arXiv subjects

Giuseppe Perelli

Publications and source records attributed to Giuseppe Perelli.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Demystifying Sequential Recommendations: Counterfactual Explanations via Genetic Algorithms

Sequential Recommender Systems (SRSs) have demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in capturing users' evolving preferences. However, their inherent complexity as "black box" models poses significant challenges for explainability. This work presents the first counterfactual explanation technique specifically developed for SRSs, introducing a novel approach in this space, addressing the key question: What minimal changes in a user's interaction history would lead to different recommendations? To achieve this, we introduce a specialized genetic algorithm tailored for discrete sequences and show that generating counterfactual explanations for sequential data is an NP-Complete problem. We evaluate these approaches across four experimental settings, varying between targeted-untargeted and categorized-uncategorized scenarios, to comprehensively assess their capability in generating meaningful explanations. Using three different datasets and three models, we are able to demonstrate that our methods successfully generate interpretable counterfactual explanation while maintaining model fidelity close to one. Our findings contribute to the growing field of Explainable AI by providing a framework for understanding sequential recommendation decisions through the lens of "what-if" scenarios, ultimately enhancing user trust and system transparency.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2025

Beyond Predictions: A Participatory Framework for Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making

Conventional automated decision-support systems often prioritize predictive accuracy, overlooking the complexities of real-world settings where stakeholders' preferences may diverge or conflict. This can lead to outcomes that disadvantage vulnerable groups and erode trust in algorithmic processes. Participatory AI approaches aim to address these issues but remain largely context-specific, limiting their broader applicability and scalability. To address these gaps, we propose a participatory framework that reframes decision-making as a multi-stakeholder learning and optimization problem. Our modular, model-agnostic approach builds on the standard machine learning training pipeline to fine-tune user-provided prediction models and evaluate decision strategies, including compromise functions that mediate stakeholder trade-offs. A synthetic scoring mechanism aggregates user-defined preferences across multiple metrics, ranking strategies and selecting an optimal decision-maker to generate actionable recommendations that jointly optimize performance, fairness, and domain-specific goals. Empirical validation on two high-stakes case studies demonstrates the versatility of the framework and its promise as a more accountable, context-aware alternative to prediction-centric pipelines for socially impactful deployments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Synthesis of Reward Machines for Multi-Agent Equilibrium Design (Full Version)

Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's authority in equilibrium design is more constrained; she can only modify the incentive structures in a given game to achieve certain outcomes without the ability to create the game from scratch. We study the problem of equilibrium design using dynamic incentive structures, known as reward machines. We use weighted concurrent game structures for the game model, with goals (for the players and the designer) defined as mean-payoff objectives. We show how reward machines can be used to represent dynamic incentives that allocate rewards in a manner that optimises the designer's goal. We also introduce the main decision problem within our framework, the payoff improvement problem. This problem essentially asks whether there exists a dynamic incentive (represented by some reward machine) that can improve the designer's payoff by more than a given threshold value. We present two variants of the problem: strong and weak. We demonstrate that both can be solved in polynomial time using a Turing machine equipped with an NP oracle. Furthermore, we also establish that these variants are either NP-hard or coNP-hard. Finally, we show how to synthesise the corresponding reward machine if it exists.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Optimal Alignment of Temporal Knowledge Bases

Answering temporal CQs over temporalized Description Logic knowledge bases (TKB) is a main technique to realize ontology-based situation recognition. In case the collected data in such a knowledge base is inaccurate, important query answers can be missed. In this paper we introduce the TKB Alignment problem, which computes a variant of the TKB that minimally changes the TKB, but entails the given temporal CQ and is in that sense (cost-)optimal. We investigate this problem for ALC TKBs and conjunctive queries with LTL operators and devise a solution technique to compute (cost-optimal) alignments of TKBs that extends techniques for the alignment problem for propositional LTL over finite traces.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2023

Designing Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Social Welfare and Temporal Logic Constraints

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a desirable equilibrium that satisfies a specific temporal logic property. Our study is based on a framework where system specifications are represented as temporal logic formulae, games as quantitative concurrent game structures, and players' goals as mean-payoff objectives. We consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that designing incentives to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game can be achieved in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/{\Sigma}P 2 for GR(1) specifications. We also examine the complexity of related decision and optimisation problems, such as optimality and uniqueness of solutions, as well as considering social welfare, and show that the complexities of these problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy. Equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to rational synthesis and verification problems for concurrent games with mean-payoff objectives when no solution exists or as a technique to repair concurrent games with undesirable Nash equilibria in an optimal way.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2022

On the Complexity of Rational Verification

Rational verification refers to the problem of checking which temporal logic properties hold of a concurrent multiagent system, under the assumption that agents in the system choose strategies that form a game-theoretic equilibrium. Rational verification can be understood as a counterpart to model checking for multiagent systems, but while classical model checking can be done in polynomial time for some temporal logic specification languages such as CTL, and polynomial space with LTL specifications, rational verification is much harder: the key decision problems for rational verification are 2EXPTIME-complete with LTL specifications, even when using explicit-state system representations. Against this background, our contributions in this paper are threefold. First, we show that the complexity of rational verification can be greatly reduced by restricting specifications to GR(1), a fragment of LTL that can represent a broad and practically useful class of response properties of reactive systems. In particular, we show that for a number of relevant settings, rational verification can be done in polynomial space and even in polynomial time. Second, we provide improved complexity results for rational verification when considering players' goals given by mean-payoff utility functions; arguably the most widely used approach for quantitative objectives in concurrent and multiagent systems. Finally, we consider the problem of computing outcomes that satisfy social welfare constraints. To this end, we consider both utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare and show that computing such outcomes is either PSPACE-complete or NP-complete.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2021

Equilibrium Design for Concurrent Games

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance, an equilibrium satisfying a given temporal logic property -- a problem that we call equilibrium design. We base our study on a framework where system specifications are represented as temporal logic formulae, games as quantitative concurrent game structures, and players' goals as mean-payoff objectives. In particular, we consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that implementing a mechanism to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game, whenever such a mechanism exists, can be done in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/$Σ^{P}_{2}$ for GR(1) specifications. We also study the complexity of various related decision and optimisation problems, such as optimality and uniqueness of solutions, and show that the complexities of all such problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy. As an application, equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to the rational synthesis and verification problems for concurrent games with mean-payoff objectives whenever no solution exists, or as a technique to repair, whenever possible, concurrent games with undesirable rational outcomes (Nash equilibria) in an optimal way.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Behavioral QLTL

In this paper we introduce Behavioral QLTL, which is a ``behavioral'' variant of linear-time temporal logic on infinite traces with second-order quantifiers. Behavioral QLTL is characterized by the fact that the functions that assign the truth value of the quantified propositions along the trace can only depend on the past. In other words such functions must be``processes''. This gives to the logic a strategic flavor that we usually associate to planning. Indeed we show that temporally extended planning in nondeterministic domains, as well as LTL synthesis, are expressed in Behavioral QLTL through formulas with a simple quantification alternation. While, as this alternation increases, we get to forms of planning/synthesis in which conditional and conformant planning aspects get mixed. We study this logic from the computational point of view and compare it to the original QLTL (with non-behavioral semantics) and with simpler forms of behavioral semantics.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2020

Automated Temporal Equilibrium Analysis: Verification and Synthesis of Multi-Player Games

In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational verification problem is concerned with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its constituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in pursuit of individual objectives. Typically, those objectives are expressed as temporal logic formulae which the relevant agent desires to see satisfied. Unfortunately, rational verification is computationally complex, and requires specialised techniques in order to obtain practically useable implementations. In this paper, we present such a technique. This technique relies on a reduction of the rational verification problem to the solution of a collection of parity games. Our approach has been implemented in the Equilibrium Verification Environment (EVE) system. The EVE system takes as input a model of a concurrent/multi-agent system represented using the Simple Reactive Modules Language (SRML), where agent goals are represented as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae, together with a claim about the equilibrium behaviour of the system, also expressed as an LTL formula. EVE can then check whether the LTL claim holds on some (or every) computation of the system that could arise through agents choosing Nash equilibrium strategies; it can also check whether a system has a Nash equilibrium, and synthesise individual strategies for players in the multi-player game. After presenting our basic framework, we describe our new technique and prove its correctness. We then describe our implementation in the EVE system, and present experimental results which show that EVE performs favourably in comparison to other existing tools that support rational verification.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2020

Equilibria for Games with Combined Qualitative and Quantitative Objectives

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act independently and strategically in pursuit of personal preferences. In this article, we study these games in the context of finite-memory strategies, and we assume players' preferences are defined by a qualitative and a quantitative objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its qualitative objective (given as a formula of Linear Temporal Logic) and then prefers to minimise costs (given by a mean-payoff function). Our main result is that deciding the existence of a strict epsilon Nash equilibrium in such games is 2ExpTime-complete (and hence decidable), even if players' deviations are implemented as infinite-memory strategies.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2020

Multi-Player Games with LDL Goals over Finite Traces

Linear Dynamic Logic on finite traces LDLf is a powerful logic for reasoning about the behaviour of concurrent and multi-agent systems. In this paper, we investigate techniques for both the characterisation and verification of equilibria in multi-player games with goals/objectives expressed using logics based on LDLf. This study builds upon a generalisation of Boolean games, a logic-based game model of multi-agent systems where players have goals succinctly represented in a logical way. Because LDLf goals are considered, in the settings we study -- Reactive Modules games and iterated Boolean games with goals over finite traces -- players' goals can be defined to be regular properties while achieved in a finite, but arbitrarily large, trace. In particular, using alternating automata, the paper investigates automata-theoretic approaches to the characterisation and verification of (pure strategy Nash) equilibria, shows that the set of Nash equilibria in multi-player games with LDLf objectives is regular, and provides complexity results for the associated automata constructions.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2020

Reconfigurable Interaction for MAS Modelling

We propose a formalism to model and reason about multi-agent systems. We allow agents to interact and communicate in different modes so that they can pursue joint tasks; agents may dynamically synchronize, exchange data, adapt their behaviour, and reconfigure their communication interfaces. The formalism defines a local behaviour based on shared variables and a global one based on message passing. We extend LTL to be able to reason explicitly about the intentions of the different agents and their interaction protocols. We also study the complexity of satisfiability and model-checking of this extension.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2019

Solving Parity Games Using An Automata-Based Algorithm

Parity games are abstract infinite-round games that take an important role in formal verification. In the basic setting, these games are two-player, turn-based, and played under perfect information on directed graphs, whose nodes are labeled with priorities. The winner of a play is determined according to the parities (even or odd) of the minimal priority occurring infinitely often in that play. The problem of finding a winning strategy in parity games is known to be in UPTime $\cap$ CoUPTime and deciding whether a polynomial time solution exists is a long-standing open question. In the last two decades, a variety of algorithms have been proposed. Many of them have been also implemented in a platform named PGSolver. This has enabled an empirical evaluation of these algorithms and a better understanding of their relative merits. In this paper, we further contribute to this subject by implementing, for the first time, an algorithm based on alternating automata. More precisely, we consider an algorithm introduced by Kupferman and Vardi that solves a parity game by solving the emptiness problem of a corresponding alternating parity automaton. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that this algorithm outperforms other algorithms when the game has a a small number of priorities relative to the size of the game. In many concrete applications, we do indeed end up with parity games where the number of priorities is relatively small. This makes the new algorithm quite useful in practice.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Nash Equilibrium and Bisimulation Invariance

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system states to player actions. Analysing a system in such a setting involves computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the concurrent game. However, we show that, with respect to the above model of strategies (arguably, the "standard" model in the computer science literature), bisimilarity does not preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. Thus, two concurrent games which are behaviourally equivalent from a semantic perspective, and which from a logical perspective satisfy the same temporal logic formulae, may nevertheless have fundamentally different properties (solutions) from a game theoretic perspective. Our aim in this paper is to explore the issues raised by this discovery. After illustrating the issue by way of a motivating example, we present three models of strategies with respect to which the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved under bisimilarity. We use some of these models of strategies to provide new semantic foundations for logics for strategic reasoning, and investigate restricted scenarios where bisimilarity can be shown to preserve the existence of Nash equilibria with respect to the conventional model of strategies in the computer science literature.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2019

Reasoning about Quality and Fuzziness of Strategic Behaviours

Temporal logics are extensively used for the specification of on-going behaviours of reactive systems. Two significant developments in this area are the extension of traditional temporal logics with modalities that enable the specification of on-going strategic behaviours in multi-agent systems, and the transition of temporal logics to a quantitative setting, where different satisfaction values enable the specifier to formalise concepts such as certainty or quality. We introduce and study FSL---a quantitative extension of SL (Strategy Logic), one of the most natural and expressive logics describing strategic behaviours. The satisfaction value of an FSL formula is a real value in [0,1], reflecting `how much' or `how well' the strategic on-going objectives of the underlying agents are satisfied. We demonstrate the applications of FSL in quantitative reasoning about multi-agent systems, by showing how it can express concepts of stability in multi-agent systems, and how it generalises some fuzzy temporal logics. We also provide a model-checking algorithm for our logic, based on a quantitative extension of Quantified CTL*.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2017

Reasoning about Strategies: on the Satisfiability Problem

Strategy Logic (SL, for short) has been introduced by Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi as a useful formalism for reasoning explicitly about strategies, as first-order objects, in multi-agent concurrent games. This logic turns out to be very powerful, subsuming all major previously studied modal logics for strategic reasoning, including ATL, ATL*, and the like. Unfortunately, due to its high expressiveness, SL has a non-elementarily decidable model-checking problem and the satisfiability question is undecidable, specifically Sigma_1^1. In order to obtain a decidable sublogic, we introduce and study here One-Goal Strategy Logic (SL[1G], for short). This is a syntactic fragment of SL, strictly subsuming ATL*, which encompasses formulas in prenex normal form having a single temporal goal at a time, for every strategy quantification of agents. We prove that, unlike SL, SL[1G] has the bounded tree-model property and its satisfiability problem is decidable in 2ExpTime, thus not harder than the one for ATL*.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2016

Cycle Detection in Computation Tree Logic

Temporal logic is a very powerful formalism deeply investigated and used in formal system design and verification. Its application usually reduces to solving specific decision problems such as model checking and satisfiability. In these kind of problems, the solution often requires detecting some specific properties over cycles. For instance, this happens when using classic techniques based on automata, game-theory, SCC decomposition, and the like. Surprisingly, no temporal logics have been considered so far with the explicit ability of talking about cycles. In this paper we introduce Cycle-CTL*, an extension of the classical branching-time temporal logic CTL* along with cycle quantifications in order to predicate over cycles. This logic turns out to be very expressive. Indeed, we prove that it strictly extends CTL* and is orthogonal to mu-calculus. We also give an evidence of its usefulness by providing few examples involving non-regular properties. We investigate the model checking problem for Cycle-CTL* and show that it is PSPACE-Complete as for CTL*. We also study the satisfiability problem for the existential-cycle fragment of the logic and show that it is solvable in 2ExpTime. This result makes use of an automata-theoretic approach along with novel ad-hoc definitions of bisimulation and tree-like unwinding.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2014

On the Remarkable Features of Binding Forms

Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem has given rise to a broad and productive line of research in mathematical logic, where the classification process of decidable classes of first-order sentences represent only one of the remarkable results. According to the criteria used to identify the particular classes of interest, this process was declined into several research programs, of which some of the most deeply investigated are the ones classifying sentences in prenex normal form in base of their prefix vocabulary. Unfortunately, almost all of these approaches did not shed any light on the reasons why modal logic is so robustly decidable. Trying to answer to this question, Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti introduced the guarded fragment of first-order logic, which generalizes the modal framework by essentially retaining all its fundamental properties. They started, so, a completely new research program based on the way quantifications can be relativized. Although this approach succeeded in its original task, we cannot consider it satisfactory in spotting the reasons why some complex extensions of modal logic are well-behaved. In particular, by just using the related results, we are not able to derive the decidability of multi-agent logics for strategic abilities. In this paper, aiming to lay the foundation for a more thorough understanding of some of these decidability questions, we introduce a new kind of classification based on the binding forms that are admitted in a sentence, i.e., on the way the arguments of a relation can be bound to a variable. We describe a hierarchy of first-order fragments based on the Boolean combinations of these forms, showing that the less expressive one is already incomparable with the guarded logic and related extensions. We also prove, via a new model-theoretic technique, that it enjoys the finite-model property and a PSpace satisfiability problem.

cs.LO↗