arXiv subjects

Gert de Cooman

Publications and source records attributed to Gert de Cooman.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A decision-theoretic approach to dealing with uncertainty in quantum mechanics

We provide a decision-theoretic framework for dealing with uncertainty in quantum mechanics. This uncertainty is two-fold: on the one hand there may be uncertainty about the state the quantum system is in, and on the other hand, as is essential to quantum mechanical uncertainty, even if the quantum state is known, measurements may still produce an uncertain outcome. In our framework, measurements therefore play the role of acts with an uncertain outcome and our simple decision-theoretic postulates ensure that Born's rule is encapsulated in the utility functions associated with such acts. This approach allows us to uncouple (precise) probability theory from quantum mechanics, in the sense that it leaves room for a more general, so-called imprecise probabilities approach. We discuss the mathematical implications of our findings, which allow us to give a decision-theoretic foundation to recent seminal work by Benavoli, Facchini and Zaffalon, and we compare our approach to earlier and different approaches by Deutsch and Wallace.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2025

Conditioning Accept-Desirability models in the context of AGM-like belief change

We discuss conditionalisation for Accept-Desirability models in an abstract decision-making framework, where uncertain rewards live in a general linear space, and events are special projection operators on that linear space. This abstract setting allows us to unify classical and quantum probabilities, and extend them to an imprecise probabilities context. We introduce a new conditioning rule for our Accept-Desirability models, based on the idea that observing an event introduces new indifferences between options. We associate a belief revision operator with our conditioning rule, and investigate which of the AGM axioms for belief revision still hold in our more general framework. We investigate two interesting special cases where all of these axioms are shown to still hold: classical propositional logic and full conditional probabilities.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Conditioning and AGM-like belief change in the Desirability-Indifference framework

We show how the AGM framework for belief change (expansion, revision, contraction) can be extended to deal with conditioning in the so-called Desirability-Indifference framework, based on abstract notions of accepting and rejecting options, as well as on abstract notions of events. This level of abstraction allows us to deal simultaneously with classical and quantum probability theory.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Conditioning through indifference in quantum mechanics

We can learn (more) about the state a quantum system is in through measurements. We look at how to describe the uncertainty about a quantum system's state conditional on executing such measurements. We show that by exploiting the interplay between desirability, coherence and indifference, a general rule for conditioning can be derived. We then apply this rule to conditioning on measurement outcomes, and show how it generalises to conditioning on a set of measurement outcomes.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2024

The logic behind desirable sets of things, and its filter representation

We identify the (filter representation of the) logic behind the recent theory of coherent sets of desirable (sets of) things, which generalise coherent sets of desirable (sets of) gambles as well as coherent choice functions, and show that this identification allows us to establish various representation results for such coherent models in terms of simpler ones.

math.LO↗

arXiv2023

Randomness and imprecision: from supermartingales to randomness tests

We generalise the randomness test definitions in the literature for both the Martin-Löf and Schnorr randomness of a series of binary outcomes, in order to allow for interval-valued rather than merely precise forecasts for these outcomes, and prove that under some computability conditions on the forecasts, our definition of Martin-Löf test randomness can be seen as a special case of Levin's uniform randomness. We show that the resulting randomness notions are, under some computability and non-degeneracy conditions on the forecasts, equivalent to the martingale-theoretic versions we introduced in earlier papers. In addition, we prove that our generalised notion of Martin-Löf randomness can be characterised by universal supermartingales and universal randomness tests.

math.PR↗

arXiv2023

Imprecision in Martingale-Theoretic Prequential Randomness

In a prequential approach to algorithmic randomness, probabilities for the next outcome can be forecast `on the fly' without the need for fully specifying a probability measure on all possible sequences of outcomes, as is the case in the more standard approach. We take the first steps in allowing for probability intervals instead of precise probabilities in this prequential approach, based on ideas from our earlier imprecise-probabilistic and martingale-theoretic account of algorithmic randomness. We define what it means for an infinite sequence $(I_1,x_1,I_2,x_2,\dots)$ of successive interval forecasts $I_k$ and subsequent binary outcomes $x_k$ to be random. We compare the resulting prequential randomness notion with the more standard one, and investigate where both randomness notions coincide, as well as where their properties correspond.

math.PR↗

arXiv2022

On the (dis)similarities between stationary imprecise and non-stationary precise uncertainty models in algorithmic randomness

The field of algorithmic randomness studies what it means for infinite binary sequences to be random for some given uncertainty model. Classically, martingale-theoretic notions of such randomness involve precise uncertainty models, and it is only recently that imprecision has been introduced into this context. As a consequence, the investigation into how imprecision alters our view on martingale-theoretic random sequences has only just begun. In this contribution, where we allow for non-computable uncertainty models, we establish a close and surprising connection between precise and imprecise uncertainty models in this randomness context. In particular, we show that there are stationary imprecise models and non-computable non-stationary precise models that have the exact same set of random sequences. We also give a preliminary discussion of the possible implications of our result for a statistics based on imprecise probabilities, and shed some light on the practical (ir)relevance of both imprecise and non-computable precise uncertainty models in that context.

math.PR↗

arXiv2022

Decision-making with E-admissibility given a finite assessment of choices

Given information about which options a decision-maker definitely rejects from given finite sets of options, we study the implications for decision-making with E-admissibility. This means that from any finite set of options, we reject those options that no probability mass function compatible with the given information gives the highest expected utility. We use the mathematical framework of choice functions to specify choices and rejections, and specify the available information in the form of conditions on such functions. We characterise the most conservative extension of the given information to a choice function that makes choices based on E-admissibility, and provide an algorithm that computes this extension by solving linear feasibility problems.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

The Smallest Probability Interval a Sequence Is Random for: A Study for Six Types of Randomness

There are many randomness notions. On the classical account, many of them are about whether a given infinite binary sequence is random for some given probability. If so, this probability turns out to be the same for all these notions, so comparing them amounts to finding out for which of them a given sequence is random. This changes completely when we consider randomness with respect to probability intervals, because here, a sequence is always random for at least one interval, so the question is not if, but rather for which intervals, a sequence is random. We show that for many randomness notions, every sequence has a smallest interval it is (almost) random for. We study such smallest intervals and use them to compare a number of randomness notions. We establish conditions under which such smallest intervals coincide, and provide examples where they do not.

math.PR↗

arXiv2021

Game-Theoretic Upper Expectations for Discrete-Time Finite-State Uncertain Processes

Game-theoretic upper expectations are joint (global) probability models that mathematically describe the behaviour of uncertain processes in terms of supermartingales; capital processes corresponding to available betting strategies. Compared to (the more common) measure-theoretic expectation functionals, they are not bounded to restrictive assumptions such as measurability or precision, yet succeed in preserving, or even generalising many of their fundamental properties. We focus on a discrete-time setting where local state spaces are finite and, in this specific context, build on the existing work of Shafer and Vovk; the main developers of the framework of game-theoretic upper expectations. In a first part, we study Shafer and Vovk's characterisation of a local upper expectation and show how it is related to Walley's behavioural notion of coherence. The second part consists in a study of game-theoretic upper expectations on a more global level, where several alternative definitions, as well as a broad range of properties are derived, e.g. the law of iterated upper expectations, compatibility with local models, coherence properties,... Our main contribution, however, concerns the continuity behaviour of these operators. We prove continuity with respect to non-increasing sequences of so-called lower cuts and continuity with respect to non-increasing sequences of finitary functions. We moreover show that the game-theoretic upper expectation is uniquely determined by its values on the domain of bounded below limits of finitary functions, and additionally show that, for any such limit, the limiting sequence can be constructed in such a way that the game-theoretic upper expectation is continuous with respect to this particular sequence.

math.PR↗

arXiv2021

Coherent and Archimedean choice in general Banach spaces

I introduce and study a new notion of Archimedeanity for binary and non-binary choice between options that live in an abstract Banach space, through a very general class of choice models, called sets of desirable option sets. In order to be able to bring an important diversity of contexts into the fold, amongst which choice between horse lottery options, I pay special attention to the case where these linear spaces don't include all `constant' options.I consider the frameworks of conservative inference associated with Archimedean (and coherent) choice models, and also pay quite a lot of attention to representation of general (non-binary) choice models in terms of the simpler, binary ones.The representation theorems proved here provide an axiomatic characterisation for, amongst many other choice methods, Levi's E-admissibility and Walley-Sen maximality.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Randomness is inherently imprecise

We use the martingale-theoretic approach of game-theoretic probability to incorporate imprecision into the study of randomness. In particular, we define several notions of randomness associated with interval, rather than precise, forecasting systems, and study their properties. The richer mathematical structure that thus arises lets us, amongst other things, better understand and place existing results for the precise limit. When we focus on constant interval forecasts, we find that every sequence of binary outcomes has an associated filter of intervals it is random for. It may happen that none of these intervals is precise -- a single real number -- which justifies the title of this paper. We illustrate this by showing that randomness associated with non-stationary precise forecasting systems can be captured by a constant interval forecast, which must then be less precise: a gain in model simplicity is thus paid for by a loss in precision. But imprecise randomness can't always be explained away as a result of oversimplification: we show that there are sequences that are random for a constant interval forecast, but never random for any {\comp} (more) precise forecasting system. We also show that the set of sequences that are random for a non-vacuous interval forecasting system is meagre, as it is for precise forecasting systems.

math.PR↗

arXiv2021

On a notion of independence proposed by Teddy Seidenfeld

Teddy Seidenfeld has been arguing for quite a long time that binary preference models are not powerful enough to deal with a number of crucial aspects of imprecision and indeterminacy in uncertain inference and decision making. It is at his insistence that we initiated our study of so-called sets of desirable option sets, which we have argued elsewhere provides an elegant and powerful approach to dealing with general, binary as well as non-binary, decision-making under uncertainty. We use this approach here to explore an interesting notion of irrelevance (and independence), first suggested by Seidenfeld in an example intended as a criticism of a number of specific decision methodologies based on (convex) binary preferences. We show that the consequences of making such an irrelevance or independence assessment are very strong, and might be used to argue for the use of so-called mixing choice functions, and E-admissibility as the resulting decision scheme.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

A Particular Upper Expectation as Global Belief Model for Discrete-Time Finite-State Uncertain Processes

To model discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes, we argue for the use of a global belief model in the form of an upper expectation that is the most conservative one under a set of basic axioms. Our motivation for these axioms, which describe how local and global belief models should be related, is based on two possible interpretations for an upper expectation: a behavioural one similar to Walley's, and an interpretation in terms of upper envelopes of linear expectations. We show that the most conservative upper expectation satisfying our axioms, that is, our model of choice, coincides with a particular version of the game-theoretic upper expectation introduced by Shafer and Vovk. This has two important implications: it guarantees that there is a unique most conservative global belief model satisfying our axioms; and it shows that Shafer and Vovk's model can be given an axiomatic characterisation and thereby provides an alternative motivation for adopting this model, even outside their game-theoretic framework. Finally, we relate our model to the upper expectation resulting from a traditional measure-theoretic approach. We show that this measure-theoretic upper expectation also satisfies the proposed axioms, which implies that it is dominated by our model or, equivalently, the game-theoretic model. Moreover, if all local models are precise, all three models coincide.

math.PR↗

arXiv2020

Computable randomness is about more than probabilities

We introduce a notion of computable randomness for infinite sequences that generalises the classical version in two important ways. First, our definition of computable randomness is associated with imprecise probability models, in the sense that we consider lower expectations (or sets of probabilities) instead of classical 'precise' probabilities. Secondly, instead of binary sequences, we consider sequences whose elements take values in some finite sample space. Interestingly, we find that every sequence is computably random with respect to at least one lower expectation, and that lower expectations that are more informative have fewer computably random sequences. This leads to the intriguing question whether every sequence is computably random with respect to a unique most informative lower expectation. We study this question in some detail and provide a partial answer.

math.PR↗

arXiv2020

Inference with Choice Functions Made Practical

We study how to infer new choices from previous choices in a conservative manner. To make such inferences, we use the theory of choice functions: a unifying mathematical framework for conservative decision making that allows one to impose axioms directly on the represented decisions. We here adopt the coherence axioms of De Bock and De Cooman (2019). We show how to naturally extend any given choice assessment to such a coherent choice function, whenever possible, and use this natural extension to make new choices. We present a practical algorithm to compute this natural extension and provide several methods that can be used to improve its scalability.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Monte Carlo Estimation for Imprecise Probabilities: Basic Properties

We describe Monte Carlo methods for estimating lower envelopes of expectations of real random variables. We prove that the estimation bias is negative and that its absolute value shrinks with increasing sample size. We discuss fairly practical techniques for proving strong consistency of the estimators and use these to prove the consistency of an example in the literature. We also provide an example where there is no consistency.

math.PR↗