Finite-key security of BB84 with passive receivers via reduction to active measurements
In BB84 with passive receiver basis choice (passive BB84) and threshold detectors, the distribution of detection bases can depend on the incoming photon number. Its relation to BB84 with active receiver basis choice (active BB84), in which the basis is chosen using independent randomness, is therefore nontrivial. We establish a reduction theorem that expresses the secret-key-length formula for passive BB84 in terms of an active BB84 formula. The theorem allows a passive key-length formula to be obtained by simple substitutions into an existing active formula, without constructing a passive-specific security proof from scratch. It applies to key-length formulas derived using the Shor--Preskill, Koashi, and Renner approaches, because the reduction uses only properties shared by these approaches. Our result illustrates a modular approach that separates receiver analysis from the security proof and allows the proof of a common reference protocol to be reused for different implementations.