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Guillermo Francia

Publications and source records attributed to Guillermo Francia.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Adapter-Based Few-Shot Continual Learning for Malicious Packet Recognition

The continual evolution of malware variants necessitates detection systems that can adapt to new threats without retraining from scratch. However, continually updating models on new data often leads to catastrophic forgetting, where previously learned knowledge is overwritten. While continual learning has been increasingly explored for malware detection, the specific setting of Few-Shot Class-Incremental Learning (FSCIL), where new malware classes must be learned from only a small number of labeled examples, remains comparatively underexplored. Therefore, this work investigates the FSCIL setting for malware classification. To address the stability-plasticity dilemma, we propose a hybrid framework that leverages a Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) backbone initialized through domain-specific pre-training on malware packets. Our method incorporates Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) to efficiently adapt the model during the base session while freezing the core backbone to preserve previously learned representations, alongside a prototype-based classification head for incremental sessions to establish robust decision boundaries from limited samples. Extensive experiments across several datasets demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms prior malware FSCIL baselines and achieves state-of-the-art performance.

cs.CR

Visual Adaptive Prompting for Compositional Zero-Shot Learning

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated impressive multimodal capabilities in learning joint representations of visual and textual data, making them powerful tools for tasks such as Compositional Zero-Shot Learning (CZSL). CZSL requires models to generalize to novel combinations of visual primitives--such as attributes and objects--that were not explicitly encountered during training. Recent works in prompting for CZSL have focused on modifying inputs for the text encoder, often using static prompts that do not change across varying visual contexts. However, these approaches struggle to fully capture varying visual contexts, as they focus on text adaptation rather than leveraging visual features for compositional reasoning. To address this, we propose a Visual Adaptive Prompting System (VAPS) that leverages a learnable visual prompt repository and similarity-based retrieval mechanism within the framework of VLMs to bridge the gap between semantic and visual features. Our method introduces a dynamic visual prompt repository mechanism that selects the most relevant attribute and object prompts based on the visual features of the image. Our proposed system includes a visual prompt adapter that encourages the model to learn a more generalizable embedding space. Experiments on three CZSL benchmarks, across both closed and open-world scenarios, demonstrate state-of-the-art results.

cs.CV

Proactive Adversarial Defense: Harnessing Prompt Tuning in Vision-Language Models to Detect Unseen Backdoored Images

Backdoor attacks pose a critical threat by embedding hidden triggers into inputs, causing models to misclassify them into target labels. While extensive research has focused on mitigating these attacks in object recognition models through weight fine-tuning, much less attention has been given to detecting backdoored samples directly. Given the vast datasets used in training, manual inspection for backdoor triggers is impractical, and even state-of-the-art defense mechanisms fail to fully neutralize their impact. To address this gap, we introduce a groundbreaking method to detect unseen backdoored images during both training and inference. Leveraging the transformative success of prompt tuning in Vision Language Models (VLMs), our approach trains learnable text prompts to differentiate clean images from those with hidden backdoor triggers. Experiments demonstrate the exceptional efficacy of this method, achieving an impressive average accuracy of 86% across two renowned datasets for detecting unseen backdoor triggers, establishing a new standard in backdoor defense.

cs.CV