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Haipeng Luo

Publications and source records attributed to Haipeng Luo.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Comparator-Adaptive $Φ$-Regret: Improved Bounds, Simpler Algorithms, and Applications to Games

In the classic expert problem, $Φ$-regret measures the gap between the learner's total loss and that achieved by applying the best action transformation $ϕ\in Φ$. A recent work by Lu et al., [2025] introduces an adaptive algorithm whose regret against a comparator $ϕ$ depends on a certain sparsity-based complexity measure of $ϕ$, (almost) recovering and interpolating optimal bounds for standard regret notions such as external, internal, and swap regret. In this work, we propose a general idea to achieve an even better comparator-adaptive $Φ$-regret bound via much simpler algorithms compared to Lu et al., [2025]. Specifically, we discover a prior distribution over all possible binary transformations and show that it suffices to achieve prior-dependent regret against these transformations. Then, we propose two concrete and efficient algorithms to achieve so, where the first one learns over multiple copies of a prior-aware variant of the Kernelized MWU algorithm of Farina et al., [2022], and the second one learns over multiple copies of a prior-aware variant of the BM-reduction [Blum and Mansour, 2007]. To further showcase the power of our methods and the advantages over Lu et al., [2025] besides the simplicity and better regret bounds, we also show that our second approach can be extended to the game setting to achieve accelerated and adaptive convergence rate to $Φ$-equilibria for a class of general-sum games. When specified to the special case of correlated equilibria, our bound improves over the existing ones from Anagnostides et al., [2022a,b]

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Simultaneous Swap Regret Minimization via KL-Calibration

Calibration is a fundamental concept that aims at ensuring the reliability of probabilistic predictions by aligning them with real-world outcomes. There is a surge of studies on new calibration measures that are easier to optimize compared to the classical $\ell_1$-Calibration while still having strong implications for downstream applications. One recent such example is the work by Fishelson et al. (2025) who show that it is possible to achieve $O(T^{1/3})$ pseudo $\ell_2$-Calibration error via minimizing pseudo swap regret of the squared loss, which in fact implies the same bound for all bounded proper losses with a smooth univariate form. In this work, we significantly generalize their result in the following ways: (a) in addition to smooth univariate forms, our algorithm also simultaneously achieves $O(T^{1/3})$ swap regret for any proper loss with a twice continuously differentiable univariate form (such as Tsallis entropy); (b) our bounds hold not only for pseudo swap regret that measures losses using the forecaster's distributions on predictions, but also hold for the actual swap regret that measures losses using the forecaster's actual realized predictions. We achieve so by introducing a new stronger notion of calibration called (pseudo) KL-Calibration, which we show is equivalent to the (pseudo) swap regret for log loss. We prove that there exists an algorithm that achieves $O(T^{1/3})$ KL-Calibration error and provide an explicit algorithm that achieves $O(T^{1/3})$ pseudo KL-Calibration error. Moreover, we show that the same algorithm achieves $O(T^{1/3}(\log T)^{-1/3}\log(T/δ))$ swap regret w.p. $\ge 1-δ$ for any proper loss with a smooth univariate form, which implies $O(T^{1/3})$ $\ell_2$-Calibration error. A technical contribution of our work is a new randomized rounding procedure and a non-uniform discretization scheme to minimize the swap regret for log loss.

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From Average-Iterate to Last-Iterate Convergence in Games: A Reduction and Its Applications

The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects the actual decisions made by the learners and captures the day-to-day behavior of the learning dynamics. While many algorithms are known to converge in the average-iterate, achieving last-iterate convergence typically requires considerably more effort in both the design and the analysis of the algorithm. Somewhat surprisingly, we show in this paper that for a large family of games, there exists a simple black-box reduction that transforms the average iterates of an uncoupled learning dynamics into the last iterates of a new uncoupled learning dynamics, thus also providing a reduction from last-iterate convergence to average-iterate convergence. Our reduction applies to games where each player's utility is linear in both their own strategy and the joint strategy of all opponents. This family includes two-player bimatrix games and generalizations such as multi-player polymatrix games. By applying our reduction to the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm, we obtain new state-of-the-art last-iterate convergence rates for uncoupled learning dynamics in multi-player zero-sum polymatrix games: (1) an $O(\frac{\log d}{T})$ last-iterate convergence rate under gradient feedback, representing an exponential improvement in the dependence on the dimension $d$ (i.e., the maximum number of actions available to either player); and (2) an $\widetilde{O}(d^{\frac{1}{5}} T^{-\frac{1}{5}})$ last-iterate convergence rate under bandit feedback, improving upon the previous best rates of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{d} T^{-\frac{1}{8}})$ and $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{d} T^{-\frac{1}{6}})$.

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Efficient Swap Multicalibration of Elicitable Properties

Multicalibration [HJKRR18] is an algorithmic fairness perspective that demands that the predictions of a predictor are correct conditional on themselves and membership in a collection of potentially overlapping subgroups of a population. The work of [NR23] established a surprising connection between multicalibration for an arbitrary property $Γ$ (e.g., mean or median) and property elicitation: a property $Γ$ can be multicalibrated if and only if it is elicitable, where elicitability is the notion that the true property value of a distribution can be obtained by solving a regression problem over the distribution. In the online setting, [NR23] proposed an inefficient algorithm that achieves $\sqrt T$ $\ell_2$-multicalibration error for a hypothesis class of group membership functions and an elicitable property $Γ$, after $T$ rounds of interaction between a forecaster and adversary. In this paper, we generalize multicalibration for an elicitable property $Γ$ from group membership functions to arbitrary bounded hypothesis classes and introduce a stronger notion -- swap multicalibration, following [GKR23]. Subsequently, we propose an oracle-efficient algorithm which, when given access to an online agnostic learner, achieves $T^{1/(r+1)}$ $\ell_r$-swap multicalibration error with high probability (for $r\ge2$) for a hypothesis class with bounded sequential Rademacher complexity and an elicitable property $Γ$. For the special case of $r=2$, this implies an oracle-efficient algorithm that achieves $T^{1/3}$ $\ell_2$-swap multicalibration error, which significantly improves on the previously established bounds for the problem [NR23, GMS25, LSS25a], and completely resolves an open question raised in [GJRR24] on the possibility of an oracle-efficient algorithm that achieves $\sqrt{T}$ $\ell_2$-mean multicalibration error by answering it in a strongly affirmative sense.

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Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and Games

Learning and computation of equilibria are central problems in game theory, theory of computation, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we introduce proximal regret, a new notion of regret based on proximal operators that lies strictly between external and swap regret. When every player employs a no-proximal-regret algorithm in a general convex game, the empirical distribution of play converges to proximal correlated equilibria (PCE), a refinement of coarse correlated equilibria. Our framework unifies several emerging notions in online learning and game theory-such as gradient equilibrium and semicoarse correlated equilibrium-and introduces new ones. Our main result shows that the classic Online Gradient Descent (GD) algorithm achieves an optimal $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound on proximal regret, revealing that GD, without modification, minimizes a stronger regret notion than external regret. This provides a new explanation for the empirically superior performance of gradient descent in online learning and games. We further extend our analysis to Mirror Descent in the Bregman setting and to Optimistic Gradient Descent, which yields faster convergence in smooth convex games.

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Adapting to Stochastic and Adversarial Losses in Episodic MDPs with Aggregate Bandit Feedback

We study online learning in finite-horizon episodic Markov decision processes (MDPs) under the challenging aggregate bandit feedback model, where the learner observes only the cumulative loss incurred in each episode, rather than individual losses at each state-action pair. While prior work in this setting has focused exclusively on worst-case analysis, we initiate the study of best-of-both-worlds (BOBW) algorithms that achieve low regret in both stochastic and adversarial environments. We propose the first BOBW algorithms for episodic tabular MDPs with aggregate bandit feedback. In the case of known transitions, our algorithms achieve $O(\log T)$ regret in stochastic settings and ${O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in adversarial ones. Importantly, we also establish matching lower bounds, showing the optimality of our algorithms in this setting. We further extend our approach to unknown-transition settings by incorporating confidence-based techniques. Our results rely on a combination of FTRL over occupancy measures, self-bounding techniques, and new loss estimators inspired by recent advances in online shortest path problems. Along the way, we also provide the first individual-gap-dependent lower bounds and demonstrate near-optimal BOBW algorithms for shortest path problems with bandit feedback.

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Improved Regret and Contextual Linear Extension for Pandora's Box and Prophet Inequality

We study the Pandora's Box problem in an online learning setting with semi-bandit feedback. In each round, the learner sequentially pays to open up to $n$ boxes with unknown reward distributions, observes rewards upon opening, and decides when to stop. The utility of the learner is the maximum observed reward minus the cumulative cost of opened boxes, and the goal is to minimize regret defined as the gap between the cumulative expected utility and that of the optimal policy. We propose a new algorithm that achieves $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$ regret after $T$ rounds, which improves the $\widetilde{O}(n\sqrt{T})$ bound of Agarwal et al. [2024] and matches the known lower bound up to logarithmic factors. To better capture real-life applications, we then extend our results to a natural but challenging contextual linear setting, where each box's expected reward is linear in some known but time-varying $d$-dimensional context and the noise distribution is fixed over time. We design an algorithm that learns both the linear function and the noise distributions, achieving $\widetilde{O}(nd\sqrt{T})$ regret. Finally, we show that our techniques also apply to the online Prophet Inequality problem, where the learner must decide immediately whether or not to accept a revealed reward. In both non-contextual and contextual settings, our approach achieves similar improvements and regret bounds.

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Reinforcement Learning from Adversarial Preferences in Tabular MDPs

We introduce a new framework of episodic tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs) with adversarial preferences, which we refer to as preference-based MDPs (PbMDPs). Unlike standard episodic MDPs with adversarial losses, where the numerical value of the loss is directly observed, in PbMDPs the learner instead observes preferences between two candidate arms, which represent the choices being compared. In this work, we focus specifically on the setting where the reward functions are determined by Borda scores. We begin by establishing a regret lower bound for PbMDPs with Borda scores. As a preliminary step, we present a simple instance to prove a lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{HSAT})$ for episodic MDPs with adversarial losses, where $H$ is the number of steps per episode, $S$ is the number of states, $A$ is the number of actions, and $T$ is the number of episodes. Leveraging this construction, we then derive a regret lower bound of $Ω( (H^2 S K)^{1/3} T^{2/3} )$ for PbMDPs with Borda scores, where $K$ is the number of arms. Next, we develop algorithms that achieve a regret bound of order $T^{2/3}$. We first propose a global optimization approach based on online linear optimization over the set of all occupancy measures, achieving a regret bound of $\tilde{O}((H^2 S^2 K)^{1/3} T^{2/3} )$ under known transitions. However, this approach suffers from suboptimal dependence on the potentially large number of states $S$ and computational inefficiency. To address this, we propose a policy optimization algorithm whose regret is roughly bounded by $\tilde{O}( (H^6 S K^5)^{1/3} T^{2/3} )$ under known transitions, and further extend the result to the unknown-transition setting.

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Hunyuan-TurboS: Advancing Large Language Models through Mamba-Transformer Synergy and Adaptive Chain-of-Thought

As Large Language Models (LLMs) rapidly advance, we introduce Hunyuan-TurboS, a novel large hybrid Transformer-Mamba Mixture of Experts (MoE) model. It synergistically combines Mamba's long-sequence processing efficiency with Transformer's superior contextual understanding. Hunyuan-TurboS features an adaptive long-short chain-of-thought (CoT) mechanism, dynamically switching between rapid responses for simple queries and deep "thinking" modes for complex problems, optimizing computational resources. Architecturally, this 56B activated (560B total) parameter model employs 128 layers (Mamba2, Attention, FFN) with an innovative AMF/MF block pattern. Faster Mamba2 ensures linear complexity, Grouped-Query Attention minimizes KV cache, and FFNs use an MoE structure. Pre-trained on 16T high-quality tokens, it supports a 256K context length and is the first industry-deployed large-scale Mamba model. Our comprehensive post-training strategy enhances capabilities via Supervised Fine-Tuning (3M instructions), a novel Adaptive Long-short CoT Fusion method, Multi-round Deliberation Learning for iterative improvement, and a two-stage Large-scale Reinforcement Learning process targeting STEM and general instruction-following. Evaluations show strong performance: overall top 7 rank on LMSYS Chatbot Arena with a score of 1356, outperforming leading models like Gemini-2.0-Flash-001 (1352) and o4-mini-2025-04-16 (1345). TurboS also achieves an average of 77.9% across 23 automated benchmarks. Hunyuan-TurboS balances high performance and efficiency, offering substantial capabilities at lower inference costs than many reasoning models, establishing a new paradigm for efficient large-scale pre-trained models.

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Alternating Regret for Online Convex Optimization

Motivated by alternating learning dynamics in two-player games, a recent work by Cevher et al.(2024) shows that $o(\sqrt{T})$ alternating regret is possible for any $T$-round adversarial Online Linear Optimization (OLO) problem, and left as an open question whether the same is true for general Online Convex Optimization (OCO). We answer this question in the affirmative by showing that the continuous Hedge algorithm achieves $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(d^{\frac{2}{3}}T^{\frac{1}{3}})$ alternating regret for any adversarial $d$-dimensional OCO problems. We show that this implies an alternating learning dynamic that finds a Nash equilibrium for any convex-concave zero-sum games or a coarse correlated equilibrium for any convex two-player general-sum games at a rate of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(d^{\frac{2}{3}}/T^{\frac{2}{3}})$. To further improve the time complexity and/or the dimension dependence, we propose another simple algorithm, Follow-the-Regularized-Leader with a regularizer whose convex conjugate is 3rd-order smooth, for OCO with smooth and self-concordant loss functions (such as linear or quadratic losses). We instantiate our algorithm with different regularizers and show that, for example, when the decision set is the $\ell_2$ ball, our algorithm achieves $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{\frac{2}{5}})$ alternating regret with no dimension dependence (and a better $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{\frac{1}{3}})$ bound for quadratic losses). We complement our results by showing some algorithm-specific alternating regret lower bounds, including a somewhat surprising $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ lower bound for a Regret Matching variant that is widely used in alternating learning dynamics.

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WizardMath: Empowering Mathematical Reasoning for Large Language Models via Reinforced Evol-Instruct

Large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have shown remarkable performance in natural language processing (NLP) tasks, including challenging mathematical reasoning. However, most existing open-source models are only pre-trained on large-scale internet data and without math-related optimization. In this paper, we present WizardMath, which enhances the mathematical CoT reasoning abilities of LLMs without using external python tools, by applying our proposed Reinforcement Learning from Evol-Instruct Feedback (RLEIF) method to the domain of math. Through extensive experiments on two mathematical reasoning benchmarks, namely GSM8k and MATH, we reveal the extraordinary capabilities of our model. Remarkably, WizardMath-Mistral 7B surpasses top-tier open-source LLMs by a substantial margin with higher data efficiency. Furthermore, WizardMath 70B even outperforms GPT-3.5-Turbo, Claude 2, Gemini Pro and GPT-4-early-version. Additionally, our preliminary exploration highlights the pivotal role of instruction evolution and process supervision in achieving exceptional math performance. For more details refer to https://github.com/nlpxucan/WizardLM

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Improved Bounds for Swap Multicalibration and Swap Omniprediction

In this paper, we consider the related problems of multicalibration -- a multigroup fairness notion and omniprediction -- a simultaneous loss minimization paradigm, both in the distributional and online settings. The recent work of Garg et al. (2024) raised the open problem of whether it is possible to efficiently achieve $O(\sqrt{T})$ $\ell_{2}$-multicalibration error against bounded linear functions. In this paper, we answer this question in a strongly affirmative sense. We propose an efficient algorithm that achieves $O(T^{\frac{1}{3}})$ $\ell_{2}$-swap multicalibration error (both in high probability and expectation). On propagating this bound onward, we obtain significantly improved rates for $\ell_{1}$-swap multicalibration and swap omniprediction for a loss class of convex Lipschitz functions. In particular, we show that our algorithm achieves $O(T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ $\ell_{1}$-swap multicalibration and swap omniprediction errors, thereby improving upon the previous best-known bound of $O(T^{\frac{7}{8}})$. As a consequence of our improved online results, we further obtain several improved sample complexity rates in the distributional setting. In particular, we establish a $O(\varepsilon ^ {-3})$ sample complexity of efficiently learning an $\varepsilon$-swap omnipredictor for the class of convex and Lipschitz functions, $O(\varepsilon ^{-2.5})$ sample complexity of efficiently learning an $\varepsilon$-swap agnostic learner for the squared loss, and $O(\varepsilon ^ {-5}), O(\varepsilon ^ {-2.5})$ sample complexities of learning $\ell_{1}, \ell_{2}$-swap multicalibrated predictors against linear functions, all of which significantly improve on the previous best-known bounds.

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Group Distributionally Robust Optimization with Flexible Sample Queries

Group distributionally robust optimization (GDRO) aims to develop models that perform well across $m$ distributions simultaneously. Existing GDRO algorithms can only process a fixed number of samples per iteration, either 1 or $m$, and therefore can not support scenarios where the sample size varies dynamically. To address this limitation, we investigate GDRO with flexible sample queries and cast it as a two-player game: one player solves an online convex optimization problem, while the other tackles a prediction with limited advice (PLA) problem. Within such a game, we propose a novel PLA algorithm, constructing appropriate loss estimators for cases where the sample size is either 1 or not, and updating the decision using follow-the-regularized-leader. Then, we establish the first high-probability regret bound for non-oblivious PLA. Building upon the above approach, we develop a GDRO algorithm that allows an arbitrary and varying sample size per round, achieving a high-probability optimization error bound of $O\left(\frac{1}{t}\sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^t \frac{m}{r_j}\log m}\right)$, where $r_t$ denotes the sample size at round $t$. This result demonstrates that the optimization error decreases as the number of samples increases and implies a consistent sample complexity of $O(m\log (m)/ε^2)$ for any fixed sample size $r\in[m]$, aligning with existing bounds for cases of $r=1$ or $m$. We validate our approach on synthetic binary and real-world multi-class datasets.

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On Tractable $Φ$-Equilibria in Non-Concave Games

While Online Gradient Descent and other no-regret learning procedures are known to efficiently converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium in games where each agent's utility is concave in their own strategy, this is not the case when utilities are non-concave -- a common scenario in machine learning applications involving strategies parameterized by deep neural networks, or when agents' utilities are computed by neural networks, or both. Non-concave games introduce significant game-theoretic and optimization challenges: (i) Nash equilibria may not exist; (ii) local Nash equilibria, though they exist, are intractable; and (iii) mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria generally have infinite support and are intractable. To sidestep these challenges, we revisit the classical solution concept of $Φ$-equilibria introduced by Greenwald and Jafari [2003], which is guaranteed to exist for an arbitrary set of strategy modifications $Φ$ even in non-concave games [Stolz and Lugosi, 2007]. However, the tractability of $Φ$-equilibria in such games remains elusive. In this paper, we initiate the study of tractable $Φ$-equilibria in non-concave games and examine several natural families of strategy modifications. We show that when $Φ$ is finite, there exists an efficient uncoupled learning algorithm that converges to the corresponding $Φ$-equilibria. Additionally, we explore cases where $Φ$ is infinite but consists of local modifications. We show that approximating local $Φ$-equilibria beyond the first-order stationary regime is computationally intractable. In contrast, within this regime, we show Online Gradient Descent efficiently converges to $Φ$-equilibria for several natural infinite families of modifications, including a new structural family of modifications inspired by the well-studied proximal operator.

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Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games

We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$). Despite their widespread use for solving real games, virtually nothing is known about their last-iterate convergence. A major obstacle to analyzing RM-type dynamics is that their regret operators lack Lipschitzness and (pseudo)monotonicity. We start by showing numerically that several variants used in practice, such as RM$^+$, predictive RM$^+$ and alternating RM$^+$, all lack last-iterate convergence guarantees even on a simple $3\times 3$ matrix game. We then prove that recent variants of these algorithms based on a smoothing technique, extragradient RM$^{+}$ and smooth Predictive RM$^+$, enjoy asymptotic last-iterate convergence (without a rate), $1/\sqrt{t}$ best-iterate convergence, and when combined with restarting, linear-rate last-iterate convergence. Our analysis builds on a new characterization of the geometric structure of the limit points of our algorithms, marking a significant departure from most of the literature on last-iterate convergence. We believe that our analysis may be of independent interest and offers a fresh perspective for studying last-iterate convergence in algorithms based on non-monotone operators.

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On Separation Between Best-Iterate, Random-Iterate, and Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games

Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice. Recent work (Cai et al., 2024) showed that a broad class of learning dynamics, including Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU), can exhibit arbitrarily slow last-iterate convergence even in simple $2 \times 2$ matrix games, despite many of these dynamics being known to converge asymptotically in the last iterate. It remains unclear, however, whether these algorithms achieve fast non-ergodic convergence under weaker criteria, such as best-iterate convergence. We show that for $2\times 2$ matrix games, OMWU achieves an $O(T^{-1/6})$ best-iterate convergence rate, in stark contrast to its slow last-iterate convergence in the same class of games. Furthermore, we establish a lower bound showing that OMWU does not achieve any polynomial random-iterate convergence rate, measured by the expected duality gaps across all iterates. This result challenges the conventional wisdom that random-iterate convergence is essentially equivalent to best-iterate convergence, with the former often used as a proxy for establishing the latter. Our analysis uncovers a new connection to dynamic regret and presents a novel two-phase approach to best-iterate convergence, which could be of independent interest.

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Instance-Dependent Regret Bounds for Learning Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback

No-regret self-play learning dynamics have become one of the premier ways to solve large-scale games in practice. Accelerating their convergence via improving the regret of the players over the naive $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound after $T$ rounds has been extensively studied in recent years, but almost all studies assume access to exact gradient feedback. We address the question of whether acceleration is possible under bandit feedback only and provide an affirmative answer for two-player zero-sum normal-form games. Specifically, we show that if both players apply the Tsallis-INF algorithm of Zimmert and Seldin (2018, arXiv:1807.07623), then their regret is at most $O(c_1 \log T + \sqrt{c_2 T})$, where $c_1$ and $c_2$ are game-dependent constants that characterize the difficulty of learning -- $c_1$ resembles the complexity of learning a stochastic multi-armed bandit instance and depends inversely on some gap measures, while $c_2$ can be much smaller than the number of actions when the Nash equilibria have a small support or are close to the boundary. In particular, for the case when a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, $c_2$ becomes zero, leading to an optimal instance-dependent regret bound as we show. We additionally prove that in this case, our algorithm also enjoys last-iterate convergence and can identify the pure strategy Nash equilibrium with near-optimal sample complexity.

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Contextual Linear Bandits with Delay as Payoff

A recent work by Schlisselberg et al. (2024) studies a delay-as-payoff model for stochastic multi-armed bandits, where the payoff (either loss or reward) is delayed for a period that is proportional to the payoff itself. While this captures many real-world applications, the simple multi-armed bandit setting limits the practicality of their results. In this paper, we address this limitation by studying the delay-as-payoff model for contextual linear bandits. Specifically, we start from the case with a fixed action set and propose an efficient algorithm whose regret overhead compared to the standard no-delay case is at most $DΔ_{\max}\log T$, where $T$ is the total horizon, $D$ is the maximum delay, and $Δ_{\max}$ is the maximum suboptimality gap. When payoff is loss, we also show further improvement of the bound, demonstrating a separation between reward and loss similar to Schlisselberg et al. (2024). Contrary to standard linear bandit algorithms that construct least squares estimator and confidence ellipsoid, the main novelty of our algorithm is to apply a phased arm elimination procedure by only picking actions in a volumetric spanner of the action set, which addresses challenges arising from both payoff-dependent delays and large action sets. We further extend our results to the case with varying action sets by adopting the reduction from Hanna et al. (2023). Finally, we implement our algorithm and showcase its effectiveness and superior performance in experiments.

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