arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Gert de Cooman.
We extend de Finetti's [Ann. Inst. H. Poincaré 7 (1937) 1--68] notion of exchangeability to finite and countable sequences of variables, when a subject's beliefs about them are modelled using coherent lower previsions rather than (linear) previsions. We derive representation theorems in both the finite and countable cases, in terms of sampling without and with replacement, respectively.
When the initial and transition probabilities of a finite Markov chain in discrete time are not well known, we should perform a sensitivity analysis. This can be done by considering as basic uncertainty models the so-called credal sets that these probabilities are known or believed to belong to, and by allowing the probabilities to vary over such sets. This leads to the definition of an imprecise Markov chain. We show that the time evolution of such a system can be studied very efficiently using so-called lower and upper expectations, which are equivalent mathematical representations of credal sets. We also study how the inferred credal set about the state at time n evolves as n goes to infinity: under quite unrestrictive conditions, it converges to a uniquely invariant credal set, regardless of the credal set given for the initial state. This leads to a non-trivial generalisation of the classical Perron-Frobenius Theorem to imprecise Markov chains.
A model for a subject's beliefs about a phenomenon may exhibit symmetry, in the sense that it is invariant under certain transformations. On the other hand, such a belief model may be intended to represent that the subject believes or knows that the phenomenon under study exhibits symmetry. We defend the view that these are fundamentally different things, even though the difference cannot be captured by Bayesian belief models. In fact, the failure to distinguish between both situations leads to Laplace's so-called Principle of Insufficient Reason, which has been criticised extensively in the literature. We show that there are belief models (imprecise probability models, coherent lower previsions) that generalise and include the Bayesian belief models, but where this fundamental difference can be captured. This leads to two notions of symmetry for such belief models: weak invariance (representing symmetry of beliefs) and strong invariance (modelling beliefs of symmetry). We discuss various mathematical as well as more philosophical aspects of these notions. We also discuss a few examples to show the relevance of our findings both to probabilistic modelling and to statistical inference, and to the notion of exchangeability in particular.
We study n-monotone functionals, which constitute a generalisation of n-monotone set functions. We investigate their relation to the concepts of exactness and natural extension, which generalise the notions of coherence and natural extension in the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities. We improve upon a number of results in the literature, and prove among other things a representation result for exact n-monotone functionals in terms of Choquet integrals.
We give an overview of two approaches to probability theory where lower and upper probabilities, rather than probabilities, are used: Walley's behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities, and Shafer and Vovk's game-theoretic account of probability. We show that the two theories are more closely related than would be suspected at first sight, and we establish a correspondence between them that (i) has an interesting interpretation, and (ii) allows us to freely import results from one theory into the other. Our approach leads to an account of probability trees and random processes in the framework of Walley's theory. We indicate how our results can be used to reduce the computational complexity of dealing with imprecision in probability trees, and we prove an interesting and quite general version of the weak law of large numbers.
We extend de Finetti's (1937) notion of exchangeability to finite and countable sequences of variables, when a subject's beliefs about them are modelled using coherent lower previsions rather than (linear) previsions. We prove representation theorems in both the finite and the countable case, in terms of sampling without and with replacement, respectively. We also establish a convergence result for sample means of exchangeable sequences. Finally, we study and solve the problem of exchangeable natural extension: how to find the most conservative (point-wise smallest) coherent and exchangeable lower prevision that dominates a given lower prevision.
Currently, there is renewed interest in the problem, raised by Shafer in 1985, of updating probabilities when observations are incomplete. This is a fundamental problem in general, and of particular interest for Bayesian networks. Recently, Grunwald and Halpern have shown that commonly used updating strategies fail in this case, except under very special assumptions. In this paper we propose a new method for updating probabilities with incomplete observations. Our approach is deliberately conservative: we make no assumptions about the so-called incompleteness mechanism that associates complete with incomplete observations. We model our ignorance about this mechanism by a vacuous lower prevision, a tool from the theory of imprecise probabilities, and we use only coherence arguments to turn prior into posterior probabilities. In general, this new approach to updating produces lower and upper posterior probabilities and expectations, as well as partially determinate decisions. This is a logical consequence of the existing ignorance about the incompleteness mechanism. We apply the new approach to the problem of classification of new evidence in probabilistic expert systems, where it leads to a new, so-called conservative updating rule. In the special case of Bayesian networks constructed using expert knowledge, we provide an exact algorithm for classification based on our updating rule, which has linear-time complexity for a class of networks wider than polytrees. This result is then extended to the more general framework of credal networks, where computations are often much harder than with Bayesian nets. Using an example, we show that our rule appears to provide a solid basis for reliable updating with incomplete observations, when no strong assumptions about the incompleteness mechanism are justified.