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Grigoris Ntousakis

Publications and source records attributed to Grigoris Ntousakis.

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Lexo: Eliminating Stealthy Supply-Chain Attacks via LLM-Assisted Program Regeneration

Software supply-chain attacks are an important and ongoing concern in the open source software ecosystem. These attacks maintain the standard functionality that a component implements, but additionally hide malicious functionality activated only when the component reaches its target environment. Lexo addresses such stealthy attacks by automatically learning and regenerating vulnerability-free versions of potentially malicious components. Lexo first generates a set of input-output pairs to model a component's full observable behavior, which it then uses to synthesize a new version of the original component. The new component implements the original functionality but avoids stealthy malicious behavior. Throughout this regeneration process, Lexo consults several distinct instances of Large Language Models (LLMs), uses correctness and coverage metrics to shepherd these instances, and guardrails their results. An evaluation on 100+ real-world packages, including high-profile stealthy supply-chain attacks, indicates that Lexo scales across multiple domains, regenerates code efficiently (<30m on average), maintains compatibility, and succeeds in eliminating malicious code in several real-world supply-chain-attacks, even in cases when a state-of-the-art LLM fails to eliminate malicious code when given the source code of the component and prompted to do so.

cs.CR

Mir: Automated Quantifiable Privilege Reduction Against Dynamic Library Compromise in JavaScript

Third-party libraries ease the development of large-scale software systems. However, they often execute with significantly more privilege than needed to complete their task. This additional privilege is often exploited at runtime via dynamic compromise, even when these libraries are not actively malicious. Mir addresses this problem by introducing a fine-grained read-write-execute (RWX) permission model at the boundaries of libraries. Every field of an imported library is governed by a set of permissions, which developers can express when importing libraries. To enforce these permissions during program execution, Mir transforms libraries and their context to add runtime checks. As permissions can overwhelm developers, Mir's permission inference generates default permissions by analyzing how libraries are used by their consumers. Applied to 50 popular libraries, Mir's prototype for JavaScript demonstrates that the RWX permission model combines simplicity with power: it is simple enough to automatically infer 99.33% of required permissions, it is expressive enough to defend against 16 real threats, it is efficient enough to be usable in practice (1.93% overhead), and it enables a novel quantification of privilege reduction.

cs.CR