arXiv subjects

Guillermo Angeris

Publications and source records attributed to Guillermo Angeris.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Market Clearing with Semi-fungible Assets

As markets have digitized, the number of tradable products has skyrocketed. Algorithmically constructed portfolios of these assets now dominate public and private markets, resulting in a combinatorial explosion of tradable assets. In this paper, we provide a simple means to compute market clearing prices for semi-fungible assets which have a partial ordering between them. Such assets are increasingly found in traditional markets (bonds, commodities, ETFs), private markets (private credit, compute markets), and in decentralized finance. We formulate the market clearing problem as an optimization problem over a directed acyclic graph that represents participant preferences. Subsequently, we use convex duality to efficiently estimate market clearing prices, which correspond to particular dual variables. We then describe dominant strategy incentive compatible payment and allocation rules for clearing these markets. We conclude with examples of how this framework can construct prices for a variety of algorithmically constructed, semi-fungible portfolios of practical importance.

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arXiv2024

The Convex Geometry of Network Flows

In this paper, we derive a number of interesting properties and extensions of the convex flow problem from the perspective of convex geometry. We show that the sets of allowable flows always can be imbued with a downward closure property, which leads to a useful `calculus' of flows, allowing easy combination and splitting of edges. We then derive a conic form for the convex flow problem, which we show is equivalent to the original problem and almost self-dual. Using this conic form, we consider the nonconvex flow problem with fixed costs on the edges, i.e., where there is some fixed cost to send any nonzero flow over an edge. We show that this problem has almost integral solutions by a Shapley--Folkman argument, and we describe a rounding scheme that works well in practice. Additionally, we provide a heuristic for this nonconvex problem which is a simple modification of our original algorithm. We conclude by discussing a number of interesting avenues for future work.

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arXiv2024

Solving the Convex Flow Problem

In this paper, we introduce the solver ConvexFlows for the convex flow problem first defined in the authors' previous work. In this problem, we aim to optimize a concave utility function depending on the flows over a graph. However, unlike the classic network flows literature, we also allow for a concave relationship between the input and output flows of edges. This nonlinear gain describes many physical phenomena, including losses in power network transmission lines. We outline an efficient algorithm for solving this problem which parallelizes over the graph edges. We provide an open source implementation of this algorithm in the Julia programming language package ConvexFlows.jl. This package includes an interface to easily specify these flow problems. We conclude by walking through an example of solving for an optimal power flow using ConvexFlows.

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arXiv2024

Convex Network Flows

We introduce a general framework for flow problems over hypergraphs. In our problem formulation, which we call the convex flow problem, we have a concave utility function for the net flow at every node and a concave utility function for each edge flow. The objective is to maximize the sum of these utilities, subject to constraints on the flows allowed at each edge, which we only assume to be a convex set. This framework not only includes many classic problems in network optimization, such as max flow, min-cost flow, and multi-commodity flows, but also generalizes these problems to allow, for example, concave edge gain functions. In addition, our framework includes applications spanning a number of fields: optimal power flow over lossy networks, routing and resource allocation in ad-hoc wireless networks, Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining, and order routing through financial exchanges, among others. We show that the convex flow problem has a dual with a number of interesting interpretations, and that this dual decomposes over the edges of the hypergraph. Using this decomposition, we propose a fast solution algorithm that parallelizes over the edges and admits a clean problem interface. We provide an open source implementation of this algorithm in the Julia programming language, which we show is significantly faster than the state-of-the-art commercial convex solver Mosek.

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arXiv2024

Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal

In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case adversaries. In particular, we show that the average welfare gap between the following two scenarios is at most $O(1/\sqrt{T})$, where $T$ is the length of the time horizon considered. In the first scenario, the designer knows all future actions by users and is allowed to fix the optimal prices of resources ahead of time, based on the designer's oracular knowledge of those actions. In the second, the prices are updated by a very simple algorithm that does not have this oracular knowledge, a special case of which is similar to EIP-1559, the base fee mechanism used by the Ethereum blockchain. Roughly speaking, this means that, on average, over a reasonable timescale, there is no difference in welfare between 'correctly' fixing the prices, with oracular knowledge of the future, when compared to the proposed algorithm. We show a matching lower bound of $\Omega(1/\sqrt{T})$ for any implementable algorithm and also separately consider the case where the adversary is known to be stochastic.

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arXiv2023

The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value

Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple theoretical definition of the 'cost of MEV', prove some basic properties, and show that the definition is useful via a number of examples. In a variety of settings, this definition is related to the 'smoothness' of a function over the symmetric group. From this definition and some basic observations, we recover a number of results from the literature.

math.OC↗

arXiv2023

The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are the most popular type of decentralized trading venue for cryptocurrency tokens. In this paper, we give a very general geometric framework (or 'axioms') which encompass and generalize many of the known results for CFMMs in the literature, without requiring strong conditions such as differentiability or homogeneity. One particular consequence of this framework is that every CFMM has a (unique) canonical trading function that is nondecreasing, concave, and homogeneous, showing that many results known only for homogeneous trading functions are actually fully general. We also show that CFMMs satisfy a number of intuitive and geometric composition rules, and give a new proof, via conic duality, of the equivalence of the portfolio value function and the trading function. Many results are extended to the general setting where the CFMM is not assumed to be path-independent, but only one trade is allowed. Finally, we show that all 'path-independent' CFMMs have a simple geometric description that does not depend on any notion of a 'trading history'.

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arXiv2023

A Note on the Welfare Gap in Fair Ordering

Public blockchains group submitted transactions into batches, called blocks. A natural question is how to determine which transactions are included in these batches. In this note, we show a gap between the welfare of so-called `fair' ordering, namely first-in-first-out (an ideal that a number of blockchain protocols strive to achieve), where the first transactions to arrive are the ones put into the block, and the welfare of `optimal' inclusion that is, at least approximately, welfare-maximizing, such as choosing which transactions are included in a block via an auction. We show this gap is positive under a simple model with mild assumptions where we assume transactions are, roughly speaking, uniformly drawn from a reasonable distribution. Our results formalize a performance metric for blockchain inclusion rules and consequently provide a framework to help design and compare these rules. The results can be directly extended to ordering mechanisms as well.

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arXiv2023

An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap have facilitated trillions of dollars of digital asset trades and have billions of dollars of liquidity. One natural question is how to optimally route trades across a network of CFMMs in order to ensure the largest possible utility (as specified by a user). We present an efficient algorithm, based on a decomposition method, to solve the problem of optimally executing an order across a network of decentralized exchanges. The decomposition method, as a side effect, makes it simple to incorporate more complicated CFMMs, or even include 'aggregate CFMMs' (such as Uniswap v3), into the routing problem. Numerical results show significant performance improvements of this method, tested on realistic networks of CFMMs, when compared against an off-the-shelf commercial solver.

math.OC↗

arXiv2023

Concave Pro-rata Games

In this paper, we introduce a family of games called concave pro-rata games. In such a game, players place their assets into a pool, and the pool pays out some concave function of all assets placed into it. Each player then receives a pro-rata share of the payout; i.e., each player receives an amount proportional to how much they placed in the pool. Such games appear in a number of practical scenarios, including as a simplified version of batched decentralized exchanges, such as those proposed by Penumbra. We show that this game has a number of interesting properties, including a symmetric pure equilibrium that is the unique equilibrium of this game, and we prove that its price of anarchy is $\Omega(n)$ in the number of players. We also show some numerical results in the iterated setting which suggest that players quickly converge to an equilibrium in iterated play.

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arXiv2022

A primer on perpetuals

We consider a continuous-time financial market with no arbitrage and no transactions costs. In this setting, we introduce two types of perpetual contracts, one in which the payoff to the long side is a fixed function of the underlyers and the long side pays a funding rate to the short side, the other in which the payoff to the long side is a fixed function of the underlyers times a discount factor that changes over time but no funding payments are required. Assuming asset prices are continuous and strictly positive, we derive model-free expressions for the funding rate and discount rate of these perpetual contracts as well as replication strategies for the short side. When asset prices can jump, we derive expressions for the funding and discount rates, which are semi-robust in the sense that they do not depend on the dynamics of the volatility process of the underlying risky assets, but do depend on the intensity of jumps under the market's pricing measure. When asset prices can jump and the volatility process is independent of the underlying risky assets, we derive an explicit replication strategy for the short side of a perpetual contract. Throughout the paper, we illustrate through examples how specific perpetual contracts relate to traditional financial instruments such as variance swaps and leveraged exchange traded funds.

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arXiv2022

Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets

Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise non-fungible resources such as bandwidth, computation, and storage, by hardcoding their relative prices. Fixing the relative price of each resource in this way inhibits granular price discovery, limiting scalability and opening up the possibility of denial-of-service attacks. As a result, many prominent networks such as Ethereum and Solana have proposed multi-dimensional fee markets. In this paper, we provide a principled way to design fee markets that efficiently price multiple non-fungible resources. Starting from a loss function specified by the network designer, we show how to compute dynamic prices that align the network's incentives (to minimize the loss) with those of the users and miners (to maximize their welfare), even as demand for these resources changes. Our pricing mechanism follows from a natural decomposition of the network designer's problem into two parts that are related to each other via the resource prices. These results can be used to efficiently set fees in order to improve network performance.

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arXiv2022

A Note on Generalizing Power Bounds for Physical Design

In this note we show how to construct a number of nonconvex quadratic inequalities for a variety of physics equations appearing in physical design problems. These nonconvex quadratic inequalities can then be used to construct bounds on physical design problems where the objective is a quadratic or a ratio of quadratics. We show that the quadratic inequalities and the original physics equations are equivalent under a technical condition that holds in many practical cases which is easy to computationally (and, in some cases, manually) verify.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers

We consider the problem of optimally executing an order involving multiple crypto-assets, sometimes called tokens, on a network of multiple constant function market makers (CFMMs). When we ignore the fixed cost associated with executing an order on a CFMM, this optimal routing problem can be cast as a convex optimization problem, which is computationally tractable. When we include the fixed costs, the optimal routing problem is a mixed-integer convex problem, which can be solved using (sometimes slow) global optimization methods, or approximately solved using various heuristics based on convex optimization. The optimal routing problem includes as a special case the problem of identifying an arbitrage present in a network of CFMMs, or certifying that none exists.

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arXiv2022

Bounds on Efficiency Metrics in Photonics

In this paper, we present a method for computing bounds for a variety of efficiency metrics in photonics, such as the focusing efficiency or the mode purity. We focus on the special case where the objective function can be written as the ratio of two quadratic functions of the field and show that there exists a simple semidefinite programming relaxation for this problem. We provide a numerical example of bounding the maximal mode conversion purity for a device of given size. This paper is accompanied by an open source Julia package for basic simulations and bounds.

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arXiv2021

Replicating Monotonic Payoffs Without Oracles

In this paper, we show that any monotonic payoff can be replicated using only liquidity provider shares in constant function market makers (CFMMs), without the need for additional collateral or oracles. Such payoffs include cash-or-nothing calls and capped calls, among many others, and we give an explicit method for finding a trading function matching these payoffs. For example, this method provides an easy way to show that the trading function for maintaining a portfolio where 50% of the portfolio is allocated in one asset and 50% in the other is exactly the constant product market maker (e.g., Uniswap) from first principles. We additionally provide a simple formula for the total earnings of an arbitrageur who is arbitraging against these CFMMs.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2021

Constant Function Market Makers: Multi-Asset Trades via Convex Optimization

The rise of Ethereum and other blockchains that support smart contracts has led to the creation of decentralized exchanges (DEXs), such as Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, mStable, and SushiSwap, which enable agents to trade cryptocurrencies without trusting a centralized authority. While traditional exchanges use order books to match and execute trades, DEXs are typically organized as constant function market makers (CFMMs). CFMMs accept and reject proposed trades based on the evaluation of a function that depends on the proposed trade and the current reserves of the DEX. For trades that involve only two assets, CFMMs are easy to understand, via two functions that give the quantity of one asset that must be tendered to receive a given quantity of the other, and vice versa. When more than two assets are being exchanged, it is harder to understand the landscape of possible trades. We observe that various problems of choosing a multi-asset trade can be formulated as convex optimization problems, and can therefore be reliably and efficiently solved.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Reciprocal Multi-Robot Collision Avoidance with Asymmetric State Uncertainty

We present a general decentralized formulation for a large class of collision avoidance methods and show that all collision avoidance methods of this form are guaranteed to be collision free. This class includes several existing algorithms in the literature as special cases. We then present a particular instance of this collision avoidance method, CARP (Collision Avoidance by Reciprocal Projections), that is effective even when the estimates of other agents' positions and velocities are noisy. The method's main computational step involves the solution of a small convex optimization problem, which can be quickly solved in practice, even on embedded platforms, making it practical to use on computationally-constrained robots such as quadrotors. This method can be extended to find smooth polynomial trajectories for higher dynamic systems such at quadrotors. We demonstrate this algorithm's performance in simulations and on a team of physical quadrotors. Our method finds optimal projections in a median time of 17.12ms for 285 instances of 100 randomly generated obstacles, and produces safe polynomial trajectories at over 60hz on-board quadrotors. Our paper is accompanied by an open source Julia implementation and ROS package.

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