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Gillian Hadfield

Publications and source records attributed to Gillian Hadfield.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Can AI agents conduct open-ended AI research? Early evidence from two case studies

Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But evidence on whether agents can carry out open-ended AI research is thin. Current evaluations either test agents on narrow, verifiable tasks, which excludes open-ended research, or submit AI-generated papers to blind peer review, which is overstretched, stochastic, and suffers from poor review quality. We introduce a third way to measure progress towards AI R\&D automation. An agent takes on the central, open-ended research question of a high-quality unpublished paper, and the paper's original authors grade its output. We call these shadow evaluations. We ran shadow evaluations on two unpublished NeurIPS 2026 submissions, giving frontier agents six days and thousands of dollars of compute. The agents completed all of the engineering without human help, yet could not make substantial progress towards answering the research questions. As a result, both papers were unambiguously rejected by the authors. We identify five recurring failure modes: poor judgment about the bar for publishable research, uncreative responses to shortcomings in the research design, ineffective backtracking from dead ends, poor resource awareness, and instruction drift. A robustness check with a second model and scaffold reproduced these failures. We release the expert reviews, survey responses, agent repositories, and logs. Our results provide early evidence that today's agents can do the engineering of AI research, but struggle with critical parts of the research lifecycle.

cs.AI

Talk Isn't Always Cheap: Understanding Failure Modes in Multi-Agent Debate

While multi-agent debate has been proposed as a promising strategy for improving AI reasoning ability, we find that debate can sometimes be harmful rather than helpful. Prior work has primarily focused on debates within homogeneous groups of agents, whereas we explore how diversity in model capabilities influences the dynamics and outcomes of multi-agent interactions. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that debate can lead to a decrease in accuracy over time - even in settings where stronger (i.e., more capable) models outnumber their weaker counterparts. Our analysis reveals that models frequently shift from correct to incorrect answers in response to peer reasoning, favoring agreement over challenging flawed reasoning. We perform additional experiments investigating various potential contributing factors to these harmful shifts - including sycophancy, social conformity, and model and task type. These results highlight important failure modes in the exchange of reasons during multi-agent debate, suggesting that naive applications of debate may cause performance degradation when agents are neither incentivised nor adequately equipped to resist persuasive but incorrect reasoning.

cs.CL

Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI

The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These systems pose novel and under-explored risks. In this report, we provide a structured taxonomy of these risks by identifying three key failure modes (miscoordination, conflict, and collusion) based on agents' incentives, as well as seven key risk factors (information asymmetries, network effects, selection pressures, destabilising dynamics, commitment problems, emergent agency, and multi-agent security) that can underpin them. We highlight several important instances of each risk, as well as promising directions to help mitigate them. By anchoring our analysis in a range of real-world examples and experimental evidence, we illustrate the distinct challenges posed by multi-agent systems and their implications for the safety, governance, and ethics of advanced AI.

cs.MA

AI Model Registries: A Foundational Tool for AI Governance

In this report, we propose the implementation of national registries for frontier AI models as a foundational tool for AI governance. We explore the rationale, design, and implementation of such registries, drawing on comparisons with registries in analogous industries to make recommendations for a registry that is efficient, unintrusive, and which will bring AI governance closer to parity with the governmental insight into other high-impact industries. We explore key information that should be collected, including model architecture, model size, compute and data used during training, and we survey the viability and utility of evaluations developed specifically for AI. Our proposal is designed to provide governmental insight and enhance AI safety while fostering innovation and minimizing the regulatory burden on developers. By providing a framework that respects intellectual property concerns and safeguards sensitive information, this registry approach supports responsible AI development without impeding progress. We propose that timely and accurate registration should be encouraged primarily through injunctive action, by requiring third parties to use only registered models, and secondarily through direct financial penalties for non-compliance. By providing a comprehensive framework for AI model registries, we aim to support policymakers in developing foundational governance structures to monitor and mitigate risks associated with advanced AI systems.

cs.CY

How will advanced AI systems impact democracy?

Advanced AI systems capable of generating humanlike text and multimodal content are now widely available. In this paper, we discuss the impacts that generative artificial intelligence may have on democratic processes. We consider the consequences of AI for citizens' ability to make informed choices about political representatives and issues (epistemic impacts). We ask how AI might be used to destabilise or support democratic mechanisms like elections (material impacts). Finally, we discuss whether AI will strengthen or weaken democratic principles (foundational impacts). It is widely acknowledged that new AI systems could pose significant challenges for democracy. However, it has also been argued that generative AI offers new opportunities to educate and learn from citizens, strengthen public discourse, help people find common ground, and to reimagine how democracies might work better.

cs.CY

Managing extreme AI risks amid rapid progress

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is progressing rapidly, and companies are shifting their focus to developing generalist AI systems that can autonomously act and pursue goals. Increases in capabilities and autonomy may soon massively amplify AI's impact, with risks that include large-scale social harms, malicious uses, and an irreversible loss of human control over autonomous AI systems. Although researchers have warned of extreme risks from AI, there is a lack of consensus about how exactly such risks arise, and how to manage them. Society's response, despite promising first steps, is incommensurate with the possibility of rapid, transformative progress that is expected by many experts. AI safety research is lagging. Present governance initiatives lack the mechanisms and institutions to prevent misuse and recklessness, and barely address autonomous systems. In this short consensus paper, we describe extreme risks from upcoming, advanced AI systems. Drawing on lessons learned from other safety-critical technologies, we then outline a comprehensive plan combining technical research and development with proactive, adaptive governance mechanisms for a more commensurate preparation.

cs.CY

International Institutions for Advanced AI

International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.

cs.CY

Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

cs.CY

Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence (AI100) 2021 Study Panel Report

In September 2021, the "One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence" project (AI100) issued the second report of its planned long-term periodic assessment of artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on society. It was written by a panel of 17 study authors, each of whom is deeply rooted in AI research, chaired by Michael Littman of Brown University. The report, entitled "Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms," answers a set of 14 questions probing critical areas of AI development addressing the major risks and dangers of AI, its effects on society, its public perception and the future of the field. The report concludes that AI has made a major leap from the lab to people's lives in recent years, which increases the urgency to understand its potential negative effects. The questions were developed by the AI100 Standing Committee, chaired by Peter Stone of the University of Texas at Austin, consisting of a group of AI leaders with expertise in computer science, sociology, ethics, economics, and other disciplines.

cs.AI

Toward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims

With the recent wave of progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has come a growing awareness of the large-scale impacts of AI systems, and recognition that existing regulations and norms in industry and academia are insufficient to ensure responsible AI development. In order for AI developers to earn trust from system users, customers, civil society, governments, and other stakeholders that they are building AI responsibly, they will need to make verifiable claims to which they can be held accountable. Those outside of a given organization also need effective means of scrutinizing such claims. This report suggests various steps that different stakeholders can take to improve the verifiability of claims made about AI systems and their associated development processes, with a focus on providing evidence about the safety, security, fairness, and privacy protection of AI systems. We analyze ten mechanisms for this purpose--spanning institutions, software, and hardware--and make recommendations aimed at implementing, exploring, or improving those mechanisms.

cs.CY

The Role of Cooperation in Responsible AI Development

In this paper, we argue that competitive pressures could incentivize AI companies to underinvest in ensuring their systems are safe, secure, and have a positive social impact. Ensuring that AI systems are developed responsibly may therefore require preventing and solving collective action problems between companies. We note that there are several key factors that improve the prospects for cooperation in collective action problems. We use this to identify strategies to improve the prospects for industry cooperation on the responsible development of AI.

cs.CY

Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment

We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We first provide an overview of the incomplete contracting literature and explore parallels between this work and the problem of AI alignment. As we emphasize, misalignment between principal and agent is a core focus of economic analysis. We highlight some technical results from the economics literature on incomplete contracts that may provide insights for AI alignment researchers. Our core contribution, however, is to bring to bear an insight that economists have been urged to absorb from legal scholars and other behavioral scientists: the fact that human contracting is supported by substantial amounts of external structure, such as generally available institutions (culture, law) that can supply implied terms to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts. We propose a research agenda for AI alignment work that focuses on the problem of how to build AI that can replicate the human cognitive processes that connect individual incomplete contracts with this supporting external structure.

cs.AI