arXiv subjects

Giles Edkins

Publications and source records attributed to Giles Edkins.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

MirrorCode: AI can rebuild entire programs from behavior alone

AI models are rapidly improving at autonomous coding, as shown by benchmark progress and one-off demonstrations such as AI implementing a C compiler. However, existing coding benchmarks tend to focus on shorter tasks, and one-off demonstrations are hard to compare systematically because they often have some human guidance, and are not standardized or repeated across models. To address these challenges, we introduce MirrorCode, a long-horizon coding benchmark based on reimplementing entire software projects. In MirrorCode, AI agents must replicate the functionalities of an existing program, without access to its source code. AI solutions must match the original program's output exactly on end-to-end tests, including held-out tests. MirrorCode's 25 target programs span different areas of computing: Unix utilities, data serialization and query tools, bioinformatics, interpreters, static analysis, cryptography, and compression. Existing AI models can already reimplement complex software, with the strongest model scoring 56% across the benchmark. For example, AI can reimplement gotree, a 16,000-line bioinformatics toolkit - a task that we believe would take weeks for a human engineer. However, studying the frontier of performance requires a larger inference budget than typical benchmarks, for example, \$2,600 over 19 days for a single attempt on a large task. We show that AI agents can already complete long-horizon software engineering tasks, especially when requirements are precisely specified. More broadly, our work suggests AI will have transformative effects on software engineering, as autonomous agents continue to improve.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluated

If AI models can detect when they are being evaluated, the effectiveness of evaluations might be compromised. For example, models could have systematically different behavior during evaluations, leading to less reliable benchmarks for deployment and governance decisions. We investigate whether frontier language models can accurately classify transcripts based on whether they originate from evaluations or real-world deployment, a capability we call evaluation awareness. To achieve this, we construct a diverse benchmark of 1,000 prompts and transcripts from 61 distinct datasets. These span public benchmarks (e.g., MMLU, SWEBench), real-world deployment interactions, and agent trajectories from scaffolding frameworks (e.g., web-browsing agents). Frontier models clearly demonstrate above-random evaluation awareness (Gemini-2.5-Pro reaches an AUC of $0.83$), but do not yet surpass our simple human baseline (AUC of $0.92$). Furthermore, both AI models and humans are better at identifying evaluations in agentic settings compared to chat settings. Additionally, we test whether models can identify the purpose of the evaluation. Under multiple-choice and open-ended questioning, AI models far outperform random chance in identifying what an evaluation is testing for. Our results indicate that frontier models already exhibit a substantial, though not yet superhuman, level of evaluation-awareness. We recommend tracking this capability in future models.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Evaluating Defences against Unsafe Feedback in RLHF

While there has been progress towards aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values and ensuring safe behaviour at inference time, safety guards can easily be removed when fine tuned on unsafe and harmful datasets. While this setting has been treated extensively, another popular training paradigm, learning from unsafe feedback with reinforcement learning, has previously been unexplored. This is concerning due to the widespread deployment of feedback collection systems. We address this gap by providing an analysis of learning settings where feedback is harmful, i.e. that unsafe samples are preferred over safe ones despite model developers goal to maintain safety. We find that safety-aligned LLMs easily explore unsafe action spaces via generating harmful text and optimize for reward that violates safety constraints indicating that current safety guards are not enough to prevent learning from unsafe feedback. In order to protect against this vulnerability, we adapt a number of both "implict" and "explicit" harmful fine-tuning defences to evaluate whether they are effective as learning constraints in an RLHF setting finding that no method is generally effective pointing to the need for more defence research. We end the paper with the observation that some defences work by performing "harmless reward hacking" for which we provide a theoretical explanation drawn from the theory of Constrained Markov Decision Processes and provide some direction for future defence development.

cs.LG↗