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Giovanni Apruzzese

Publications and source records attributed to Giovanni Apruzzese.

39 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

Modeling Realistic Adversarial Attacks against Network Intrusion Detection Systems

The incremental diffusion of machine learning algorithms in supporting cybersecurity is creating novel defensive opportunities but also new types of risks. Multiple researches have shown that machine learning methods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that create tiny perturbations aimed at decreasing the effectiveness of detecting threats. We observe that existing literature assumes threat models that are inappropriate for realistic cybersecurity scenarios because they consider opponents with complete knowledge about the cyber detector or that can freely interact with the target systems. By focusing on Network Intrusion Detection Systems based on machine learning, we identify and model the real capabilities and circumstances required by attackers to carry out feasible and successful adversarial attacks. We then apply our model to several adversarial attacks proposed in literature and highlight the limits and merits that can result in actual adversarial attacks. The contributions of this paper can help hardening defensive systems by letting cyber defenders address the most critical and real issues, and can benefit researchers by allowing them to devise novel forms of adversarial attacks based on realistic threat models.

cs.CR↗

On the Evaluation of Sequential Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection

Recent advances in deep learning renewed the research interests in machine learning for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). Specifically, attention has been given to sequential learning models, due to their ability to extract the temporal characteristics of Network traffic Flows (NetFlows), and use them for NIDS tasks. However, the applications of these sequential models often consist of transferring and adapting methodologies directly from other fields, without an in-depth investigation on how to leverage the specific circumstances of cybersecurity scenarios; moreover, there is a lack of comprehensive studies on sequential models that rely on NetFlow data, which presents significant advantages over traditional full packet captures. We tackle this problem in this paper. We propose a detailed methodology to extract temporal sequences of NetFlows that denote patterns of malicious activities. Then, we apply this methodology to compare the efficacy of sequential learning models against traditional static learning models. In particular, we perform a fair comparison of a `sequential' Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) against a `static' Feedforward Neural Networks (FNN) in distinct environments represented by two well-known datasets for NIDS: the CICIDS2017 and the CTU13. Our results highlight that LSTM achieves comparable performance to FNN in the CICIDS2017 with over 99.5\% F1-score; while obtaining superior performance in the CTU13, with 95.7\% F1-score against 91.5\%. This paper thus paves the way to future applications of sequential learning models for NIDS.

cs.CR↗

Hardening Random Forest Cyber Detectors Against Adversarial Attacks

Machine learning algorithms are effective in several applications, but they are not as much successful when applied to intrusion detection in cyber security. Due to the high sensitivity to their training data, cyber detectors based on machine learning are vulnerable to targeted adversarial attacks that involve the perturbation of initial samples. Existing defenses assume unrealistic scenarios; their results are underwhelming in non-adversarial settings; or they can be applied only to machine learning algorithms that perform poorly for cyber security. We present an original methodology for countering adversarial perturbations targeting intrusion detection systems based on random forests. As a practical application, we integrate the proposed defense method in a cyber detector analyzing network traffic. The experimental results on millions of labelled network flows show that the new detector has a twofold value: it outperforms state-of-the-art detectors that are subject to adversarial attacks; it exhibits robust results both in adversarial and non-adversarial scenarios.

cs.CR↗