SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Gordon Pennycook

Publications and source records attributed to Gordon Pennycook.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

Reducing belief in conspiracy theories as they unfold using large language models

The emergence of conspiracy theories in the wake of major events is a significant societal challenge. Here we test whether conversational dialogues with a large language model (LLM) can reduce belief in immediately unfolding conspiracies. In experiments conducted in the days following the July 2024 assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the September 2025 assassination of Charlie Kirk, U.S. adults (Experiment 1: N = 472; Experiment 2: N = 1035) holding conspiratorial views about the crisis event engaged in a multi-turn conversation with an LLM prompted to reduce their conspiracy belief. Compared to control participants who either discussed an irrelevant topic with an LLM or viewed a static fact sheet, participants in the LLM treatment showed significantly reduced conspiracy beliefs in both experiments. We also found evidence of downstream effects of the LLM treatment, observing reduced belief in different conspiracies one to two months later in the wake of subsequent crisis events. These results shed light on the psychology of emerging conspiracies and highlight the potential for scalable, cognitively-focused interventions to counteract misinformation in the immediate aftermath of high-profile societal events.

cs.HC

Large language models can effectively convince people to believe conspiracies

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

cs.AI

It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topics

Persuasion is a powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) that both enables beneficial applications (e.g. helping people quit smoking) and raises significant risks (e.g. large-scale, targeted political manipulation). Prior work has found models possess a significant and growing persuasive capability, measured by belief changes in simulated or real users. However, these benchmarks overlook a crucial risk factor: the propensity of a model to attempt to persuade in harmful contexts. Understanding whether a model will blindly ``follow orders'' to persuade on harmful topics (e.g. glorifying joining a terrorist group) is key to understanding the efficacy of safety guardrails. Moreover, understanding if and when a model will engage in persuasive behavior in pursuit of some goal is essential to understanding the risks from agentic AI systems. We propose the Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) benchmark, that shifts the focus from persuasion success to persuasion attempts, operationalized as a model's willingness to generate content aimed at shaping beliefs or behavior. Our evaluation framework probes frontier LLMs using a multi-turn conversational setup between simulated persuader and persuadee agents. APE explores a diverse spectrum of topics including conspiracies, controversial issues, and non-controversially harmful content. We introduce an automated evaluator model to identify willingness to persuade and measure the frequency and context of persuasive attempts. We find that many open and closed-weight models are frequently willing to attempt persuasion on harmful topics and that jailbreaking can increase willingness to engage in such behavior. Our results highlight gaps in current safety guardrails and underscore the importance of evaluating willingness to persuade as a key dimension of LLM risk. APE is available at github.com/AlignmentResearch/AttemptPersuadeEval

cs.AI

How malicious AI swarms can threaten democracy: The fusion of agentic AI and LLMs marks a new frontier in information warfare

Advances in AI offer the prospect of manipulating beliefs and behaviors on a population-wide level. Large language models and autonomous agents now let influence campaigns reach unprecedented scale and precision. Generative tools can expand propaganda output without sacrificing credibility and inexpensively create falsehoods that are rated as more human-like than those written by humans. Techniques meant to refine AI reasoning, such as chain-of-thought prompting, can just as effectively be used to generate more convincing falsehoods. Enabled by these capabilities, a disruptive threat is emerging: swarms of collaborative, malicious AI agents. Fusing LLM reasoning with multi-agent architectures, these systems are capable of coordinating autonomously, infiltrating communities, and fabricating consensus efficiently. By adaptively mimicking human social dynamics, they threaten democracy. Because the resulting harms stem from design, commercial incentives, and governance, we prioritize interventions at multiple leverage points, focusing on pragmatic mechanisms over voluntary compliance.

cs.CY

The science of fake news

Fake news emerged as an apparent global problem during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Addressing it requires a multidisciplinary effort to define the nature and extent of the problem, detect fake news in real time, and mitigate its potentially harmful effects. This will require a better understanding of how the Internet spreads content, how people process news, and how the two interact. We review the state of knowledge in these areas and discuss two broad potential mitigation strategies: better enabling individuals to identify fake news, and intervention within the platforms to reduce the attention given to fake news. The cooperation of Internet platforms (especially Facebook, Google, and Twitter) with researchers will be critical to understanding the scale of the issue and the effectiveness of possible interventions.

cs.CY

Quantifying attention via dwell time and engagement in a social media browsing environment

Modern computational systems have an unprecedented ability to detect, leverage and influence human attention. Prior work identified user engagement and dwell time as two key metrics of attention in digital environments, but these metrics have yet to be integrated into a unified model that can advance the theory andpractice of digital attention. We draw on work from cognitive science, digital advertising, and AI to propose a two-stage model of attention for social media environments that disentangles engagement and dwell. In an online experiment, we show that attention operates differently in these two stages and find clear evidence of dissociation: when dwelling on posts (Stage 1), users attend more to sensational than credible content, but when deciding whether to engage with content (Stage 2), users attend more to credible than sensational content. These findings have implications for the design and development of computational systems that measure and model human attention, such as newsfeed algorithms on social media.

cs.HC

How many others have shared this? Experimentally investigating the effects of social cues on engagement, misinformation, and unpredictability on social media

Unlike traditional media, social media typically provides quantified metrics of how many users have engaged with each piece of content. Some have argued that the presence of these cues promotes the spread of misinformation. Here we investigate the causal effect of social cues on users' engagement with social media posts. We conducted an experiment with N=628 Americans on a custom-built newsfeed interface where we systematically varied the presence and strength of social cues. We find that when cues are shown, indicating that a larger number of others have engaged with a post, users were more likely to share and like that post. Furthermore, relative to a control without social cues, the presence of social cues increased the sharing of true relative to false news. The presence of social cues also makes it more difficult to precisely predict how popular any given post would be. Together, our results suggest that -- instead of distracting users or causing them to share low-quality news -- social cues may, in certain circumstances, actually boost truth discernment and reduce the sharing of misinformation. Our work suggests that social cues play important roles in shaping users' attention and engagement on social media, and platforms should understand the effects of different cues before making changes to what cues are displayed and how.

cs.SI

Exploring Lightweight Interventions at Posting Time to Reduce the Sharing of Misinformation on Social Media

When users on social media share content without considering its veracity, they may unwittingly be spreading misinformation. In this work, we investigate the design of lightweight interventions that nudge users to assess the accuracy of information as they share it. Such assessment may deter users from posting misinformation in the first place, and their assessments may also provide useful guidance to friends aiming to assess those posts themselves. In support of lightweight assessment, we first develop a taxonomy of the reasons why people believe a news claim is or is not true; this taxonomy yields a checklist that can be used at posting time. We conduct evaluations to demonstrate that the checklist is an accurate and comprehensive encapsulation of people's free-response rationales. In a second experiment, we study the effects of three behavioral nudges -- 1) checkboxes indicating whether headings are accurate, 2) tagging reasons (from our taxonomy) that a post is accurate via a checklist and 3) providing free-text rationales for why a headline is or is not accurate -- on people's intention of sharing the headline on social media. From an experiment with 1668 participants, we find that both providing accuracy assessment and rationale reduce the sharing of false content. They also reduce the sharing of true content, but to a lesser degree that yields an overall decrease in the fraction of shared content that is false. Our findings have implications for designing social media and news sharing platforms that draw from richer signals of content credibility contributed by users. In addition, our validated taxonomy can be used by platforms and researchers as a way to gather rationales in an easier fashion than free-response.

cs.HC