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Hangcheng Zhao

Publications and source records attributed to Hangcheng Zhao.

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Valuing Winners: When and How to Correct for Selection Bias in Randomized Experiments

Decision-makers often deploy the best-performing treatment from a randomized experiment, creating a winner's curse: selection favors treatments whose observed outcomes are high partly because of statistical noise, so the na\"ive estimate of the winner is upward biased. We distinguish two forms of winner's curse, bias relative to the true best treatment (global) and bias relative to the selected treatment's true mean (selective), and link them to regret from deploying a suboptimal treatment. This framework defines seven decision-relevant evaluation targets: mean bias, mean squared error, and confidence interval coverage for the global and selective winner's curse, and mean regret. We then show that methods that perform well on one target can perform poorly on others, so corrections should be matched to the manager's objective. Across simulations with varying effect sizes, multiple-arm settings, and data calibrated to an online A/B testing platform, no method dominates uniformly: the plug-in estimator performs best when treatment differences are large, cross-fitting performs best when treatments are similar, and resampling methods often achieve low mean squared error for moderate differences. We also introduce an adaptive empirical likelihood procedure that delivers asymptotically valid confidence intervals across settings without the tuning sensitivity of resampling-based methods.

econ.EM

Strategic Response of News Publishers to Generative AI

Generative AI can adversely impact news publishers by lowering consumer demand. It can also reduce demand for newsroom employees, and increase the creation of news "slop." However, it can also form a source of traffic referrals and an information-discovery channel that increases demand. We use high-frequency granular data to analyze the strategic response of news publishers to the introduction of Generative AI. Many publishers strategically blocked LLM access to their websites using the robots.txt file standard. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that large publishers who block GenAI bots experience reduced website traffic compared to not blocking. In addition, we find that large publishers shift toward richer content that is harder for LLMs to replicate, without increasing text volume. Finally, we find that the share of new editorial and content-production job postings rises over time. Together, these findings illustrate the levers that publishers choose to use to strategically respond to competitive Generative AI threats, and their consequences.

econ.GN

Algorithmic Collusion of Pricing and Advertising on E-commerce Platforms

When online sellers use AI learning algorithms to automatically compete on e-commerce platforms, there is concern that they will learn to coordinate on higher than competitive prices. However, this concern was primarily raised in single-dimension price competition. We investigate whether this prediction holds when sellers make pricing and advertising decisions together, i.e., two-dimensional decisions. We analyze competition in multi-agent reinforcement learning, and use a large-scale dataset from Amazon.com to provide empirical evidence. We show that when consumers have high search costs, learning algorithms can coordinate on prices lower than competitive prices, facilitating a win-win-win for consumers, sellers, and platforms. This occurs because algorithms learn to coordinate on lower advertising bids, which lower advertising costs, leading to lower prices and enlarging demand on the platform. We also show that our results generalize to any learning algorithm that uses exploration of price and advertising bids. Consistent with our predictions, an empirical analysis shows that price levels exhibit a negative interaction between estimated consumer search costs and algorithm usage index. We analyze the platform's strategic response and find that reserve price adjustments will not increase platform profits, but commission adjustments will, while maintaining the beneficial outcomes for both sellers and consumers.

econ.GN