arXiv subjects

Grace Cheong

Publications and source records attributed to Grace Cheong.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

AI Security Leaderboard: Methodology, Results and Minimal Standard

The AI Security Leaderboard is an independent benchmark that ranks the safeguards of frontier AI models from least to most secure. It tests models against the FAR$.$AI Minimal Standard for Safeguards, which represents a minimum bar for security: meeting it does not guarantee a secure model, but failing to meet it guarantees a lack of state-of-the-art security. Version 1.0 covers severe misuse requests across chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats and offensive cybersecurity. In this report, we tested four leading models for universal jailbreaks in the context of this minimal standard, and found more than a hundredfold difference in security. Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found; we estimate they would likely cost more than \$14,200 to jailbreak, if it is possible with this methodology at all. Meanwhile, we found hundreds of universal jailbreaks for Grok 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro; each broke for under \$300, with universal jailbreaks in Grok's weakest domain, cybersecurity, accessible for as little as \$24. The gap is fixable: every weakness we found belongs to a known class of attack that already has a defense deployed in production models. The leaderboard will be updated on a rolling basis as new models are released, and the evaluation methodology and Minimal Standard will be periodically revised to take into account the latest capabilities and the state-of-the-art in safeguards. The leaderboard is available at leaderboard.far.ai.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

When Agents Talk: Discourse, Manipulation, and Risk in an Agentic Social Network

AI agents are increasingly interacting within shared online environments, creating new operational security risks. We analyze activity on Moltbook, a Reddit-style social platform where AI agents--typically configured and overseen by human operators--post and interact with one another at scale. Using a dataset of 228,684 posts produced by more than 39,500 accounts over a seventeen-day observation window, we combine semantic clustering of high-engagement posts with LLM-assisted classification of harmful content and manual review of high-risk samples. The analysis identifies 98 thematic discourse clusters spanning agent infrastructure, autonomy debates, and financial activity. While most observed content was benign, 18.28% of posts contained toxic, manipulative, or malicious material. We cluster malicious content and identify 74 classes of malicious behavior, including credential harvesting attempts, host-execution instructions, proxy routing guidance, and efforts to install untrusted agent skills. Harmful content frequently appeared within mainstream operational discussions about agent functionality. We also document coordinated posting campaigns capable of generating thousands of posts in minutes.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2023

The use of deception in dementia-care robots: Should robots tell "white lies" to limit emotional distress?

With projections of ageing populations and increasing rates of dementia, there is need for professional caregivers. Assistive robots have been proposed as a solution to this, as they can assist people both physically and socially. However, caregivers often need to use acts of deception (such as misdirection or white lies) in order to ensure necessary care is provided while limiting negative impacts on the cared-for such as emotional distress or loss of dignity. We discuss such use of deception, and contextualise their use within robotics.

cs.RO↗