arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to H. F. Chau.
Tolls are collected on many highways as a means of traffic control and revenue generation. However, the presence of tollbooths on highway surely slows down traffic flow. Here, we investigate how the presence of tollbooths affect the average car speed using a simple-minded single lane deterministic discrete traffic model. More importantly, the model is exactly solvable.
Quantum key distribution is widely thought to offer unconditional security in communication between two users. Unfortunately, a widely accepted proof of its security in the presence of source, device and channel noises has been missing. This long-standing problem is solved here by showing that, given fault-tolerant quantum computers, quantum key distribution over an arbitrarily long distance of a realistic noisy channel can be made unconditionally secure. The proof is reduced from a noisy quantum scheme to a noiseless quantum scheme and then from a noiseless quantum scheme to a noiseless classical scheme, which can then be tackled by classical probability theory.
I construct a secure multi-party scheme to compute a classical function by a succinct use of a specially designed fault-tolerant random polynomial quantum error correction code. This scheme is secure provided that (asymptotically) strictly greater than five-sixths of the players are honest. Moreover, the security of this scheme follows directly from the theory of quantum error correcting code, and hence is valid without any computational assumption. I also discuss the quantum-classical complexity-security tradeoff in secure multi-party computation schemes and argue why a full-blown quantum code is necessary in my scheme.
We study numerically the behavior of the Biham-Middleton-Levine traffic model in three dimensions. Our extensive numerical simulations show that the phase diagram for this model in three dimensions is markedly different from that in one and two dimensions. In addition to the full speed moving as well as the completely jamming phases, whose respective average asymptotic car speeds $ $ equal one and zero, we observe an extensive region of car densities $ρ$ with a low but non-zero average asymptotic car speed. The transition from this extensive low average asymptotic car speed region to the completely jamming region is at least second order. We argue that this low speed region is a result of the formation of a spatially-limited-extended percolating cluster. Thus, this low speed phase is present in $n > 3$ dimensional Biham-Middleton-Levine model as well.
Quantum convolutional code was introduced recently as an alternative way to protect vital quantum information. To complete the analysis of quantum convolutional code, I report a way to decode certain quantum convolutional codes based on the classical Viterbi decoding algorithm. This decoding algorithm is optimal for a memoryless channel. I also report three simple criteria to test if decoding errors in a quantum convolutional code will terminate after a finite number of decoding steps whenever the Hilbert space dimension of each quantum register is a prime power. Finally, I show that certain quantum convolutional codes are in fact stabilizer codes. And hence, these quantum stabilizer convolutional codes have fault-tolerant implementations.
We devise a simple modification that essentially doubles the efficiency of a well-known quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). Our scheme assigns significantly different probabilities for the different polarization bases during both transmission and reception to reduce the fraction of discarded data. The actual probabilities used in the scheme are announced in public. As the number of transmitted signals increases, the efficiency of our scheme can be made to approach 100%. An eavesdropper may try to break such a scheme by eavesdropping mainly along the predominant basis. To defeat such an attack, we perform a refined analysis of accepted data: Instead of lumping all the accepted data together to estimate a single error rate, we separate the accepted data into various subsets according to the basis employed and estimate an error rate for each subset {\it individually}.
Suppose each site on a one-dimensional chain with periodic boundary condition may take on any one of the states $0,1,..., n-1$, can you find out the most frequently occurring state using cellular automaton? Here, we prove that while the above density classification task cannot be resolved by a single cellular automaton, this task can be performed efficiently by applying two cellular automaton rules in succession.
I report two general methods to construct quantum convolutional codes for $N$-state quantum systems. Using these general methods, I construct a quantum convolutional code of rate 1/4, which can correct one quantum error for every eight consecutive quantum registers.
I report two general methods to construct quantum convolutional codes for quantum registers with internal $N$ states. Using one of these methods, I construct a quantum convolutional code of rate 1/4 which is able to correct one general quantum error for every eight consecutive quantum registers.
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.
Alice has made a decision in her mind. While she does not want to reveal it to Bob at this moment, she would like to convince Bob that she is committed to this particular decision and that she cannot change it at a later time. Is there a way for Alice to get Bob's trust? Until recently, researchers had believed that the above task can be performed with the help of quantum mechanics. And the security of the quantum scheme lies on the uncertainty principle. Nevertheless, such optimism was recently shattered by Mayers and by us, who found that Alice can always change her mind if she has a quantum computer. Here, we survey this dramatic development and its implications on the security of other quantum cryptographic schemes.
Given a (finite) string of zeros and ones, we report a way to determine if the number of ones is less than, greater than, or equal to a prescribed number by applying two sets of cellular automaton rules in succession. Thus, we solve the general density classification problem using cellular automaton.
I construct a quantum error correction code (QECC) in higher spin systems using the idea of multiplicative group character. Each $N$ state quantum particle is encoded as five $N$ state quantum registers. By doing so, this code can correct any quantum error arising from any one of the five quantum registers. This code generalizes the well-known five qubit perfect code in spin-1/2 systems and is shown to be optimal for higher spin systems. I also report a simple algorithm for encoding. The importance of multiplicative group character in constructing QECCs will be addressed.
We show that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type of attack and delaying her measurement until she opens her commitment.
One-way functions are used in modern cryto-systems as doortraps because their inverse functions are supposed to be difficult to compute. Nonetheless with the discovery of reversible computation, it seems that one may break a one-way function by running a reversible computer backward. Here, we argue that reversible computation alone poses no threat to the existence of one-way functions because of the generation of ``garbage bits'' during computations. Consequently, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for a one-to-one function to be a one-way in terms of the growth rate of the total number of possible garbage bit configurations with the input size.
We consider a probabilistic quantum implementation of a variable of the Pocklington-Lehmer $N-1$ primality test using Shor's algorithm. O($\log^3 N \log\log N \log\log\log N$) elementary q-bit operations are required to determine the primality of a number $N$, making it (asymptotically) the fastest known primality test. Thus, the potential power of quantum mechanical computers is once again revealed.
I consider the theory of quantum error correcting code (QECC) where each quantum particle has more than two possible eigenstates. In this higher spin system, I report an explicit QECC that is related to the symmetry group ${\Bbb Z}_2^{\otimes (N-1)} \otimes S_N$. This QECC, which generalizes Shor's simple majority vote code, is able to correct errors arising from exactly one quantum particle. I also provide a simple encoding algorithm.
There had been well known claims of ``provably unbreakable'' quantum protocols for bit commitment and coin tossing. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment (and therefore coin tossing) schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can always cheat successfully by using an EPR-type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment and coin tossing protocols exist at all. Here we prove that an EPR-type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break {\em any} realistic quantum bit commitment and {\em ideal} coin tossing scheme. Therefore, provided that Alice has a quantum computer and is capable of storing quantum signals for an arbitrary length of time, all those schemes are insecure. Since bit commitment and coin tossing are useful primitives for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications.