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Ha-Chi Tran

Publications and source records attributed to Ha-Chi Tran.

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Unbounded Harms, Bounded Law: Liability in the Age of Borderless AI

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) has exposed significant deficiencies in risk governance. While ex-ante harm identification and prevention have advanced, Responsible AI scholarship remains underdeveloped in addressing ex-post liability. Core legal questions regarding liability allocation, responsibility attribution, and remedial effectiveness remain insufficiently theorized and institutionalized, particularly for transboundary harms and risks that transcend national jurisdictions. Drawing on contemporary AI risk analyses, we argue that such harms are structurally embedded in global AI supply chains and are likely to escalate in frequency and severity due to cross-border deployment, data infrastructures, and uneven national oversight capacities. Consequently, territorially bounded liability regimes are increasingly inadequate. Using a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, this paper examines compensation and liability frameworks from high-risk transnational domains - including vaccine injury schemes, systemic financial risk governance, commercial nuclear liability, and international environmental regimes - to distill transferable legal design principles such as strict liability, risk pooling, collective risk-sharing, and liability channelling, while highlighting potential structural constraints on their application to AI-related harms. Situated within an international order shaped more by AI arms race dynamics than cooperative governance, the paper outlines the contours of a global AI accountability and compensation architecture, emphasizing the tension between geopolitical rivalry and the collective action required to govern transboundary AI risks effectively.

cs.CY

Brokerage in the Black Box: Swing States, Strategic Ambiguity, and the Global Politics of AI Governance

The United States-China rivalry has placed frontier dual-use technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), at the center of global power dynamics, as techno-nationalism, supply chain securitization, and competing standards deepen bifurcation within a weaponized interdependence that blurs civilian-military boundaries. Existing research, yet, mostly emphasizes superpower strategies and often overlooks the role of middle powers as crucial actors shaping the global techno-order. This study examines Technological Swing States (TSS), middle powers with both technological capacity and strategic flexibility, and their ability to navigate the frontier technologies' uncertainty and opacity to mediate great-power techno-competition regionally and globally. It reconceptualizes AI opacity not merely as a technical deficit, but as a structural feature and strategic resource, stemming from algorithmic complexity, political incentives that prioritize performance over explainability, and the limits of post-hoc interpretability. This structural opacity shifts authority from technical demands for explainability to institutional mechanisms, such as certification, auditing, and disclosure, converting technical constraints into strategic political opportunities. Drawing on case studies of South Korea, Singapore, and India, the paper theorizes how TSS exploit the interplay between opacity and institutional transparency through three strategies: (i) delay and hedging, (ii) selective alignment, and (iii) normative intermediation. These practices enable TSS to preserve strategic flexibility, build trust among diverse stakeholders, and broker convergence across competing governance regimes, thereby influencing institutional design, interstate bargaining, and policy outcomes in global AI governance.

cs.CY