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Gianluigi Migliavacca

Publications and source records attributed to Gianluigi Migliavacca.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

TSO-DSO Coordination for Flexibility Management Across Voltage Levels

Several sources of flexibility in transmission and, especially, distribution networks are being unlocked by advances in information and communication technologies, aggregators, and new flexibility markets. However, maximizing benefits for both transmission and distribution system operators in a coordinated way requires new algorithms, modeling tools, and modernization of regulatory frameworks. Such approaches must account for uncertainties, the physical and operational constraints of flexibility providers and the grid itself, constraints on information exchange, and scalability, including computational requirements and time constraints. Given the diverse contexts and jurisdictions around the world, there is no single recipe for achieving coordination, but important trends and shared challenges are emerging. This paper surveys the complexities of coordination from technical, market, and technological perspectives, and outlines current practices, proposed approaches, and future research directions to effectively manage, coordinate, model, and leverage flexibility across voltage levels.

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Equilibrium models to analyse the impact of different coordination schemes between TSO and DSOs on market power in sequentially-cleared energy and ancillary services markets under load and renewable generation uncertainty

The current massive installation of distributed resources in electricity distribution systems is transforming these systems into active dispatching subjects. At the same time, the need to compensate for the intermittent generation of an increasing amount of renewable sources creates the need to acquire more ancillary services. Flexible resources in the distribution system could provide these services not only within the perimeter of the distribution network to which they are connected but also for the benefit of the transmission system. However, this requires Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to coordinate their dispatching actions effectively. One critical aspect of this coordination is establishing a market architecture that limits market power. This paper presents an innovative game-theoretic approach to compare different TSO-DSO coordination models for acquiring ancillary services from distribution resources. Several schemes are considered: some with coordinated market management by TSOs and DSOs, others with sequential or independent local markets. For each scheme, the dispatching problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic sequential game, where the first stage is the day-ahead market and the second stage is the balancing market. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by iteratively solving the profit maximization problem of each market player. Numerical tests on a CIGRE benchmark network show that coordination schemes enabling distribution resources to provide ancillary services to the transmission system can significantly increase system costs when congestion occurs in the transmission network.

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