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Hamid Noori

Publications and source records attributed to Hamid Noori.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

SensorGuard-RV: Sensor-to-Register Data Protection for Resource-Constrained RISC-V Devices

Embedded systems rely on sensor measurements that traverse a complex hardware-firmware stack (e.g. peripheral interfaces, communication buses, memory, and drivers) before reaching the applications that use them. At worst, an attacker with access to this path may successfully intercept, overwrite, fabricate, or replay readings. This may cause systems that act on such data, such as flight controllers and industrial processes, to behave incorrectly or unsafely. Existing defences, such as trusted execution environments and trusted I/O paths, still depend on trusted driver software and correctly configured access control, which remain fragile in practice. In response, we present SensorGuard-RV, a hardware-first approach that delivers sensor samples into processor registers without trusting intermediate software, buses, or memory. After configuration, a write-once ownership switch hands the sensor to a fixed-function controller that performs hardware-level authenticated encryption on sensor samples under a key inaccessible to software. We develop a new RISC-V instruction then instructs the CPU to decrypt the sample and writes it to a register only after verifying its tag and rejecting replays, including across resets. We implement SensorGuard-RV on the NEORV32 core with an ADXL362 SPI accelerometer on an Artix-7 FPGA. At 100 MHz, a protected sample reaches a register in 5,191 cycles (51.9 $μ$s), of which the two Ascon authenticated encryption engines account for 30. Because fixed-function acquisition removes per-byte software polling, the protected loop sustains 19,015 transactions/s, 5.3% above a software-driven SPI baseline. The added logic (3,155 LUTs and 2,215 registers; 5.0% and 1.7% of the device) is dominated by the Ascon engine and preserves the 100 MHz clock, while estimated power rises from 118 to 368 mW.

cs.CR↗

SABLE: Minimalist Instruction-Level Authenticated Encryption for Constrained Confidential Computing

Conventional processor designs expose code and data as plaintext throughout execution, rendering them inherently vulnerable to attacks that recover intellectual property or modify security/safety checks. Instruction-level encryption (ILE) enables CPU-level decryption, execution, and optionally authentication of individual encrypted program instructions at runtime. However, existing proposals depend on specific micro-architectures, detect corrupted instructions after they have executed, rely on non-standard ciphers, or require complex analyses of program state. In this work, we introduce and present a design exploration of a RISC-V processor architecture (SABLE) that enables minimally invasive instruction-level authenticated encryption of programs. SABLE is agnostic to the underlying micro-architecture, remaining compatible with the standard RISC-V toolchain with minor changes to post-process compiled ELF binaries. We integrate a decrypt-and-verify stage at two points (the instruction-memory wrapper and the CPU frontend) and explore seven ILE micro-architectures from a single-cycle (combinational) design to six multi-cycle (sequential) variants. We implement and evaluate the designs using ASCON-128a on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA with the open-source NEORV32 system on chip. Relative to baseline performance, the configurations span LUT, performance, power, and energy-per-instruction overheads of 1.6-9.3$\times$, 4.1-10.0$\times$, 1.5-8.0$\times$, and 10.4-80.0$\times$, respectively, using the Dhrystone benchmarking suite. Finally, we discuss design trade-offs, highlighting area-, performance-, and energy-aware design points.

cs.CR↗