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Gillian K. Hadfield

Publications and source records attributed to Gillian K. Hadfield.

14 recordsLinked to original sources

I-CALM: Incentivizing Confidence-Aware Abstention for LLM Selective Answering

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident but incorrect answers, in part because standard evaluation incentives reward guessing over expressing uncertainty. We study epistemic abstention for factual questions with verifiable answers, where the goal is to improve selective answering, making LLMs abstain when they are likely to be wrong while preserving correct answers. Inspired by human behavioral decisions in question answering, we introduce I-CALM, a prompt-level framework for black-box LLMs. I-CALM combines elicited verbal confidence, announced answer/abstain payoffs, and normative guidance emphasizing truthfulness, humility, evidential support, and responsibility. To distinguish targeted abstention from indiscriminate refusal, we use a two-stage evaluation protocol, in which LLMs first choose whether to answer or abstain, and are then forced to provide a best guess for the abstained ones. Across models and factual QA datasets, I-CALM improves selective answering by reducing false-answer rate among surfaced responses and improving abstention quality, shifting error-prone cases into abstention while retaining answers the model would have answered correctly. Overall, I-CALM offers a lightweight way to improve inference-time selective answering without retraining or access to model's internal states. Code is available at https://github.com/FayLONG03/hallucinationControl.

cs.CL

Societal Alignment Frameworks Can Improve LLM Alignment

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has focused on producing responses that meet human expectations and align with shared values - a process coined alignment. However, aligning LLMs remains challenging due to the inherent disconnect between the complexity of human values and the narrow nature of the technological approaches designed to address them. Current alignment methods often lead to misspecified objectives, reflecting the broader issue of incomplete contracts, the impracticality of specifying a contract between a model developer, and the model that accounts for every scenario in LLM alignment. In this paper, we argue that improving LLM alignment requires incorporating insights from societal alignment frameworks, including social, economic, and contractual alignment, and discuss potential solutions drawn from these domains. Given the role of uncertainty within societal alignment frameworks, we then investigate how it manifests in LLM alignment. We end our discussion by offering an alternative view on LLM alignment, framing the underspecified nature of its objectives as an opportunity rather than perfect their specification. Beyond technical improvements in LLM alignment, we discuss the need for participatory alignment interface designs.

cs.CY

Legal Alignment for Safe and Ethical AI

Alignment of artificial intelligence (AI) encompasses the normative problem of specifying how AI systems should act and the technical problem of ensuring AI systems comply with those specifications. To date, AI alignment has generally overlooked an important source of knowledge and practice for grappling with these problems: law. In this paper, we survey the emerging field of legal alignment that aims to fill this gap and systematize research that studies how legal rules, principles, and methods can be leveraged to address problems of alignment and inform the design of AI systems that operate safely and ethically. Our survey provides a taxonomy of the three core research pathways of legal alignment and explores how each can be operationalized in practice: (1) designing AI systems to comply with the content of legal rules developed through legitimate institutions and processes, (2) adapting methods from legal interpretation to guide how AI systems reason and make decisions, and (3) harnessing legal concepts as a structural blueprint for confronting challenges of reliability, trust, and cooperation in AI systems. These research pathways present new conceptual, empirical, and institutional questions, which include examining the specific set of laws that particular AI systems should follow, creating evaluations to assess their legal compliance in real-world settings, and developing governance frameworks to support the implementation of legal alignment in practice. Tackling these questions requires expertise across law, computer science, and other disciplines, offering these communities the opportunity to collaborate in designing AI for the better.

cs.CY

Talk, Judge, Cooperate: Gossip-Driven Indirect Reciprocity in Self-Interested LLM Agents

Indirect reciprocity, which means helping those who have helped others, is difficult to sustain among decentralized, self-interested LLM agents without reliable reputation systems. We address this challenge with the Agentic Linguistic Gossip Network (ALIGN), an automated framework that enables decentralized agents to form reputations, evaluate trustworthiness, and coordinate social norms by strategically sharing open-ended gossip with hierarchical tones. We demonstrate that ALIGN consistently improves indirect reciprocity and resists malicious entrants by identifying and ostracizing defectors. Notably, we find that stronger reasoning capabilities in LLMs lead to more incentive-aligned cooperation, whereas chat models often over-cooperate even when strategically suboptimal. These results suggest that leveraging LLM reasoning through decentralized gossip is a promising path for maintaining social welfare in agentic ecosystems. Our code is available at https://github.com/shuhui-zhu/ALIGN.

cs.MA

Regulatory Markets: The Future of AI Governance

Appropriately regulating artificial intelligence is an increasingly urgent and widespread policy challenge. We identify two primary, competing problem. First is a technical deficit: Legislatures and regulatory face significant challenges in rapidly translating conventional command-and-control legal requirements into technical requirements. Second is a democratic deficit: Over-reliance on industry to provide technical standards fails to ensure that the many values-based decisions that must be made to shape AI development and deployment are made by democratically accountable public, not private, actors. We propose a solution: regulatory markets, in which governments require the targets of regulation to purchase regulatory services from a government-licensed private regulator. This approach to AI regulation could overcome the limitations of both command-and-control regulation and excessive delegation to industry. Regulatory markets could enable governments to establish policy priorities for the regulation of AI while relying on market forces and industry R&D efforts to pioneer the technical methods of regulation that best achieve policymakers' stated objectives.

cs.AI

Legal Infrastructure for Transformative AI Governance

Most of our AI governance efforts focus on substance: what rules do we want in place? What limits or checks do we want to impose on AI development and deployment? But a key role for law is not only to establish substantive rules but also to establish legal and regulatory infrastructure to generate and implement rules. The transformative nature of AI calls especially for attention to building legal and regulatory frameworks. In this PNAS Perspective piece I review three examples I have proposed: the creation of registration regimes for frontier models; the creation of registration and identification regimes for autonomous agents; and the design of regulatory markets to facilitate a role for private companies to innovate and deliver AI regulatory services.

cs.AI

An Economy of AI Agents

In the coming decade, artificially intelligent agents with the ability to plan and execute complex tasks over long time horizons with little direct oversight from humans may be deployed across the economy. This chapter surveys recent developments and highlights open questions for economists around how AI agents might interact with humans and with each other, shape markets and organizations, and what institutions might be required for well-functioning markets.

econ.GN

Infrastructure for AI Agents

AI agents plan and execute interactions in open-ended environments. For example, OpenAI's Operator can use a web browser to do product comparisons and buy online goods. Much research on making agents useful and safe focuses on directly modifying their behaviour, such as by training them to follow user instructions. Direct behavioural modifications are useful, but do not fully address how heterogeneous agents will interact with each other and other actors. Rather, we will need external protocols and systems to shape such interactions. For instance, agents will need more efficient protocols to communicate with each other and form agreements. Attributing an agent's actions to a particular human or other legal entity can help to establish trust, and also disincentivize misuse. Given this motivation, we propose the concept of \textbf{agent infrastructure}: technical systems and shared protocols external to agents that are designed to mediate and influence their interactions with and impacts on their environments. Just as the Internet relies on protocols like HTTPS, our work argues that agent infrastructure will be similarly indispensable to ecosystems of agents. We identify three functions for agent infrastructure: 1) attributing actions, properties, and other information to specific agents, their users, or other actors; 2) shaping agents' interactions; and 3) detecting and remedying harmful actions from agents. We provide an incomplete catalog of research directions for such functions. For each direction, we include analysis of use cases, infrastructure adoption, relationships to existing (internet) infrastructure, limitations, and open questions. Making progress on agent infrastructure can prepare society for the adoption of more advanced agents.

cs.AI

Regulatory Markets for AI Safety

We propose a new model for regulation to achieve AI safety: global regulatory markets. We first sketch the model in general terms and provide an overview of the costs and benefits of this approach. We then demonstrate how the model might work in practice: responding to the risk of adversarial attacks on AI models employed in commercial drones.

cs.CY

Rational Silence and False Polarization: How Viewpoint Organizations and Recommender Systems Distort the Expression of Public Opinion

AI-based social media platforms has already transformed the nature of economic and social interaction. AI enables the massive scale and highly personalized nature of online information sharing that we now take for granted. Extensive attention has been devoted to the polarization that social media platforms appear to facilitate. However, a key implication of the transformation we are experiencing due to these AI-powered platforms has received much less attention: how platforms impact what observers of online discourse come to believe about community views. These observers include policymakers and legislators, who look to social media to gauge the prospects for policy and legislative change, as well as developers of AI models trained on large-scale internet data, whose outputs may similarly reflect a distorted view of public opinion. In this paper, we present a nested game-theoretic model to show how observed online opinion is produced by the interaction of the decisions made by users about whether and with what rhetorical intensity to share their opinions on a platform, the efforts of organizations (such as traditional media and advocacy organizations) that seek to encourage or discourage opinion-sharing online, and the operation of AI-powered recommender systems controlled by social media platforms. We show that signals from ideological organizations encourage an increase in rhetorical intensity, leading to the 'rational silence' of moderate users. This, in turn, creates a polarized impression of where average opinions lie. We also show that this observed polarization can also be amplified by recommender systems that encourage the formation of communities online that end up seeing a skewed sample of opinion. We also identify practical strategies platforms can implement, such as reducing exposure to signals from ideological organizations and a tailored approach to content moderation.

cs.MA

Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development

Mitigating the risks from frontier AI systems requires up-to-date and reliable information about those systems. Organizations that develop and deploy frontier systems have significant access to such information. By reporting safety-critical information to actors in government, industry, and civil society, these organizations could improve visibility into new and emerging risks posed by frontier systems. Equipped with this information, developers could make better informed decisions on risk management, while policymakers could design more targeted and robust regulatory infrastructure. We outline the key features of responsible reporting and propose mechanisms for implementing them in practice.

cs.CY

Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence

Computing power, or "compute," is crucial for the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. As a result, governments and companies have started to leverage compute as a means to govern AI. For example, governments are investing in domestic compute capacity, controlling the flow of compute to competing countries, and subsidizing compute access to certain sectors. However, these efforts only scratch the surface of how compute can be used to govern AI development and deployment. Relative to other key inputs to AI (data and algorithms), AI-relevant compute is a particularly effective point of intervention: it is detectable, excludable, and quantifiable, and is produced via an extremely concentrated supply chain. These characteristics, alongside the singular importance of compute for cutting-edge AI models, suggest that governing compute can contribute to achieving common policy objectives, such as ensuring the safety and beneficial use of AI. More precisely, policymakers could use compute to facilitate regulatory visibility of AI, allocate resources to promote beneficial outcomes, and enforce restrictions against irresponsible or malicious AI development and usage. However, while compute-based policies and technologies have the potential to assist in these areas, there is significant variation in their readiness for implementation. Some ideas are currently being piloted, while others are hindered by the need for fundamental research. Furthermore, naive or poorly scoped approaches to compute governance carry significant risks in areas like privacy, economic impacts, and centralization of power. We end by suggesting guardrails to minimize these risks from compute governance.

cs.CY

Silly rules improve the capacity of agents to learn stable enforcement and compliance behaviors

How can societies learn to enforce and comply with social norms? Here we investigate the learning dynamics and emergence of compliance and enforcement of social norms in a foraging game, implemented in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting. In this spatiotemporally extended game, individuals are incentivized to implement complex berry-foraging policies and punish transgressions against social taboos covering specific berry types. We show that agents benefit when eating poisonous berries is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents, as this helps overcome a credit-assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, however, we also show that introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, improves the rate and stability with which agents learn to punish taboo violations and comply with taboos. Counterintuitively, our results show that an arbitrary taboo (a "silly rule") can enhance social learning dynamics and achieve better outcomes in the middle stages of learning. We discuss the results in the context of studying normativity as a group-level emergent phenomenon.

cs.MA

Legible Normativity for AI Alignment: The Value of Silly Rules

It has become commonplace to assert that autonomous agents will have to be built to follow human rules of behavior--social norms and laws. But human laws and norms are complex and culturally varied systems, in many cases agents will have to learn the rules. This requires autonomous agents to have models of how human rule systems work so that they can make reliable predictions about rules. In this paper we contribute to the building of such models by analyzing an overlooked distinction between important rules and what we call silly rules--rules with no discernible direct impact on welfare. We show that silly rules render a normative system both more robust and more adaptable in response to shocks to perceived stability. They make normativity more legible for humans, and can increase legibility for AI systems as well. For AI systems to integrate into human normative systems, we suggest, it may be important for them to have models that include representations of silly rules.

cs.AI