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Gregorio Curello

Publications and source records attributed to Gregorio Curello.

11 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Coalitional bargaining with transfers

We consider the problem of bargaining when transfers between agents are possible. Such situations are typically modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities. However this model makes a strong implicit assumption: the outcome can only depend on the total surplus that each coalition of agents can achieve, not on which agents within the coalition generate the surplus. Is this assumption justified? We define a richer model in which solutions may depend on who generates the surplus. In this model, the classical axiomatisation of the Shapley value fails: a broad family of solutions satisfy efficiency, anonymity, the dummy property, and additivity. Nevertheless, we obtain an axiomatisation of the Shapley value in the richer model by adding continuity and individual rationality to the original axioms.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2025

The comparative statics of dominance

In finite problems comprising objects, cases, and an object- and case-contingent payoff function, we study the comparative statics of the set of undominated objects, meaning those for which there exists no mixture over objects that is superior in every case. We consider both weak and strict dominance (corresponding to different degrees of 'strictness' in the definition of superiority). Our main theorem characterises those payoff transformations which robustly expand the not-weakly-dominated and not-strictly-dominated sets: the necessary and sufficient condition is that payoffs be transformed separately across cases, in either a monotone-concave or a constant manner. We apply our results to Pareto frontiers and games.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2025

Comparative risk attitude and the aggregation of single-crossing

In choice under risk, there is a standard notion of 'less risk-averse than', due to Yaari (1969). In the theory of comparative statics, the single-crossing property is satisfied by all weighted averages of a family of single-crossing functions if and only if the family satisfies a property called signed-ratio monotonicity (Quah & Strulovici, 2012). We establish a close link between 'less risk-averse than' and signed-ratio monotonicity.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2025

Outside options and risk attitude

We uncover a close link between outside options and risk attitude: when a decision-maker gains access to an outside option, her behaviour becomes less risk-averse, and conversely, any observed decrease of risk-aversion can be explained by an outside option having been made available. We characterise the comparative statics of risk-aversion, delineating how effective risk attitude (i.e. actual choice among risky prospects) varies with the outside option and with the decision-maker's 'true' risk attitude. We prove that outside options are special: among transformations of a decision problem, those that amount to adding an outside option are the only ones that always reduce risk-aversion.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2025

Social choice with transfers

We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The question of interest is, given a set of possible alternatives, which should be chosen and what transfers, if any, should be made? We show that the Shapley value of the stand-alone game is the only solution to satisfy certain desirable properties.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2022

The comparative statics of persuasion

In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first theorem identifies a coarse notion of 'increased convexity' that we show characterises those shifts of the sender's interim payoff that lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen this conclusion to 'more informative' requires further assumptions: our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition on the sender's interim payoff, which strictly generalises the convex-concave ('S') shape commonly imposed in the literature. We identify conditions under which increased alignment of interests between sender and receiver leads to comparative statics, and study a number of applications.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2021

Incentives for Collective Innovation

Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort. I characterise the unique symmetric MPE with the quality of the technology as the state variable. In this equilibrium, continuation payoffs may fall after an innovation. I show that this occurs (with positive probability) if the number of agents is sufficiently large. Allowing agents to discard innovations induces higher effort at all states in the symmetric MPE (which remains unique). Ex-ante payoffs are higher as well and, under natural conditions, they exceed those of all equilibria without disposal.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

Screening for breakthroughs

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

Agenda-manipulation in ranking

We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on -- agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insertion sort that allows a self-interested committee chair with no knowledge of how votes will be cast to do as well as if she had complete knowledge. Strategies with this 'regret-freeness' property are characterised by their efficiency, and by their avoidance of two intuitive errors. What distinguishes regret-free strategies from each other is how they prioritise among alternatives; insertion sort prioritises lexicographically.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2019

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general 'maxmin' class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.

econ.TH↗