arXiv subjects

Georgy Ishmaev

Publications and source records attributed to Georgy Ishmaev.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Ethical Risk Analysis of L2 Rollups

Layer 2 rollups improve throughput and fees, but can reintroduce risk through operator discretion and information asymmetry. We ask which operator and governance designs produce ethically problematic user risk. We adapt Ethical Risk Analysis to rollup architectures, build a role-based taxonomy of decision authority and exposure, and pair the framework with two empirical signals, a cross sectional snapshot of 129 projects from L2BEAT and a hand curated incident set covering 2022 to 2025. We analyze mechanisms that affect risks to users funds, including upgrade timing and exit windows, proposer liveness and whitelisting, forced inclusion usability, and data availability choices. We find that ethical hazards rooted in L2 components control arrangements are widespread: instant upgrades without exit windows appear in about 86 percent of projects, and proposer controls that can freeze withdrawals in about 50 percent. Reported incidents concentrate in sequencer liveness and inclusion, consistent with these dependencies. We translate these findings into ethically grounded suggestions on mitigation strategies including technical components and governance mechanisms.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

MeritRank: Sybil Tolerant Reputation for Merit-based Tokenomics

Decentralized reputation systems are emerging as promising mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of token-based economies. Unlike traditional monetary incentives, these systems reward participants based on the actual value of their contributions to the network. However, the advantages and challenges associated with such systems remain largely unexplored. In this work, we investigate the inherent trade-offs in designing a decentralized reputation system that is simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil-resistant. Specifically, `generalizable' means that the system can assess various types of contributions across different contexts, `trustless' indicates that it functions without the need for a central authority to oversee reputations, and `Sybil-resistant' refers to its ability to withstand manipulations by fake identities, i.e., Sybil attacks. We propose MeritRank, a Sybil-tolerant reputation system based on feedback aggregation from participants. Instead of entirely preventing Sybil attacks, our approach effectively limits the benefits that attackers can gain from such strategies. This is achieved by reducing the perceived value of the attacker's and Sybil nodes' contributions through the application of decay mechanisms -- specifically, transitivity decay, connectivity decay, and epoch decay. Using a dataset of participant interactions in MakerDAO, we conducted experiments to demonstrate the Sybil tolerance of MeritRank.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

Ethics of Blockchain Technologies

This chapter explores three key questions in blockchain ethics. First, it situates blockchain ethics within the broader field of technology ethics, outlining its goals and guiding principles. Second, it examines the unique ethical challenges of blockchain applications, including permissionless systems, incentive mechanisms, and privacy concerns. Key obstacles, such as conceptual modeling and information asymmetries, are identified as critical issues. Finally, the chapter argues that blockchain ethics should be approached as an engineering discipline, emphasizing the analysis and design of trade-offs in complex systems.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

Tit-for-Token: Understanding Fairness when Forwarding Data by Incentivized Peers in Decentralized Storage Networks

Decentralized storage networks offer services with intriguing possibilities to reduce inequalities in an extremely centralized market. The challenge is to conceive incentives that are fair in regard to the income distribution among peers. Despite many systems using tokens to incentivize forwarding data, like Swarm, little is known about the interplay between incentives, storage-, and network-parameters. This paper aims to help fill this gap by developing Tit-for-Token (Tit4Tok), a framework to understand fairness. Tit4Tok realizes a triad of altruism (acts of kindness such as debt forgiveness), reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat's mirroring cooperation), and monetary rewards as desired in the free market. Tit4Tok sheds light on incentives across the accounting and settlement layers. We present a comprehensive exploration of different factors when incentivized peers share bandwidth in a libp2p-based network, including uneven distributions emerging when gateways provide data to users outside the network. We quantified the Income-Fairness with the Gini coefficient, using multiple model instantiations and diverse approaches for debt cancellation. We propose regular changes to the gateway neighborhood and show that our shuffling method improves the Income-Fairness from 0.66 to 0.16. We quantified the non-negligible cost of tolerating free-riding (altruism). The performance is evaluated by extensive computer simulations and using an IPFS workload to study the effects of caching.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2023

LØ: An Accountable Mempool for MEV Resistance

Possible manipulation of user transactions by miners in a permissionless blockchain systems is a growing concern. This problem is a pervasive and systemic issue, known as Miner Extractable Value (MEV), incurs highs costs on users of decentralised applications. Furthermore, transaction manipulations create other issues in blockchain systems such as congestion, higher fees, and system instability. Detecting transaction manipulations is difficult, even though it is known that they originate from the pre-consensus phase of transaction selection for a block building, at the base layer of blockchain protocols. In this paper we summarize known transaction manipulation attacks. We then present LØ, an accountable base layer protocol specifically designed to detect and mitigate transaction manipulations. LØ is built around accurate detection of transaction manipulations and assignment of blame at the granularity of a single mining node. LØ forces miners to log all the transactions they receive into a secure mempool data structure and to process them in a verifiable manner. Overall, LØ quickly and efficiently detects reordering, injection or censorship attempts. Our performance evaluation shows that LØ is also practical and only introduces a marginal performance overhead.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

A Deployment-First Methodology to Mechanism Design and Refinement in Distributed Systems

Catalyzed by the popularity of blockchain technology, there has recently been a renewed interest in the design, implementation and evaluation of decentralized systems. Most of these systems are intended to be deployed at scale and in heterogeneous environments with real users and unpredictable workloads. Nevertheless, most research in this field evaluates such systems in controlled environments that poorly reflect the complex conditions of real-world environments. In this work, we argue that deployment is crucial to understanding decentralized mechanisms in a real-world environment and an enabler to building more robust and sustainable systems. We highlight the merits of deployment by comparing this approach with other experimental setups and show how our lab applied a deployment-first methodology. We then outline how we use Tribler, our peer-to-peer file-sharing application, to deploy and monitor decentralized mechanisms at scale. We illustrate the application of our methodology by describing a deployment trial in experimental tokenomics. Finally, we summarize four lessons learned from multiple deployment trials where we applied our methodology.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

Gromit: Benchmarking the Performance and Scalability of Blockchain Systems

The growing number of implementations of blockchain systems stands in stark contrast with still limited research on a systematic comparison of performance characteristics of these solutions. Such research is crucial for evaluating fundamental trade-offs introduced by novel consensus protocols and their implementations. These performance limitations are commonly analyzed with ad-hoc benchmarking frameworks focused on the consensus algorithm of blockchain systems. However, comparative evaluations of design choices require macro-benchmarks for uniform and comprehensive performance evaluations of blockchains at the system level rather than performance metrics of isolated components. To address this research gap, we implement Gromit, a generic framework for analyzing blockchain systems. Gromit treats each system under test as a transaction fabric where clients issue transactions to validators. We use Gromit to conduct the largest blockchain study to date, involving seven representative systems with varying consensus models. We determine the peak performance of these systems with a synthetic workload in terms of transaction throughput and scalability and show that transaction throughput does not scale with the number of validators. We explore how robust the subjected systems are against network delays and reveal that the performance of permissoned blockchain is highly sensitive to network conditions.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2021

A Truly Self-Sovereign Identity System

Existing digital identity management systems fail to deliver the desirable properties of control by the users of their own identity data, credibility of disclosed identity data, and network-level anonymity. The recently proposed Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) approach promises to give users these properties. However, we argue that without addressing privacy at the network level, SSI systems cannot deliver on this promise. In this paper we present the design and analysis of our solution TCID, created in collaboration with the Dutch government. TCID is a system consisting of a set of components that together satisfy seven functional requirements to guarantee the desirable system properties. We show that the latency incurred by network-level anonymization in TCID is significantly larger than that of identity data disclosure protocols but is still low enough for practical situations. We conclude that current research on SSI is too narrowly focused on these data disclosure protocols.

cs.CR↗