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Guevara Noubir

Publications and source records attributed to Guevara Noubir.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

FlyBlind: Cross-Slice Timeliness Attacks on UAV Situational Awareness over 5G

Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) operating over 5G Standalone (SA) networks use a shared User Plane for both command-and-control (C2) data and video feedback. Operators assess link quality through latency and availability, relying on soft isolation between network slices. However, the risk that an authorized co-tenant could make the Ground Control Station (GCS) state outdated without disrupting the connection remains underexplored. This work introduces FlyBlind, a timeliness attack in which an authorized co-tenant on a neighboring slice maintains legitimate uplink demand, causing state aging at the GCS without a rogue gNB or direct interference with C2 traffic. Our key insight is that, under soft isolation, sharing idle resources turns authorized competition for grants into state aging that conventional link monitors fail to detect. We formalize this effect, termed Silent State Staleness, as a falsifiable false-healthy predicate. On a dedicated testbed, telemetry age at the GCS saturates at approximately 12 seconds, with discrepancies of tens of meters between the GCS position estimate and ground truth, while the one-way delay (OWD) p99 remains in the tens of milliseconds, availability exceeds 99.9%, and the vehicle keeps operating in GUIDED mode without triggering failsafe mechanisms. These findings indicate that, in deployments with asymmetric uplink enforcement, verifying state freshness at the destination is essential rather than relying solely on link health.

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POLARIS: PHY-Aware Spectrum Steering for Dynamic Spectrum Sharing

Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (DSS) enables flexible activation of additional spectrum resources but leaves open a key runtime question: once new spectrum becomes available, which steering mechanism should migrate connected devices toward it with minimum service disruption? We present the first PHY-aware characterization of 3GPP-compliant UE steering mechanisms, including Bandwidth Part (BWP) reconfiguration, Carrier Aggregation (CA), E-UTRA-NR Dual Connectivity (EN-DC), Connected-Mode Handover (HO), and Release and Redirection (R&R), using modem-level traces from devices connected to operational networks, collected across 1,600 executions over four months in 12 urban areas. By mapping each mechanism to observable PHY-layer milestones, we decompose steering latency into intrinsic PHY-centric execution and RRC-to-PHY completion components, revealing substantial heterogeneity: NR BWP achieves 6.25 ms mean latency with zero tail exceedance above 50 ms, while CA exceeds 1225 ms; mobility procedures remain largely modem-bound, whereas discovery-driven mechanisms experience significant RRC-to-PHY completion amplification. Guided by these measurements, we design POLARIS, an O-RAN-based system that selects the least disruptive steering mechanism via a two-parameter disruption score. POLARIS reduces mean latency by up to 85.1% and T95 by 89.7% over static or non-adaptive baselines, eliminates tail exceedance above 50 ms, and avoids high-disruption mechanisms, demonstrating that PHY-layer execution profiling enables reliable and context-aware spectrum steering in DSS-enabled networks.

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When Connectivity Is Not Enough: Cross-Layer Attacks on UAV C2 over 5G

Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations increasingly use 5G standalone (SA) networks for command and control (C2) between the UAV and the ground control station (GCS). The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified mechanisms for authentication and authorization of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in this architectural setting. As a result, operators may treat registration state, Protocol Data Unit (PDU) session status, and IP reachability as evidence that the C2 path is available. In practice, however, these connectivity indicators alone do not guarantee that closed-loop control remains operationally safe. Attacks can degrade UAS C2 when timeliness degrades under shared User Plane contention, mobility continuity fails during Control Plane instability, or command integrity is violated at a trusted next-generation Node B (gNodeB). Such failures undermine connectivity as the central security indicator for UAV operations. In this paper, we demonstrate these issues using three distinct threat models on a reproducible Open5GS and UERANSIM testbed that carries Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) over the 5G User Plane, and we use a commercial Nokia core to ground deployment assumptions. We address timeliness, availability, and integrity through experiments in which attack success is defined as forcing an unsafe closed-loop state without a clean disconnect. We observe stale telemetry and heavy-tailed delay under co-tenant User Plane contention, failsafe after handover under Control Plane instability, and navigation hijacking after command rewriting at a compromised gNodeB. We further discuss why each threat model arises and evaluate mitigations for these cross-layer failures. Across the study, we disclosed five robustness issues: three CVEs have already been assigned, and two additional CVE requests are pending.

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AirCatch: Effectively tracing advanced tag-based trackers

Tag-based tracking ecosystems help users locate lost items, but can be leveraged for unwanted tracking and stalking. Existing protocol-driven defenses and prior academic solutions largely assume stable identifiers or predictable beaconing. However, identifier-based defenses fundamentally break down against advanced rogue trackers that aggressively rotate identifiers. We present AirCatch, a passive detection system that exploits a physical-layer constraint: while logical identifiers can change arbitrarily fast, the transmitter's analog imprint remains stable and reappears as a compact and persistently occupied region in Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO) feature space. AirCatch advances the state of the art along three axes: (i) a novel, modulation-aware CFO fingerprint that augments packet-level CFO with content-independent CFO components that amplify device distinctiveness; (ii) a new tracking detection algorithm based on high core density and persistence that is robust to contamination and evasion through per-identifier segmentation; and (iii) an ultra-low-cost receiver, an approximately 10 dollar BLE SDR named BlePhasyr, built from commodity components, that makes RF fingerprinting based detection practical in resource-constrained deployments. We evaluate AirCatch across Apple, Google, Tile, and Samsung tag families in multi-hour captures, systematically stress-test evasion using a scenario generator over a grid of transmission and rotation periods, and validate in diverse real-world mobility traces including home and office commutes, public transport, car travel, and airport journeys while sweeping background tag density. Across these stress tests, AirCatch achieves no false positives and early detection over a wide range of adversarial configurations and environments, degrading gracefully only in extreme low-rate regimes that also reduce attacker utility.

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ARGOS: Anomaly Recognition and Guarding through O-RAN Sensing

Rogue Base Station (RBS) attacks, particularly those exploiting downgrade vulnerabilities, remain a persistent threat as 5G Standalone (SA) deployments are still limited and User Equipment (UE) manufacturers continue to support legacy network connectivity. This work introduces ARGOS, a comprehensive O-RAN compliant Intrusion Detection System (IDS) deployed within the Near Real-Time RIC, designed to detect RBS downgrade attacks in real time, an area previously unexplored within the O-RAN context. The system enhances the 3GPP KPM Service Model to enable richer, UE-level telemetry and features a custom xApp that applies unsupervised Machine Learning models for anomaly detection. Distinctively, the updated KPM Service Model operates on cross-layer features extracted from Modem Layer 1 (ML1) logs and Measurement Reports collected directly from Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) UEs. To evaluate system performance under realistic conditions, a dedicated testbed is implemented using Open5GS, srsRAN, and FlexRIC, and validated against an extensive real-world measurement dataset. Among the evaluated models, the Variational Autoencoder (VAE) achieves the best balance of detection performance and efficiency, reaching 99.5% Accuracy with only 0.6% False Positives and minimal system overhead.

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Establishing Trust in the Beyond-5G Core Network using Trusted Execution Environments

The fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks starts a paradigm shift from the traditional monolithic system design to a Service Based Architecture, that fits modern performance requirements and scales efficiently to new services. This paradigm will be the foundation of future cellular core networks beyond 5G. The new architecture splits network functionalities into smaller logical entities that can be disaggregated logically, physically, and geographically. This affords interoperability between the mobile network operators and commercial software and hardware vendors or cloud providers. By making use of commodity services and products, this system construct inherits the vulnerabilities in those underlying technologies, thereby increasing its attack surface and requiring a rigorous security analysis. In this work, we review the security implications introduced in B5G networks, and the security mechanisms that are supported by the 5G standard. We emphasize on the support of Zero Trust Architecture in 5G and its relevance in decentralized deployments. We revisit the definition of trust in modern enterprise network operations and identify important Zero Trust properties that are weakened by the nature of cloud deployments. To that end, we propose a vertical extension of Zero Trust, namely, Zero Trust Execution, to model untrusted execution environments, and we provide an analysis on how to establish trust in Beyond-5G network architectures using Trusted Execution Environments. Our analysis shows how our model architecture handles the increased attack surface and reinforces the Zero Trust Architecture principles in the 5G Core, without any changes to the 5G standard. Finally, we provide experimental results over a 5G testbed using Open5GS and UERANSIM that demonstrate minimal performance overhead, and a monetary cost evaluation.

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Unprotected 4G/5G Control Procedures at Low Layers Considered Dangerous

Over the years, several security vulnerabilities in the 3GPP cellular systems have been demonstrated in the literature. Most studies focus on higher layers of the cellular radio stack, such as the RRC and NAS, which are cryptographically protected. However, lower layers of the stack, such as PHY and MAC, are not as thoroughly studied, even though they are neither encrypted nor integrity protected. Furthermore, the latest releases of 5G significantly increased the number of low-layer control messages and procedures. The complexity of the cellular standards and the high degree of cross-layer operations, makes reasoning about security non-trivial, and requires a systematic analysis. We study the control procedures carried by each physical channel, and find that current cellular systems are susceptible to several new passive attacks due to information leakage, and active attacks by injecting MAC and PHY messages. For instance, we find that beamforming information leakage enables fingerprinting-based localization and tracking of users. We identify active attacks that reduce the users' throughput by disabling RF front ends at the UE, disrupt user communications by tricking other connected UEs into acting as jammers, or stealthily disconnect an active user. We evaluate our attacks against COTS UEs in various scenarios and demonstrate their practicality by measuring current operators' configurations across three countries. Our results show that an attacker can, among other things, localize users with an accuracy of 20 meters 96% of the time, track users' moving paths with a probability of 90%, reduce throughput by more than 95% within 2 seconds (by spoofing a 39 bits DCI), and disconnect users.

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An Efficient Radar Receiver for OFDM-based Joint Radar and Communication Systems

We propose in this work a radar detection system for orthogonal-frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) transmission. We assume that the transmitting antenna Tx is colocated with a monostatic radar. The latter knows the transmitted signal and listens to echoes coming from the reflection of fixed or moving targets. We estimate the targets parameters (range and velocity) using a 2D-Periodogram. Moreover, we improve the estimation performance in low signal to noise ratio (SNR) conditions using the discrete Fourier transform channel estimation (DFT-CE) and we show that Zadoff-Chu precoding (ZCP) adopted for communication, does not degrade the radar estimation in good SNR conditions. Furthermore, since the dimensions of the data matrix can be much larger than the number of targets to be detected, we propose a sparse Fourier transform based Fourier projection-slice (FPS-SFT) algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of the 2D-Periodogram. An appropriate system parameterization in the 77GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band, allows to achieve a range resolution of 30.52 cm and a velocity resolution of 0.67 m/s and to reduce the periodogram computation time up to around 98.84%.

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Towards an AI-Driven Universal Anti-Jamming Solution with Convolutional Interference Cancellation Network

Wireless links are increasingly used to deliver critical services, while intentional interference (jamming) remains a very serious threat to such services. In this paper, we are concerned with the design and evaluation of a universal anti-jamming building block, that is agnostic to the specifics of the communication link and can therefore be combined with existing technologies. We believe that such a block should not require explicit probes, sounding, training sequences, channel estimation, or even the cooperation of the transmitter. To meet these requirements, we propose an approach that relies on advances in Machine Learning, and the promises of neural accelerators and software defined radios. We identify and address multiple challenges, resulting in a convolutional neural network architecture and models for a multi-antenna system to infer the existence of interference, the number of interfering emissions and their respective phases. This information is continuously fed into an algorithm that cancels the interfering signal. We develop a two-antenna prototype system and evaluate our jamming cancellation approach in various environment settings and modulation schemes using Software Defined Radio platforms. We demonstrate that the receiving node equipped with our approach can detect a jammer with over 99% of accuracy and achieve a Bit Error Rate (BER) as low as $10^{-6}$ even when the jammer power is nearly two orders of magnitude (18 dB) higher than the legitimate signal, and without requiring modifications to the link modulation. In non-adversarial settings, our approach can have other advantages such as detecting and mitigating collisions.

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DEFORM: A Practical, Universal Deep Beamforming System

We introduce, design, and evaluate a set of universal receiver beamforming techniques. Our approach and system DEFORM, a Deep Learning (DL) based RX beamforming achieves significant gain for multi antenna RF receivers while being agnostic to the transmitted signal features (e.g., modulation or bandwidth). It is well known that combining coherent RF signals from multiple antennas results in a beamforming gain proportional to the number of receiving elements. However in practice, this approach heavily relies on explicit channel estimation techniques, which are link specific and require significant communication overhead to be transmitted to the receiver. DEFORM addresses this challenge by leveraging Convolutional Neural Network to estimate the channel characteristics in particular the relative phase to antenna elements. It is specifically designed to address the unique features of wireless signals complex samples, such as the ambiguous $2π$ phase discontinuity and the high sensitivity of the link Bit Error Rate. The channel prediction is subsequently used in the Maximum Ratio Combining algorithm to achieve an optimal combination of the received signals. While being trained on a fixed, basic RF settings, we show that DEFORM DL model is universal, achieving up to 3 dB of SNR gain for a two antenna receiver in extensive experiments demonstrating various settings of modulations, bandwidths, and channels. The universality of DEFORM is demonstrated through joint beamforming relaying of LoRa (Chirp Spread Spectrum modulation) and ZigBee signals, achieving significant improvements to Packet Loss/Delivery Rates relatively to conventional Amplify and Forward (LoRa PLR reduced by 23 times and ZigBee PDR increased by 8 times).

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Spectro-Temporal RF Identification using Deep Learning

RF emissions detection, classification, and spectro-temporal localization are crucial not only for tasks relating to understanding, managing, and protecting the RF spectrum, but also for safety and security applications such as detecting intruding drones or jammers. Achieving this goal for wideband spectrum and in real-time performance is a challenging problem. We present WRIST, a Wideband, Real-time RF Identification system with Spectro-Temporal detection, framework and system. Our resulting deep learning model is capable to detect, classify, and precisely locate RF emissions in time and frequency using RF samples of 100 MHz spectrum in real-time (over 6Gbps incoming I&Q streams). Such capabilities are made feasible by leveraging a deep-learning based one-stage object detection framework, and transfer learning to a multi-channel image-based RF signals representation. We also introduce an iterative training approach which leverages synthesized and augmented RF data to efficiently build large labelled datasets of RF emissions (SPREAD). WRIST detector achieves 90 mean Average Precision even in extremely congested environment in the wild. WRIST model classifies five technologies (Bluetooth, Lightbridge, Wi-Fi, XPD, and ZigBee) and is easily extendable to others. We are making our curated and annotated dataset available to the whole community. It consists of nearly 1 million fully labelled RF emissions collected from various off-the-shelf wireless radios in a range of environments and spanning the five classes of emissions.

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Spectrum-Flexible Secure Broadcast Ranging

Secure ranging is poised to play a critical role in several emerging applications such as self-driving cars, unmanned aerial systems, wireless IoT devices, and augmented reality. In this paper, we propose a design of a secure broadcast ranging systems with unique features and techniques. Its spectral-flexibility, and low-power short ranging bursts enable co-existence with existing systems such as in the 2.4GHz ISM band. We exploit a set of RF techniques such as upsampling and successive interference cancellation to achieve high accuracy and scalability to tens of reflectors even when operating over narrow bands of spectrum. We demonstrate that it can be implemented on popular SDR platforms FPGA and/or hosts (with minimal FPGA modifications). The protocol design, and cryptographically generated/detected signals, and randomized timing of transmissions, provide stealth and security against denial of service, sniffing, and distance manipulation attacks. Through extensive experimental evaluations (and simulations for scalability to over 100 reflectors) we demonstrate an accuracy below 20cm on a wide range of SNR (as low as 0dB), spectrum 25MHz-100MHz, with bursts as short as 5us.

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A Privacy-Preserving Longevity Study of Tor's Hidden Services

Tor and hidden services have emerged as a practical solution to protect user privacy against tracking and censorship. At the same time, little is known about the lifetime and nature of hidden services. Data collection and study of Tor hidden services is challenging due to its nature of providing privacy. Studying the lifetime of hidden services provides several benefits. For example, it allows investigation of the maliciousness of domains based on their lifetime. Short-lived hidden services are more likely not to be legitimate domains, e.g., used by ransomware, as compared to long-lived domains. In this work, we investigate the lifetime of hidden services by collecting data from a small (2%) subset of all Tor HSDir relays in a privacy-preserving manner. Based on the data collected, we devise protocols and extrapolation techniques to infer the lifetime of hidden services. Moreover we show that, due to Tor's specifics, our small subset of HSDir relays is sufficient to extrapolate lifetime with high accuracy, while respecting Tor user and service privacy and following Tor's research safety guidelines. Our results indicate that a large majority of the hidden services have a very short lifetime. In particular, 50% of all current Tor hidden services have an estimate lifetime of only 10 days or less, and 80% have a lifetime of less than a month.

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Mitigating Location Privacy Attacks on Mobile Devices using Dynamic App Sandboxing

We present the design, implementation and evaluation of a system, called MATRIX, developed to protect the privacy of mobile device users from location inference and sensor side-channel attacks. MATRIX gives users control and visibility over location and sensor (e.g., Accelerometers and Gyroscopes) accesses by mobile apps. It implements a PrivoScope service that audits all location and sensor accesses by apps on the device and generates real-time notifications and graphs for visualizing these accesses; and a Synthetic Location service to enable users to provide obfuscated or synthetic location trajectories or sensor traces to apps they find useful, but do not trust with their private information. The services are designed to be extensible and easy for users, hiding all of the underlying complexity from them. MATRIX also implements a Location Provider component that generates realistic privacy-preserving synthetic identities and trajectories for users by incorporating traffic information using historical data from Google Maps Directions API, and accelerations using statistical information from user driving experiments. The random traffic patterns are generated by modeling/solving user schedule using a randomized linear program and modeling/solving for user driving behavior using a quadratic program. We extensively evaluated MATRIX using user studies, popular location-driven apps and machine learning techniques, and demonstrate that it is portable to most Android devices globally, is reliable, has low-overhead, and generates synthetic trajectories that are difficult to differentiate from real mobility trajectories by an adversary.

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Security of GPS/INS based On-road Location Tracking Systems

Location information is critical to a wide-variety of navigation and tracking applications. Today, GPS is the de-facto outdoor localization system but has been shown to be vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in road transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and tracking as well as offer resilience to wireless signals spoofing, and jamming attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the security guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation for road transportation systems. We consider an adversary required to travel from a source location to a destination, and monitored by a INS-aided GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel to alternate locations without being detected. We developed and evaluated algorithms that achieve such goal, providing the adversary significant latitude. Our algorithms build a graph model for a given road network and enable us to derive potential destinations an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms render the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they generate road trajectories indistinguishable from plausible paths (both in terms of turn angles and roads curvature). We also designed, built, and demonstrated that the magnetometer can be actively spoofed using a combination of carefully controlled coils. We implemented and evaluated the impact of the attack using both real-world and simulated driving traces in more than 10 cities located around the world. Our evaluations show that it is possible for an attacker to reach destinations that are as far as 30 km away from the true destination without being detected. We also show that it is possible for the adversary to reach almost 60-80% of possible points within the target region in some cities.

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Cascading Denial of Service Attacks on Wi-Fi Networks

We unveil the existence of a vulnerability in Wi-Fi, which allows an adversary to remotely launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack that propagates both in time and space. This vulnerability stems from a coupling effect induced by hidden nodes. Cascading DoS attacks can congest an entire network and do not require the adversary to violate any protocol. We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks through experiments with real Wi-Fi cards, extensive ns-3 simulations, and theoretical analysis. The simulations show that the attack is effective both in networks operating under fixed and varying bit rates, as well as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. To gain insight into the root-causes of the attack, we model the network as a dynamical system and analyze its limiting behavior. The model predicts that a phase transition (and hence a cascading attack) is possible when the retry limit parameter of Wi-Fi is greater or equal to 7, and explicitly characterizes the phase transition region in terms of the system parameters.

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Honey Onions: a Framework for Characterizing and Identifying Misbehaving Tor HSDirs

In the last decade, Tor proved to be a very successful and widely popular system to protect users' anonymity. However, Tor remains a practical system with a variety of limitations, some of which were indeed exploited in the recent past. In particular, Tor's security relies on the fact that a substantial number of its nodes do not misbehave. In this work we introduce, the concept of honey onions, a framework to detect misbehaving Tor relays with HSDir capability. This allows to obtain lower bounds on misbehavior among relays. We propose algorithms to both estimate the number of snooping HSDirs and identify the most likely snoopers. Our experimental results indicate that during the period of the study (72 days) at least 110 such nodes were snooping information about hidden services they host. We reveal that more than half of them were hosted on cloud infrastructure and delayed the use of the learned information to prevent easy traceback.

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On GitHub's Programming Languages

GitHub is the most widely used social, distributed version control system. It has around 10 million registered users and hosts over 16 million public repositories. Its user base is also very active as GitHub ranks in the top 100 Alexa most popular websites. In this study, we collect GitHub's state in its entirety. Doing so, allows us to study new aspects of the ecosystem. Although GitHub is the home to millions of users and repositories, the analysis of users' activity time-series reveals that only around 10% of them can be considered active. The collected dataset allows us to investigate the popularity of programming languages and existence of pattens in the relations between users, repositories, and programming languages. By, applying a k-means clustering method to the users-repositories commits matrix, we find that two clear clusters of programming languages separate from the remaining. One cluster forms for "web programming" languages (Java Script, Ruby, PHP, CSS), and a second for "system oriented programming" languages (C, C++, Python). Further classification, allow us to build a phylogenetic tree of the use of programming languages in GitHub. Additionally, we study the main and the auxiliary programming languages of the top 1000 repositories in more detail. We provide a ranking of these auxiliary programming languages using various metrics, such as percentage of lines of code, and PageRank.

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