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Giuseppe D'Alconzo

Publications and source records attributed to Giuseppe D'Alconzo.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Linear Code Equivalence via Plücker Coordinates

The assumed hardness of the Linear Code Equivalence problem (LCE) lies at the core of the security of the LESS signature scheme and other signature schemes with advanced functionalities. The LCE problem asks to determine whether two linear codes are equivalent. This equivalence is represented by a monomial matrix $ Q$, i.e. the product of a diagonal matrix $D$ and a permutation matrix $P$. The recovery of $Q=DP$ is known to be reduced to the recovery of the permutation matrix $ P$ alone. Exploiting this fact, we construct an algebraic model for LCE involving only the matrix $P$. To this end, we study the action of monomial matrices on linear codes using tools from algebraic geometry, including Plücker coordinates and fields of invariant rational functions. In particular, we analyse the action of diagonal matrices on linear codes, which can be interpreted as diagonal scaling of the coordinates of elements of the Grassmannian. We propose a method to determine algebraically independent generators of the field of rational functions invariant under this action, without relying on Reynolds operators or Gröbner basis computations. Furthermore, given two equivalent codes, we apply our results to explicitly construct, for each invariant function, a polynomial having $P$ as a root. However, the resulting polynomials are not of practical use: their degrees are high for cryptographically relevant parameters, and the number of monomials grows exponentially, making them infeasible to manipulate. Despite this limitation, our results are of theoretical interest, as they constitute the first application of these tools to the cryptanalysis of LCE and provide insight into how algebraic geometry and invariant theory can be employed in Cryptography.

math.AG

A note on a Code-Based Signature Scheme

In this work, we exploit a serious security flaw in a code-based signature scheme from a 2019 work by Liu, Yang, Han and Wang. They adapt the McEliece cryptosystem to obtain a new scheme and, on top of this, they design an efficient digital signature. We show that the new encryption scheme based on McEliece, even if it has longer public keys, is not more secure than the standard one. Moreover, the choice of parameters for the signature leads to a significant performance improvement, but it introduces a vulnerability in the protocol.

cs.CR

A Note on the Hardness of Problems from Cryptographic Group Actions

Given a cryptographic group action, we show that the Group Action Inverse Problem (GAIP) and other related problems cannot be NP-hard unless the Polynomial Hierarchy collapses. We show this via random self-reductions and the design of interactive proofs. Since cryptographic group actions are the building block of many security protocols, this result serves both as an upper bound on the worst-case complexity of some cryptographic assumptions and as proof that the hardness in the worst and in the average case coincide. We also point out the link with Graph Isomorphism and other related NP intermediate problems.

cs.CC

Vanishing ideals of binary Hamming spheres

We consider the simplified Algebraic Normal Form (sANF) of Boolean functions vanishing on Hamming spheres centred at zero and the associated sANF vector. We show that this vector is periodic, leading to an efficient computation of the sANF and to specific formulas for particular cases. Moreover, we explicitly provide a connection to the binary M{ö}bius transform of the elementary symmetric functions. We conclude by presenting a method based on polynomial evaluation to bound the minimum distance of binary nonlinear codes. The same method can be used to compute the minimum distance and the weight distribution of binary linear codes.

math.AC

Security issues of CFS-like digital signature algorithms

We analyse the security of some variants of the CFS code-based digital signature scheme. We show how the adoption of some code-based hash-functions to improve the efficiency of CFS leads to the ability of an attacker to produce a forgery compatible to the rightful user's public key.

cs.CR