arXiv subjects

Gerdus Benadè

Publications and source records attributed to Gerdus Benadè.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Offline Local Search for Online Stochastic Bandits

Combinatorial multi-armed bandits provide a fundamental online decision-making environment where a decision-maker interacts with an environment across $T$ time steps, each time selecting an action and learning the cost of that action. The goal is to minimize regret, defined as the loss compared to the optimal fixed action in hindsight under full-information. There has been substantial interest in leveraging what is known about offline algorithm design in this online setting. Offline greedy and linear optimization algorithms (both exact and approximate) have been shown to provide useful guarantees when deployed online. We investigate local search methods, a broad class of algorithms used widely in both theory and practice, which have thus far been under-explored in this context. We focus on problems where offline local search terminates in an approximately optimal solution and give a generic method for converting such an offline algorithm into an online stochastic combinatorial bandit algorithm with $O(\log^3 T)$ (approximate) regret. In contrast, existing offline-to-online frameworks yield regret (and approximate regret) which depend sub-linearly, but polynomially on $T$. We demonstrate the flexibility of our framework by applying it to three online stochastic combinatorial optimization problems: scheduling to minimize total completion time, finding a minimum cost base of a matroid and uncertain clustering.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations

We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents. Envy-free allocations, in which each agent prefers her bundle to the bundle of every other agent, need not exist in the worst case. However, when agents have additive preferences and the value $v_{i,j}$ of agent $i$ for item $j$ is drawn independently from a distribution $D_i$, envy-free allocations exist with high probability when $m \in Ω( n \log n / \log \log n )$. In this paper, we study the existence of envy-free allocations under stochastic valuations far beyond the additive setting. We introduce a new stochastic model in which each agent's valuation is sampled by first fixing a worst-case function, and then drawing a uniformly random renaming of the items, independently for each agent. This strictly generalizes known settings; for example, $v_{i,j} \sim D_i$ may be seen as picking a random (instead of a worst-case) additive function before renaming. We prove that random renaming is sufficient to ensure that envy-free allocations exist with high probability in very general settings. When valuations are non-negative and ``order-consistent,'' a valuation class that generalizes additive, budget-additive, unit-demand, and single-minded agents, SD-envy-free allocations (a stronger notion of fairness than envy-freeness) exist for $m \in ω(n^2)$ when $n$ divides $m$, and SD-EFX allocations exist for all $m \in ω(n^2)$. The dependence on $n$ is tight, that is, for $m \in O(n^2)$ envy-free allocations don't exist with constant probability. For the case of arbitrary valuations (allowing non-monotone, negative, or mixed-manna valuations) and $n=2$ agents, we prove envy-free allocations exist with probability $1 - Θ(1/m)$ (and this is tight).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too

The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a protocol whose outcomes guarantee partisan fairness. We aim to have the best of both worlds by optimizing an objective subject to a binary fairness constraint. As the fairness constraint we adopt the geometric target, which requires the number of seats won by each party to be at least the average (rounded down) of its outcomes under the worst and best partitions of the state. To study the feasibility of this approach, we introduce a new model of redistricting that closely mirrors the classic model of cake-cutting. This model has two innovative features. First, in any part of the state there is an underlying 'density' of voters with political leanings toward any given party, making it impossible to finely separate voters for different parties into different districts. This captures a realistic constraint that previously existing theoretical models of redistricting tend to ignore. Second, parties may disagree on the distribution of voters - whether by genuine disagreement or attempted strategic behavior. In the absence of a 'ground truth' distribution, a redistricting algorithm must therefore aim to simultaneously be fair to each party with respect to its own reported data. Our main theoretical result is that, surprisingly, the geometric target is always feasible with respect to arbitrarily diverging data sets on how voters are distributed. Any standard for fairness is only useful if it can be readily satisfied in practice. Our empirical results, which use real election data and maps of six US states, demonstrate that the geometric target is always feasible, and that imposing it as a fairness constraint comes at almost no cost to three well-studied optimization objectives.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Participatory Budgeting Design for the Real World

Participatory budgeting engages the public in the process of allocating public money to different types of projects. PB designs differ in how voters are asked to express their preferences over candidate projects and how these preferences are aggregated to determine which projects to fund. This paper studies two fundamental questions in PB design. Which voting format and aggregation method to use, and how to evaluate the outcomes of these design decisions? We conduct an extensive empirical study in which 1 800 participants vote in four participatory budgeting elections in a controlled setting to evaluate the practical effects of the choice of voting format and aggregation rule. We find that k-approval leads to the best user experience. With respect to the aggregation rule, greedy aggregation leads to outcomes that are highly sensitive to the input format used and the fraction of the population that participates. The method of equal shares, in contrast, leads to outcomes that are not sensitive to the type of voting format used, and these outcomes are remarkably stable even when the majority of the population does not participate in the election. These results carry valuable insights for PB practitioners and social choice researchers.

cs.GT↗