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Guangming Xie

Publications and source records attributed to Guangming Xie.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Using Robotic Fish to Explore the Hydrodynamic Mechanism of Energy Saving in a Fish School

Fish often travel in highly organized schools. One of the most quoted functions of these configurations is energy savings. Here, we verified the hypothesis and explored the mechanism through series of experiments on "schooling" robotic fish, which can undulate actively with flexible body, resembling real fish. We find that, when the school swims in the same spatial arrays as the real one, the energy consumption of the follower mainly depends on the phase difference, a phase angle by which the body wave of the follower leads or lags that of the leader, instead of spatial arrays. Further analysis through flow visualization indicates that the follower saves energy when the phase difference corresponds to the situation that the follower flaps in the same direction of the flow field induced by the vortex dipole shedding by the leader. Using biomimetic robots to verify the biological hypothesis in this paper also sheds new light on the connections among the fields of engineering, physics and biology.

physics.bio-ph↗

Environment-dependent payoffs in finite populations

In constant-payoff finite population games, when selection is weak and population size is large, the one-third law serves as the condition for a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the case where payoff matrices are environment-dependent and provide a more general law. In this way we model feedback from the environment and show its impact on the dynamics.

q-bio.PE↗

Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.

physics.soc-ph↗

Evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations

We propose a model for evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies $A$, $B$ and $C$ in the framework of Moran process in finite populations. The model can be described as a stochastic process which can be numerically computed from a system of linear equations. Furthermore, to capture the feature of the evolutionary process, we define two essential variables, the {\em global} and the {\em local} fixation probability. If the {\em global} fixation probability of strategy $A$ exceeds the neutral fixation probability, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ no matter what the initial ratio of $B$ to $C$ is. Similarly, if the {\em local} fixation probability of $A$ exceeds the neutral one, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ only in some appropriate initial ratios of $B$ to $C$. Besides, using our model, the famous game with AllC, AllD and TFT is analyzed. Meanwhile, we find that a single individual TFT could invade the entire population under proper conditions.

physics.soc-ph↗