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Guoqiang Tian

Publications and source records attributed to Guoqiang Tian.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

A General Theory of Dynamic Mechanism Design: Joint Optimization of Contracting, Information-Production Technology, and Disclosure

We develop a general theory of dynamic mechanism design that jointly optimizes contracting, information-production technology, and disclosure across a broad class of economic environments with general allocation constraints. Hidden actions, endogenous information acquisition, learning, and disclosure interact through dynamic incentives. We accommodate correlated private information, interdependent preferences, and potentially infinite-dimensional allocations. We introduce joint perfect Bayesian equilibrium, establish the Dynamic Revelation Principle, and recursively characterize incentive compatibility. Under private values with informational interdependence, we characterize joint incentives through choice obedience, reporting-envelope first-order conditions, and global integral monotonicity. We derive an exact dynamic information-rent identity, dynamic revenue equivalence, and dynamic virtual surplus. Comparing first-best, two second-best, and third-best contracts distinguishes information rents, hidden-action implementation costs, and direct information-production expenditures, revealing nonadditive interactions of either sign and branched outcomes. Applications show Milgrom-Weber revenue-ranking reversal with endogenous acquisition, no efficient first-price equilibrium under Gaussian signals, and absent, interior, or full financial-contract disclosure.

econ.TH↗

Dynamic Mechanism and Information Design in AI-Agent Environments: A General Analytical Framework

TThis paper develops a general framework for dynamic mechanism and information design in AI-agent principal--agent environments, encompassing optimal contracting and integrating evolving hidden information and hidden action with partial verification, technological authorization, and multi-agent interaction. It nests conventional dynamic screening, hidden-action contracting, and conditional dynamic information design, while allowing reporting, action, and information-use decisions to interact through a common continuation mechanism. We establish a dynamic revelation principle and a recursive characterization of implementability in which truthful reporting and post-report obedience are jointly determined through continuation incentives. In quasilinear optimal-contracting environments, dynamic envelope and integral-monotonicity methods yield a verification-adjusted dynamic virtual-surplus representation and identify three distinct margins: dynamic information rents, verification rents, and the implementation cost of hidden action. These margins generate a branched hierarchy separating conventional dynamic screening, hidden-action contracting, and their joint problem. We also study the joint design of monitoring, information use, and incentives: more informative monitoring capacity expands the designer's opportunity set, but full disclosure need not be optimal, and information use can itself alter hidden-action incentives. With multiple agents, correlated information, peer discipline, coupled incentives, joint feasibility, and continuation opportunities create additional strategic interactions. Although motivated by AI-agent environments, the framework applies more broadly to dynamic agency settings with similar economic features.

econ.TH↗

Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions Revisited: Endogenous Information Acquisition and Costly Verification

We revisit the influential distribution-independent optimal disclosure result of Bergemann, Heumann, Morris, Sorokin, and Winter (2022), whose optimal disclosure policy reveals low bidder values and pools high values at a critical quantile depending only on the number of bidders, and show that this policy is no longer generally revenue-maximizing even for the familiar uniform and binary valuation distributions, once bidders can endogenously acquire private information through costly verification. The underlying reason reflects a fundamental principle of incentive-based mechanism design, rooted in Hurwicz's analysis of structural invariance and echoed in the Lucas critique: economic agents respond strategically to changes in the information and incentives they face. This is the essence of \emph{trust, but verify}. A change in disclosure policy may leave the underlying economic primitives unchanged while altering bidders' verification decisions and the resulting equilibrium information structure. We establish existence and uniqueness of the symmetric Bayesian Nash verification equilibrium, characterize equilibrium-implementable disclosure policies, and derive an exact revenue decomposition and a general characterization of global optimality. We further develop optimality conditions and structural results that provide a systematic foundation for analyzing optimal disclosure with endogenous information acquisition.

econ.TH↗

Endogenous Information Design and Informational Evolution in Dynamic Economic Systems with Incentives and Learning

This paper studies the endogenous informational evolution of dynamic economic systems. Building on Hurwicz's conceptual framework, such a system is defined as a dynamic joint adjustment process of resource and information allocation linked by recursive feedback. Economic theory gains precision by isolating particular margins, but when information production, disclosure, learning, incentives, actions, and future feasibility interact across these two processes, conclusions obtained by holding other margins fixed need not survive their joint determination. The paper develops a system-level dynamic equilibrium framework for this interaction. Holding particular links fixed yields familiar environments in dynamic mechanism design, information design, experimentation and learning, feedback and disclosure, and information acquisition. The analysis establishes three central failures relative to fixed or partially exogenous informational environments: informational efficiency under exogenous feasibility is generally incompatible with endogenous dynamic feasibility; incentive and disclosure design cannot generally be separated; and informational monotonicity can fail without implementation replicability. It also identifies the corresponding positive boundaries. Optimal disclosure may be interior or extreme; bang--bang disclosure arises under additional conditions, and a further specialization generates an endogenous transition from opacity to transparency. Information may therefore be optimally withheld even when its direct decision value is strictly positive. Extensions to private payoff-relevant information and limited commitment preserve the recursive structure.

econ.TH↗