or RTT, fixes these problems by reducing the target throughout the mining interval. RTT exhibits much less variable block times and even features the ability to fully adjust the target after each block. However, as we show in this paper, RTT also suffers from a critical vulnerability whereby miners deviate form the protocol to increase their profits. We introduce the Radium protocol, which mitigates this vulnerability in RTT while retaining lower variance block times, responsive target adjustment, and lowering the risk of chain death. We also show that Radium's susceptibility to the doublespend attack and orphaned blocks remains similar to Bitcoin.

cs.CR

Greedy but Cautious: Conditions for Miner Convergence to Resource Allocation Equilibrium

All public blockchains are secured by a proof of opportunity cost among block producers. For example, the security offered by proof-of-work (PoW) systems, like Bitcoin, is due to spent computation; it is work precisely because it cannot be performed for free. In general, more resources provably lost in producing blocks yields more security for the blockchain. When two blockchains share the same mechanism for providing opportunity cost, as is the case when they share the same PoW algorithm, the two chains compete for resources from block producers. Indeed, if there exists a liquid market between resource types, then theoretically all blockchains will compete for resources. In this paper, we show that there exists a resource allocation equilibrium between any two blockchains, which is essentially driven by the fiat value of reward that each chain offers in return for providing security. We go on to prove that this equilibrium is singular and always achieved provided that block producers behave in a greedy, but cautious fashion. The opposite is true when they are overly greedy: resource allocation oscillates in extremes between the two chains. We show that these results hold both in practice and in a block generation simulation. Finally, we demonstrate several applications of this theory including a trustless price-ratio oracle, increased security for blockchains whose coins have lower fiat value, and a quantification of cost to allocating resources away from the equilibrium.

cs.GT

Bobtail: A Proof-of-Work Target that Minimizes Blockchain Mining Variance (Draft)

Blockchain systems are designed to produce blocks at a constant average rate. The most popular systems currently employ a Proof of Work (PoW) algorithm as a means of creating these blocks. Bitcoin produces, on average, one block every 10 minutes. An unfortunate limitation of all deployed PoW blockchain systems is that the time between blocks has high variance. For example, 5% of the time, Bitcoin's inter-block time is at least 40 minutes. This variance impedes the consistent flow of validated transactions through the system. We propose an alternative process for PoW-based block discovery that results in an inter-block time with significantly lower variance. Our algorithm, called Bobtail, generalizes the current algorithm by comparing the mean of the k lowest order statistics to a target. We show that the variance of inter-block times decreases as k increases. If our approach were applied to Bitcoin, about 80% of blocks would be found within 7 to 12 minutes, and nearly every block would be found within 5 to 18 minutes; the average inter-block time would remain at 10 minutes. Further, we show that low-variance mining significantly thwarts doublespend and selfish mining attacks. For Bitcoin and Ethereum currently (k=1), an attacker with 40% of the mining power will succeed with 30% probability when the merchant sets up an embargo of 8 blocks; however, when k>=20, the probability of success falls to less than 1%. Similarly, for Bitcoin and Ethereum currently, a selfish miner with 40% of the mining power will claim about 66% of blocks; however, when k>=5, the same miner will find that selfish mining is less successful than honest mining. The cost of our approach is a larger block header.

cs.CR

Bonded Mining: Difficulty Adjustment by Miner Commitment

Proof-of-work blockchains must implement a difficulty adjustment algorithm (DAA) in order to maintain a consistent inter-arrival time between blocks. Conventional DAAs are essentially feedback controllers, and as such, they are inherently reactive. This approach leaves them susceptible to manipulation and often causes them to either under- or over-correct. We present Bonded Mining, a proactive DAA that works by collecting hash rate commitments secured by bond from miners. The difficulty is set directly from the commitments and the bond is used to penalize miners who deviate from their commitment. We devise a statistical test that is capable of detecting hash rate deviations by utilizing only on-blockchain data. The test is sensitive enough to detect a variety of deviations from commitments, while almost never misclassifying honest miners. We demonstrate in simulation that, under reasonable assumptions, Bonded Mining is more effective at maintaining a target block time than the Bitcoin Cash DAA, one of the newest and most dynamic DAAs currently deployed. In this preliminary work, the lowest hash rate miner our approach supports is 1% of the total and we directly consider only two types of fundamental attacks. Future work will address these limitations.

cs.CR

Ektelo: A Framework for Defining Differentially-Private Computations

The adoption of differential privacy is growing but the complexity of designing private, efficient and accurate algorithms is still high. We propose a novel programming framework and system, Ektelo, for implementing both existing and new privacy algorithms. For the task of answering linear counting queries, we show that nearly all existing algorithms can be composed from operators, each conforming to one of a small number of operator classes. While past programming frameworks have helped to ensure the privacy of programs, the novelty of our framework is its significant support for authoring accurate and efficient (as well as private) programs. After describing the design and architecture of the Ektelo system, we show that Ektelo is expressive, allows for safer implementations through code reuse, and that it allows both privacy novices and experts to easily design algorithms. We demonstrate the use of Ektelo by designing several new state-of-the-art algorithms.

cs.DB

Using Economic Risk to Model Miner Hash Rate Allocation in Cryptocurrencies

Abrupt changes in the miner hash rate applied to a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain can adversely affect user experience and security. Because different PoW blockchains often share hashing algorithms, miners face a complex choice in deciding how to allocate their hash power among chains. We present an economic model that leverages Modern Portfolio Theory to predict a miner's allocation over time using price data and inferred risk tolerance. The model matches actual allocations with mean absolute error within 20% for four out of the top five miners active on both Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH) blockchains. A model of aggregate allocation across those four miners shows excellent agreement in magnitude with the actual aggregate as well a correlation coefficient of 0.649. The accuracy of the aggregate allocation model is also sufficient to explain major historical changes in inter-block time (IBT) for BCH. Because estimates of miner risk are not time-dependent and our model is otherwise price-driven, we are able to use it to anticipate the effect of a major price shock on hash allocation and IBT in the BCH blockchain. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that, despite mitigation by the new difficulty adjustment algorithm, a price drop of 50% could increase the IBT by 50% for at least a day, with a peak delay of 100%.

cs.CR

Estimation of Miner Hash Rates and Consensus on Blockchains (draft)

We make several contributions that quantify the real-time hash rate and therefore the consensus of a blockchain. We show that by using only the hash value of blocks, we can estimate and measure the hash rate of all miners or individual miners, with quanti able accuracy. We apply our techniques to the Ethereum and Bitcoin blockchains; our solution applies to any proof-of-work-based blockchain that relies on a numeric target for the validation of blocks. We also show that if miners regularly broadcast status reports of their partial proof-of- work, the hash rate estimates are signi cantly more accurate at a cost of slightly higher bandwidth. Whether using only the blockchain, or the additional information in status reports, merchants can use our techniques to quantify in real-time the threat of double-spend attacks.

cs.CR

Securing the Assets of Decentralized Applications using Financial Derivatives (DRAFT)

Ethereum contracts can be designed to function as fully decentralized applications called DAPPs. Many DAPPs have already been fielded, including an online marketplace, a role playing game, a prediction market, and an Internet service provider. Unfortunately, DAPPs can be hacked, and the assets they control can be stolen. A recent attack on an Ethereum decentralized application called The DAO demonstrated that smart contract bugs are more than an academic concern. Ether worth tens of millions of US dollars was extracted by an attacker from The DAO, sending the value of its tokens and the overall exchange price of ether tumbling. We present a market-based technique for insuring the ether holdings of a DAPP using futures contracts indexed by the trade price of ether for DAPP tokens. Under fairly general circumstances, our technique is capable of recovering the majority of ether lost from theft with high probability even when all of the ether holdings are stolen; and the only cost to DAPP token holders is an adjustable ether withdrawal fee. If the probability of a margin call in $d$ days is $p$ for a futures contract with 20 times leverage, then our approach will allow for the recovery of half the stolen ether with probability $p$ and a withdrawal fee of 5%. A higher withdrawal fee of 25% allows for more than 80% of the ether to be recovered with probability $p$.

cs.CR

An Analysis of Attacks on Blockchain Consensus

We present and validate a novel mathematical model of the blockchain mining process and use it to conduct an economic evaluation of the double-spend attack, which is fundamental to all blockchain systems. Our analysis focuses on the value of transactions that can be secured under a conventional double-spend attack, both with and without a concurrent eclipse attack. Our model quantifies the importance of several factors that determine the attack's success, including confirmation depth, attacker mining power, and any confirmation deadline set by the merchant. In general, the security of a transaction against a double-spend attack increases roughly logarithmically with the depth of the block, made easier by the increasing sum of coin turned-over (between individuals) in the blocks, but more difficult by the increasing proof of work required. In recent blockchain data, we observed a median block turnover value of 6 BTC. Based on this value, a merchant requiring a single confirmation is protected against only attackers that can increase the current mining power by 1% or less. However, similar analysis shows that a merchant that requires a much longer 72 confirmations (~12 hours) will eliminate all potential profit for any double-spend attacker adding mining power less than 40% of the current mining power.

cs.CR