arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to George Brumpton.
We show that the construction of the linear interferometer in the Supplemental Material of arXiv:1909.09581 is flawed, leading to a generally suboptimal solution. We then provide the correct derivation of the optimal interferometric configuration that achieves the quantum Fisher information limit for imaging N weak incoherent emitters.
Quantum key distribution is often regarded as an unconditionally secure method to exchange a secret key by harnessing fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics. Despite the robustness of key exchange, classical post-processing reveals vulnerabilities that an eavesdropper could target. In particular, many reconciliation protocols correct errors by comparing the parities of subsets between both parties. These communications occur over insecure channels, leaking information that an eavesdropper could exploit. Currently there is no holistic threat model that addresses how parity-leakage during reconciliation might be actively manipulated. In this paper we introduce a new form of attack, namely the Manipulate-and-Observe attack in which the adversary (1) partially intercepts a fraction $\rho$ of the qubits during key exchange, injecting the maximally tolerated amount of errors up to the 11 percent error threshold whilst remaining undetected and (2) probes the maximum amount of parity-leakage during reconciliation, and exploits it using a vectorised, parallel brute force filter to shrink the search space from 2n down to as few as a single candidate, for an n-bit reconciled key. We perform simulations of the attack, deploying it on the most widely used protocol, BB84, andthe benchmark reconciliation protocol, Cascade. Our simulation results demonstrate that the attack can significantly reduce the security below the theoretical bound and, in the worst case, fully recover the reconciled key material. The principles of the attack could threaten other parity-based reconciliation schemes, like Low Density Parity Check, which underscores the need for urgent consideration of the combined security of key exchange and post-processing.
We develop a quantum statistical framework for passive optical surface metrology. Modelling a surface as an incoherent ensemble of point emitters imaged through a diffraction-limited system, we employ techniques from quantum parameter estimation and hypothesis testing to derive ultimate bounds for jointly estimating geometrical features and for deciding the presence or absence of surface defects, and we identify optimal measurements from the geometry of the point-spread-function manifold. As a representative application, we analyse a minimal surface crack model based on three point sources and show that spatial mode sorting can simultaneously enable near-quantum-limited estimation of crack width and depth and markedly enhanced detectability of the crack, compared with direct imaging. Our results pave the way towards enhanced optical inspection and characterisation of sub-diffraction surface features by probing a limited number of spatial modes without any illumination control.
We analyse a central broadcast continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol in which a beam produced by a thermal source is used to create a secret key between two parties, Alice and Bob. A beam splitter divides the initial beam into a pair of output beams, which are sent to Alice and Bob, with Eve intercepting Bob's beam. We investigate the protocol in detail, calculating mutual informations through a pair of analytic methods and comparing the results to the outputs of a Monte Carlo simulation of the protocol. In a lossless system, we find that a lower bound on the key rate remains positive in the protocol under a beam splitter attack, provided Bob receives a nonzero proportion of the beam initially sent to him. This suggests that the thermal state protocol could be used experimentally to produce secure keys.