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Gerardo Berbeglia

Publications and source records attributed to Gerardo Berbeglia.

21 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Measuring and Optimizing Cultural Markets

Social influence has been shown to create significant unpredictability in cultural markets, providing one potential explanation why experts routinely fail at predicting commercial success of cultural products. To counteract the difficulty of making accurate predictions, "measure and react" strategies have been advocated but finding a concrete strategy that scales for very large markets has remained elusive so far. Here we propose a "measure and optimize" strategy based on an optimization policy that uses product quality, appeal, and social influence to maximize expected profits in the market at each decision point. Our computational experiments show that our policy leverages social influence to produce significant performance benefits for the market, while our theoretical analysis proves that our policy outperforms in expectation any policy not displaying social information. Our results contrast with earlier work which focused on showing the unpredictability and inequalities created by social influence. Not only do we show for the first time that dynamically showing consumers positive social information under our policy increases the expected performance of the seller in cultural markets. We also show that, in reasonable settings, our policy does not introduce significant unpredictability and identifies "blockbusters". Overall, these results shed new light on the nature of social influence and how it can be leveraged for the benefits of the market.

cs.SI↗

On the Optimality and Predictability of Cultural Markets with Social Influence

Social influence is ubiquitous in cultural markets, from book recommendations in Amazon, to song popularities in iTunes and the ranking of newspaper articles in the online edition of the New York Times to mention only a few. Yet social influence is often presented in a bad light, often because it supposedly increases market unpredictability. Here we study a model of trial-offer markets, in which participants try products and later decide whether to purchase. We consider a simple policy which ranks the products by quality when presenting them to market participants. We show that, in this setting, market efficiency always benefits from social influence. Moreover, we prove that the market converges almost surely to a monopoly for the product of highest quality, making the market both predictable and asymptotically optimal. Computational experiments confirm that the quality ranking policy identifies "blockbusters" in reasonable time, outperforms other policies, and is highly predictable. These results indicate that social influence does not necessarily increase market unpredicatibility. The outcome really depends on how social influence is used.

cs.SI↗

Optimizing Expected Utility in a Multinomial Logit Model with Position Bias and Social Influence

Motivated by applications in retail, online advertising, and cultural markets, this paper studies how to find the optimal assortment and positioning of products subject to a capacity constraint. We prove that the optimal assortment and positioning can be found in polynomial time for a multinomial logit model capturing utilities, position bias, and social influence. Moreover, in a dynamic market, we show that the policy that applies the optimal assortment and positioning and leverages social influence outperforms in expectation any policy not using social influence.

cs.DS↗