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Guangsheng Yu

Publications and source records attributed to Guangsheng Yu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Frozen Memory Is Not Enough: Rethinking External Memory as Extraction

Methods for improving knowledge use in large language models typically fall into two regimes. Non-parametric retrieval offers flexible access to external knowledge, but adds retrieval latency, context overhead, and only shallow integration with the backbone. Parametric adaptation is efficient at inference time, but entangles knowledge with model weights and can be hard to update, audit, or transfer. Engram-style hashed memory occupies a middle regime: it stores learned information in an external, addressable table, yet consumes that table through a small learned reader. This raises a basic question: when such a memory is moved across backbones, what matters more, the frozen memory itself or the target-side reader? We study this question through cross-model frozen-memory extraction, in which a memory trained on a source model is frozen and attached to a different target model, with only a lightweight reader trained. Ablations show that learned memory content and correct addressing both matter, while the amount of usable signal depends on how well the reader is aligned to the target model. In downstream question answering tasks, a dual-layer, four-branch reader nearly closes the gap between same-model and cross-model reuse, achieving an average score of 38.8 under our controlled evaluation protocol. Moreover, when the provider reader is directly compatible with the target interface, the frozen artifact can provide substantial utility without target-side training, while optional reader adaptation yields further improvement. These results suggest that Engram can serve as a reusable external knowledge artifact, provided that the target has access to a compatible reader interface; target-side adaptation can further improve alignment when direct reader reuse is insufficient.

cs.CL↗

Diversity Combining for Multi-Path LLM Reasoning

Multi-path reasoning methods such as self-consistency (SC) sample $K$ reasoning paths and choose the most frequent answer. However, their gains quickly plateau as $K$ increases, and locating this saturation point currently requires fitting a scaling model to accuracies measured at several values of $K$ or stopping online per query. We formalize multi-path LLM reasoning as a diversity combining problem from wireless communications: each path is a noisy channel observation, and the pairwise correlation of path correctness caps the design-effect effective sample size of the vote at a finite ceiling. Generalized least squares (GLS) analysis shows that, for paths with equal gains, the optimal linear combiner of latent embeddings is uniform exactly when every row of the path covariance has the same sum, as under exchangeability, supporting majority vote as the natural default in standard SC while leaving room for weighting or pruning under heterogeneous prompt-template branches. Across 5 models and 12 benchmarks, prompt-template diversity reduces path correlation in $55$ of $60$ model-benchmark cells, with a mean relative reduction of $16\%$ and reductions in every task domain. We derive an Adaptive-K rule that uses a four-path pilot to select $K^*$, retaining $96$--$103\%$ of MV@$K{=}32$ accuracy across Math, QA, and NLU.

cs.AI↗

Who Verifies the Verifiers? Accountable Semantic Consensus for AI-Mediated Web Information Verification

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly decide whether Web evidence supports online claims, often by voting over several assessors whose errors are presumed independent and benign. On the open Web, retrieved pages can steer the assessors that read them, and assessors from one model family fail together. We prove that even for independent assessors whose every output sequence is possible on both valid and invalid claims, any protocol that decides only from their outputs and always reaches an agreed verdict never rejects invalid claims or rejects valid ones with positive probability. We present Astral, which pins all assessors to one committed snapshot of the Web evidence. With up to f assessors faulty, Astral accepts a verdict only when 2f+1 assessors attest to it above a confidence threshold and no signed challenge stands. On five public benchmarks with two of seven assessors adversarial, Astral lowers pooled attack success to 21.5-53.1%, against 54.7-77.8% for majority voting. The cost is coverage, as without attack 16.0-61.7% of claims receive a binary verdict and the rest are disputed for audit. Our code runs at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Astral-55F1.

cs.CR↗

MemoryAthena: Adaptive Routing over Latent and Generated Memories

Learned-memory methods store information in an explicit table and consume it through a separate reader, allowing addressing, storage, and reading to be modified independently. We study whether useful memory can also be generated rather than only retrieved. MemoryAthena uses three pathways: direct Engram retrieval (E), generation from retrieved Engram cues (GE), and generation from causal backbone states without consulting the memory table (GH). Generated memory is conditionally useful: it can complement E in one context but interfere with it in another. MemoryAthena therefore treats E as an anchor and learns when a generated representation should intervene. With the backbone, memory, generators, and readers frozen, a lightweight causal routing head is trained from counterfactual future-token likelihood advantages of GE and GH relative to E. At inference time, an admitted candidate modifies the E residual through bounded interpolation, while rejection recovers the direct pathway exactly. On question answering, MemoryAthena raises the five-task average from 37.65 to 39.28 over the direct pathway of the same checkpoint, while the six-task general-NLP average increases from 76.73 to 79.13. The complete memory-side system contains approximately 201M parameters, excluding the frozen backbone. Further analyses show complementary strengths among E, GE, and GH across tasks and inputs. These results support generated memory as a selective correction to direct retrieval and highlight routing when, which, and how strongly to intervene as the central challenge.

cs.CL↗

SoK: Semantic Decision Engines in Network Control Loops

A semantic decision engine such as Jev can return a valid answer and still miss a network deadline, select an infeasible action or leave the service unverified. We systematize 139 paper families by decision interface, execution path and check ownership. Fifty families claim that their engine fits a control loop or time budget, but only four support the claim with matched measurement. Across all 139, four report deadline attainment. The gap concentrates where the decision has no deterministic computation step. Those 72 families make 22 of the claims, none supported, and name a coverage owner in only two. Bounded tests under one event model show that each gap can reverse an admission verdict. A decision that meets a 10 s budget for every isolated request meets it for none once decisions queue ahead of replayed execution times. The same engine passes one coverage check and fails another. We derive a minimum reporting record, design rules and a research agenda for admitting decision engines to control loops.

cs.NI↗

Intent Interpretation at RIC Timescales: Jev Decision Models versus Large Language Models in 6G Open RAN

Intent-based Open RAN needs an interpreter that turns intents into A1 policies within the loop of the RAN intelligent controller (RIC). Decision models such as Jev-1.13.0 return typed policy fields, whereas generative large language models (LLMs) produce the policy token by token. We ask whether the extra delay of LLMs costs control deadlines, RIC capacity, or radio performance. We compare Jev-1.13.0 and two other decision models with LLMs on the RANIntent v1 benchmark, in closed-loop ns-3 simulation and on a real A1 and E2 path. Median interpretation takes 0.286 to 2.35 s, against under 25 ms for A1 and E2 transfer. Jev-1.13.0 meets the 1 s near-real-time budget on 99.8% of calls, while two hosted LLMs meet it on 17.9% and 0%. In the radio network, ideal enforcement moves the affected-class service-level agreement (SLA) violation by 3.96 percentage points in the direction each intent requests, against no update at the base point. No hosted LLM showed a resolved increase over Jev-1.13.0 at that point. At the same point, per-second direct control gave no resolved SLA reduction over a numerical xApp. Slow interpreters miss the 1 s budget, and two interpreters saturate their queues at 2 intents/s, whereas no radio penalty of slow interpreters was resolved at the base point.

cs.NI↗

Replacing Large Language Models with Jev Decision Models for Low-Latency Edge Service Orchestration

Natural-language service requests can require a language-model decision before execution starts, consuming part of the request's latency budget. We integrate Jev's decision-oriented application programming interface (API) into edge service orchestration to reduce this overhead while retaining service completion. The integration extracts four to eight bounded intent fields and applies a shared validator, admission policy, and scheduler, accounting for decision waiting throughout the request timeline. We compare Jev, two self-hosted decision models, and three hosted large language models (LLMs) on 8,280 verified requests and on a live admission path with modeled execution and a real optical character recognition service. Across 33 test conditions, Jev reduces median decision latency by 22.7-64.5% relative to the fastest LLM. This latency barely moves with input size, contract width, or catalog size. On four-field contracts, Jev's API fees per correct decision are 59.7-80.9% lower at a cost of a few exact-match points, while wide contracts mark the limit of the substitution. Receiving the service catalog with each request, Jev names unseen services as accurately as known ones. On the live admission path, Jev keeps 0.91-0.95 of requests exact and on time at loads where the LLMs fall below 0.1. Since caching repeated descriptions gives the interpreters nearly the same latency, Jev's gain lies in fresh decisions. These results support decision-model substitution for latency-bound admission on bounded contracts.

cs.DC↗

MDRC: A Deployable State-Recovery Defense for Traffic Signal Control under Sensor Corruption

Traffic Signal Control (TSC) is a safety-critical cyber-physical system that relies on real-time sensing. Corrupted observations caused by adversarial perturbations or sensor failures can propagate from the sensing layer into the controller and degrade traffic efficiency. Existing robust Reinforcement Learning (RL)-based TSC methods often suffer from limited cross-city generalization, high inference latency, and weak recovery under partial observability. We present MDRC (Meta-Diffusion-based framework for Resilient traffic signal Control against adversarial attacks and sensor failures), a post-detection state-recovery defense inserted between sensing and control. MDRC reconstructs trustworthy traffic states before they are consumed by the controller. It combines Denoising Diffusion Implicit Models (DDIM) for efficient state recovery with Reptile meta-learning for a transferable initialization across cities. We provide an optimization-based view of the DDIM recovery dynamics and establish a recovery-error bound that separates score approximation, numerical discretization, and initialization mismatch. Across seven real-world-derived CityFlow benchmarks, MDRC reduces Average Travel Time by 6.77% under stochastic and policy-aware attacks and by 12.75% under structured sensor loss, while improving state-recovery fidelity. We further evaluate 3,600 seconds of real roadside measurements with 50% of detector channels disabled and integrate MDRC into a hardware-in-the-loop traffic-signal stack. Over a 9.16-hour run with 32,389 sensing/control cycles, the system achieves 99.79% decision availability, produces no out-of-plan recommendations, and requires approximately 38 ms of component-wise processing per one-second control interval.

cs.CR↗

Your Model Is Leaking: Covert Information Transfer through LLM Residual Streams

Privacy-sensitive organizations may run large language models (LLMs) in restricted or air-gapped environments while exporting selected diagnostic artifacts. We show that a compromised runtime component can hide sensitive information in intermediate activations that are allowed to leave the restricted environment. An offline observer can recover this information with a simple linear decoder. The attack requires no model retraining or weight modification, no attacker-controlled egress, and no control over the recorder or transfer process. We introduce a residual-stream covert-channel attack that maps messages to codewords and injects them into an intermediate residual stream through a compromised runtime hook. To maintain recoverability, the injection strength is scaled with the local residual norm using the signal-to-residual-norm ratio. Across eleven models from seven architecture families, our evaluation shows 91--100% recovery on nine models with KL divergence 0.001--0.007, while evaluated activation-level detectors remain close to random guessing (AUC <= 0.56). Tested post-hoc defenses do not reliably eliminate the channel. Thus, an activation artifact can be schema-valid while carrying information that is not authorized to cross the boundary.

cs.CR↗

K-Bench: A Benchmark for LLM Unlearning in Agentic Deployments

Unlearning benchmarks such as TOFU and MUSE certify forgetting by reading the model's final answer, where a model that refuses to answer already counts as having forgotten. We show that this model-level certificate does not transfer once the model is deployed as an agent. We introduce K-Bench, a benchmark that scores LLM unlearning under agentic deployment. K-Bench inspects all six channels a ReAct agent exposes, including its chain-of-thought (CoT), tool calls and tool observations, and elicited summary. A query counts as leaked if the secret appears in any of them. Each experiment places the secret in exactly one of the agent's three sources (the weights, the prompt, or the retrieval store). The K-Score is computed separately for each source and credits forgetting only when the agent remains usable. Clearing the answer channel does not make the secret unrecoverable. On structured retrieval, the secret stays verbatim in the tool-observation channel and the aggregate leak rate is unchanged. When the secret lives in the prompt or the retrieval store, TOFU and MUSE report no leakage, while the deployed agent still leaks it on 22--86\% of queries. When the secret is in the weights, none of the twenty evaluated published methods demonstrably removes it, and only an input-corruption intervention reaches selective forgetting under the evaluated observer. The top-ranked method changes across base models. A refusal-tuning method resists the evaluated extraction without verified knowledge removal.

cs.AI↗

DEFENGRAPH: Knowledge Graph-Enhanced LLMs for Blue Team Cyber Defense

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise for supporting decision-making in cybersecurity, but their reliability in high-stakes, time-evolving environments remains limited due to hallucinations, poor temporal reasoning, and shallow grounding in system context. We introduce DEFENGRAPH, an LLM-driven assistant designed to support human defenders during cybersecurity incidents. DEFENGRAPH improves contextual reasoning by integrating a dual-layer Static-Dynamic Knowledge Graph (KG) with graph-based path retrieval, LLM-driven contextual filtering, and reasoning-based re-ranking. The framework grounds LLM outputs in both long-term domain knowledge and evolving event context, enabling faithful and temporally aware decision support. We evaluate DEFENGRAPH in a cyber defense setting using knowledge graphs constructed from heterogeneous security artifacts, including SIEM alerts, system topology, attacker behaviors, and prior defensive actions. The evaluation uses data collected during live Red vs. Blue team cyber range exercises simulating attacks on critical infrastructure, which generate realistic and noisy datasets reflecting real-world defender workflows and system dynamics. Evaluations across four prevalent LLMs show that DEFENGRAPH sets a new state-of-the-art: on GPT-4o it boosts reasoning-recall from 61.45\% to 73.49\% and ticket-action recall from 52.17% to 72.46% (precision 24.49\% to 29.24\%), with similar gains on LLaMA-3 (46.99\% to 61.45\%), DeepSeek-R1 (45.78\% to 56.63\%) and QWen-3 (51.81\% to 59.04\%), while surfacing up to 50 correct defense actions versus 36 for the next best baseline and holding fault rates steady.

cs.CR↗

Counted NFT Transfers

Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) on Ethereum currently follow a binary mobility paradigm: ERC-721 enables unrestricted transfers, whereas SBTs (ERC-5192) prohibit transfers entirely. We identify a design gap in which no standard mechanism supports bounded transferability, where ownership mobility is allowed but limited to a finite number of programmable transfers. We study counted NFT transfers and introduce ERC-7634 as a minimal realization compatible with ERC-721. The design augments each token with a transfer counter and configurable cap L, allowing ownership to evolve under a finite transfer budget. ERC-7634 defines a minimal extension interface with three lightweight functions (transferCountOf, setTransferLimit, and transferLimitOf), two events, and native-transfer hooks, requiring fewer than 60 additional lines of Solidity while preserving full backward compatibility with existing NFT infrastructure. We analyze behavioral and economic consequences of counted transfers. Our results reveal (i) a mobility premium induced by remaining transfer capacity, (ii) a protocol-level costing signal that can deter wash trading in cap-aware markets through irreversible budget consumption, (iii) bounded recursive collateralization enabled by limited ownership turnover, and (iv) associated security and gas-cost implications, including wrapper-bypass trade-offs. Evaluation on calibrated simulations shows that moderate limits (e.g., L = 10) affect fewer than 15% of tokens under representative transfer distributions, while repeated manipulation becomes unprofitable after a few cycles in a cap-aware pricing model; the additional gas overhead remains below 11% per transfer. We further position ERC-7634 within the NFT mobility design space, derive practical cap-selection guidelines, and discuss post-cap ownership outcomes including soulbound conversion, auto-burn, and provenance freeze.

cs.CR↗

MEV in Binance Builder

We study builder-driven MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain (BSC). BSC's Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) adopts a leaner design: only whitelisted builders can participate, blocks are produced at shorter intervals, and private order flow bypasses the public mempool. These features have long raised community concerns over centralization, which we empirically confirm by tracing the arbitrage activities of the two dominant builders from Apr. 1, 2025 to Feb. 28, 2026 (full observable activity cycle). Within months, the two leading builders, \bd{48Club} and \bd{Blockrazor}, produced over 87\% of blocks and captured about 90\%+ of MEV profits. We find that profits concentrate in short, low-hop arbitrage routes over wrapped tokens and stablecoins, and that block construction rapidly converges toward monopoly. Beyond concentration alone, our analysis reveals a structural source of inequality: BSC's short block interval and whitelisted PBS collapse the contestable window for MEV competition, amplifying latency advantages and excluding slower builders and searchers. MEV extraction on BSC is not only more centralized than on Ethereum, but also structurally more vulnerable to censorship and fairness erosion.

cs.CR↗

PoLO: Proof-of-Learning and Proof-of-Ownership at Once with Chained Watermarking

Our evaluation shows that PoLO achieves \textbf{99\%} watermark detection accuracy for ownership verification, while preserving data privacy and cutting verification costs to just \textbf{1.5--10\%} of traditional methods. Forging PoLO demands \textbf{1.1--4$\times$} more resources than honest proof generation, with the original proof retaining over \textbf{90\%} detection accuracy even after attacks.

cs.CR↗

Knows: Agent-Native Structured Research Representations

Research artifacts are distributed primarily as reader-oriented documents like PDFs. This creates a bottleneck for increasingly agent-assisted and agent-native research workflows, in which LLM agents need to infer fine-grained, task-relevant information from lengthy full documents, a process that is expensive, repetitive, and unstable at scale. We introduce Knows, a lightweight companion specification that binds structured claims, evidence, provenance, and verifiable relations to existing research artifacts in a form LLM agents can consume directly. Knows addresses the gap with a thin YAML sidecar (KnowsRecord) that coexists with the original PDF, requiring no changes to the publication itself, and validated by a deterministic schema linter. We evaluate Knows on 140 comprehension questions across 20 papers spanning 14 academic disciplines, comparing PDF-only, sidecar-only, and hybrid conditions across six LLM agents of varying capacity. Weak models (0.8B--2B parameters) improve from 19--25\% to 47--67\% accuracy (+29 to +42 percentage points) when reading sidecar instead of PDF, while consuming 29--86\% fewer input tokens; an LLM-as-judge re-scoring confirms that weak-model sidecar accuracy (75--77\%) approaches stronger-model PDF accuracy (78--83\%). Beyond this controlled evaluation, a community sidecar hub at https://knows.academy/ has already indexed over ten thousand publications and continues to grow daily, providing independent evidence that the format is adoption-ready at scale.

cs.AI↗

Clawed and Dangerous: Can We Trust Open Agentic Systems?

Open agentic systems combine LLM-based planning with external capabilities, persistent memory, and privileged execution. They are used in coding assistants, browser copilots, and enterprise automation. OpenClaw is a visible instance of this broader class. Without much attention yet, their security challenge is fundamentally different from that of traditional software that relies on predictable execution and well-defined control flow. In open agentic systems, everything is ''probabilistic'': plans are generated at runtime, key decisions may be shaped by untrusted natural-language inputs and tool outputs, execution unfolds in uncertain environments, and actions are taken under authority delegated by human users. The central challenge is therefore not merely robustness against individual attacks, but the governance of agentic behavior under persistent uncertainty. This paper systematizes the area through a software engineering lens. We introduce a six-dimensional analytical taxonomy and synthesize 50 papers spanning attacks, benchmarks, defenses, audits, and adjacent engineering foundations. From this synthesis, we derive a reference doctrine for secure-by-construction agent platforms, together with an evaluation scorecard for assessing platform security posture. Our review shows that the literature is relatively mature in attack characterization and benchmark construction, but remains weak in deployment controls, operational governance, persistent-memory integrity, and capability revocation. These gaps define a concrete engineering agenda for building agent ecosystems that are governable, auditable, and resilient under compromise.

cs.CR↗

PlanTwin: Privacy-Preserving Planning Abstractions for Cloud-Assisted LLM Agents

Cloud-hosted large language models (LLMs) have become the de facto planners in agentic systems, coordinating tools and guiding execution over local environments. In many deployments, however, the environment being planned over is private, containing source code, files, credentials, and metadata that cannot be exposed to the cloud. Existing solutions address adjacent concerns, such as execution isolation, access control, or confidential inference, but they do not control what cloud planners observe during planning: within the permitted scope, \textit{raw environment state is still exposed}. We introduce PlanTwin, a privacy-preserving architecture for cloud-assisted planning without exposing raw local context. The key idea is to project the real environment into a \textit{planning-oriented digital twin}: a schema-constrained and de-identified abstract graph that preserves planning-relevant structure while removing reconstructable details. The cloud planner operates solely on this sanitized twin through a bounded capability interface, while a local gatekeeper enforces safety policies and cumulative disclosure budgets. We further formalize the privacy-utility trade-off as a capability granularity problem, define architectural privacy goals using $(k,δ)$-anonymity and $ε$-unlinkability, and mitigate compositional leakage through multi-turn disclosure control. We implement PlanTwin as middleware between local agents and cloud planners and evaluate it on 60 agentic tasks across ten domains with four cloud planners. PlanTwin achieves full sensitive-item non-disclosure (SND = 1.0) while maintaining planning quality close to full-context systems: three of four planners achieve PQS $> 0.79$, and the full pipeline incurs less than 2.2\% utility loss.

cs.CR↗

In the Margins: An Empirical Study of Ethereum Inscriptions

Ethereum Inscriptions (Ethscriptions) repurpose Ethereum calldata into a persistent inscription channel by embedding \texttt{data:}~URI payloads. These transactions typically target externally owned accounts, allowing the payload to bypass EVM execution while remaining permanently replicated across full nodes. Although calldata was originally designed for compact smart-contract parameters, this repurposing enables structured data embedding with long-term storage consequences. We present the first large-scale empirical study of Ethscriptions, treating them as a distinct \emph{calldata-resident workload} rather than merely a subset of general calldata usage. Our analysis focuses on the \textit{Ethscription} operational subset, which consists of payloads that decode to JSON and conform to a token-operation grammar (e.g., \texttt{p}, \texttt{op}, \texttt{tick}, \texttt{amt}). From $6.27$ million Ethscription candidates (\Uone), we extract $4.75$ million Ethscription operations (\Utwo, $75.8\%$ of \Uone). This result shows that structured token-like activity dominates the ecosystem. Our measurements further reveal (i) a complete workload lifecycle compressed into nine months (bootstrap, expansion, saturation), (ii) proliferation of $30$+ competing protocols without convergence toward a dominant standard, (iii) a lifecycle funnel exhibiting $201\times$ deploy-to-mint amplification and a $57.6{:}1$ mint-to-transfer collapse indicative of speculative minting, (iv) extreme participation inequality (Gini~$0.86$), and (v) a measurable permanent data footprint imposed on the Ethereum network.

cs.CE↗