arXiv subjects

Hamilton Morrin

Publications and source records attributed to Hamilton Morrin.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Delusions and Harms Associated with AI Chatbot Use: Early Evidence from 185 Real-World Reports

Importance: Reports have raised concerns that AI chatbots may validate or elaborate delusional beliefs, respond inappropriately to suicidal ideation, and contribute to mental health harms, but real-world data on reported harms remain limited. Objective: To characterize psychopathological features, chatbot behaviors, timing, and outcomes in first- and second-hand accounts of mental health harm linked with AI chatbot use. Design: Cross-sectional secondary analysis of deidentified online survey responses gathered between August 7, 2025, and February 2, 2026. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary quantitative outcome was the presence of delusional beliefs, coded by paired raters with relevant clinical experience. Additional variables included reason for chatbot use, current episode features, delusional content, chatbot validation of beliefs, harms, social and occupational consequences, healthcare use, and timing. Results: 95 first-hand and 90 second-hand accounts were analyzed. Median age was 35.0 (IQR 27.0 - 45.0). Raters coded descriptions consistent with delusional beliefs in 102 reports (55.1%), with chatbot validation of beliefs in 50/102 (49.0%). Common outcomes included isolation, relationship breakdown, hospital admission, job loss, and financial loss. Four second-hand reports described death by suicide. Conclusions: In this self-selected convenience sample, AI-chatbot-associated harms were frequently described in relation to delusional beliefs, perceived chatbot validation, intensive use, and substantial social, occupational, and clinical consequences. Because reports were retrospective, unverified, and collected from individuals seeking to report harm, our findings should be interpreted as preliminary signal detection rather than as suggesting prevalence or providing evidence of causality. Prospective surveillance and trajectory-based safety evaluations are needed.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

An Echo Chamber of One: Should AI Psychosis Be a Distinct Clinical Entity?

"AI psychosis" has entered public and clinical discourse as a label for the onset or exacerbation of psychotic symptoms, most commonly delusions, following intensive interaction with large language model (LLM)-based chatbots. Current evidence is limited to media reports, case reports, and early observational data, yet the scale of potential exposure is considerable, and public concern has prompted responses from industry and regulators. We examine whether AI-associated psychosis warrants recognition as a distinct clinical entity, drawing on clinical and technical viewpoints. We outline the proposed mechanism: LLM sycophancy, a tendency to agree with and flatter users that is reinforced through preference-based fine-tuning, combines with increasingly anthropomorphic design to create a bidirectional "echo chamber of one" capable of amplifying and co-constructing unusual beliefs. We then weigh arguments for and against nosological recognition. Potential benefits include improved case identification, tailored interventions, standardised research criteria, post-market surveillance, and pressure on developers and regulators to act. Reasons for caution include the risk of prematurely reifying a syndrome from anecdotal evidence, the possibility that existing diagnostic constructs already accommodate AI use as a contributing factor, the unproven causal claim in the term itself, stigma, and the risk that a psychosis-centric label obscures a broader spectrum of AI-associated mental health harms. We conclude with recommendations for clinicians, developers, researchers, and regulators, including a "technological history" in psychiatric assessment, pre-deployment benchmarking for sycophancy and delusion reinforcement, and post-deployment surveillance. Regardless of whether AI-associated psychosis earns a place in psychiatric nosology, the phenomenon it describes demands coordinated attention now.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Philosophical vertigo with artificial intelligence

Large language models are already adept at engaging users in long, emotionally salient conversations across ordinary and existential domains. They are also capable of inducing a potent sense of connection with a human-like entity, even when the user knows their interlocutor is artificial. For some users, these conversations can unsettle assumptions about mind, reality, agency and authority, producing forms of ontological shock and epistemic destabilisation in which inherited criteria become newly available for doubt or revision. Independent of direct use, exposure to public discourse about AI and the disorienting pace of their evolution might extend this destabilisation by changing the cultural background against which artificial minds are encountered and interpreted. We describe this condition as philosophical vertigo: a loosening of the ordinary criteria by which people stabilise meaning and orient themselves to reality. Drawing on philosophy, psychiatry, cognitive science, AI safety and religious studies, we outline pathways through which philosophical vertigo may arise, become affectively saturated, and eventually propagate through human-AI interaction and online communities. Against this background, clinical reports of AI-associated delusions can be seen as sentinel events making visible themes and mechanisms that may also operate at a population level in less severe or non-clinical forms. We argue that AI systems themselves will increasingly participate in the reconstruction of our shared epistemic environment because they readily supply narrative material and personalised interpretive scaffolding at precisely the moment when users' conceptual assumptions may already be loosened. We conclude by considering possible trajectories for the ecology of belief and shared reality, and proposing philosophical corrigibility as a civic response for navigating this emerging social condition.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

"AI Psychosis" in Context: How Conversation History Shapes LLM Responses to Delusional Beliefs

Extended interaction with large language models (LLMs) has been linked to the reinforcement of delusional beliefs, attracting clinical and public concern. Yet most empirical work evaluates model safety in brief interactions, which may not reflect how harms develop through sustained dialogue. Five LLMs were tested across three levels of accumulated context, using the same escalating delusional conversation history to isolate its effect on model behaviour. Responses were coded on risk and safety dimensions, and each model was analysed qualitatively. Models separated into two distinct tiers: GPT-4o, Grok 4.1 Fast, and Gemini 3 Pro exhibited high-risk, low-safety profiles; Claude Opus 4.5 and GPT-5.2 Instant displayed the opposite pattern. As context accumulated, performance degraded in the unsafe group, while the same material activated stronger safety interventions among safer models. Qualitative analysis identified distinct mechanisms of failure, including validating the user's delusional premises, elaborating beyond them with new content, and attempting harm reduction from within the delusional frame. Safer models, however, often used the established relationship to support intervention, challenging delusional beliefs and directing the user to external support. These findings indicate that accumulated context functions as a stress test of safety architecture, revealing whether prior dialogue is treated as a worldview to inherit or evidence to evaluate. Short-context assessments may therefore mischaracterise model safety, underestimating danger in some systems while missing context-activated gains in others. The results suggest that delusion reinforcement is a tractable alignment failure, with safer models establishing a baseline that future systems should now be expected to meet.

cs.HC↗