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Hannah Hanwen Chang

Publications and source records attributed to Hannah Hanwen Chang.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Copyright Laundering Through the AI Ouroboros: Adapting the 'Fruit of the Poisonous Tree' Doctrine to Recursive AI Training

Copyright enforcement rests on an evidentiary bargain: a plaintiff must show both the defendant's access to the work and substantial similarity in the challenged output. That bargain comes under strain when AI systems are trained through multi-generational pipelines with recursive synthetic data. As successive models are tuned on the outputs of its predecessors, any copyrighted material absorbed by an early model is diffused into deeper statistical abstractions. The result is an evidentiary blind spot where overlaps that emerge look coincidental, while the chain of provenance is too attenuated to trace. These conditions are ripe for "copyright laundering"--the use of multi-generational synthetic pipelines, an "AI Ouroboros," to render traditional proof of infringement impracticable. This Article adapts the "fruit of the poisonous tree" (FOPT) principle to propose a AI-FOPT standard: if a foundational AI model's training is adjudged infringing (either for unlawful sourcing or for non-transformative ingestion that fails fair-use), then subsequent AI models principally derived from the foundational model's outputs or distilled weights carry a rebuttable presumption of taint. The burden shifts to downstream developers--those who control the evidence of provenance--to restore the evidentiary bargain by affirmatively demonstrating a verifiably independent and lawfully sourced lineage or a curative rebuild, without displacing fair-use analysis at the initial ingestion stage. Absent such proof, commercial deployment of tainted models and their outputs is actionable. This Article develops the standard by specifying its trigger, presumption, and concrete rebuttal paths (e.g., independent lineage or verifiable unlearning); addresses counterarguments concerning chilling innovation and fair use; and demonstrates why this lineage-focused approach is both administrable and essential.

cs.CY

Operational Agency: A Permeable Legal Fiction for Tracing Culpability in AI Systems

Modern artificial intelligence (AI) systems act with a high degree of independence yet lack legal personhood-a paradox that fractures doctrines grounded in human-centric notions of mens rea and actus reus. This Article introduces Operational Agency (OA)-a permeable legal fiction structured as an ex post evidentiary framework-and Operational Agency Graph (OAG), a tool for mapping causal interactions among human actors, organizations, and AI systems. OA evaluates an AI's observable operational characteristics: its goal-directedness (as a proxy for intent), predictive processing (as a proxy for foresight), and safety architecture (as a proxy for a standard of care). OAG operationalizes that analysis by embedding these characteristics in a causal graph to trace and apportion culpability among developers, fine-tuners, deployers, and users. Drawing on corporate criminal liability, the innocent-agent doctrine, and secondary and vicarious liability frameworks, the Article shows how OA and OAG strengthen existing doctrines. Across five real-world case studies spanning tort, civil rights, constitutional law, and antitrust, it demonstrates how the framework addresses challenges ranging from autonomous vehicle collisions to algorithmic price-fixing, offering courts a principled evidentiary method-and legislatures and industry a conceptual foundation-to ensure human accountability keeps pace with technological autonomy, without conferring personhood on AI.

cs.CY

Private Again: Artificial Intelligence Agents Restore Anonymity---Foreclosing Discrimination and Its Proof

Artificial intelligence agents can transact online on behalf of a human principal---browsing, paying, receiving, and reviewing---without revealing who that principal is. That architecture starves algorithmic discrimination of its inputs---identity, purchase history, location history, behavioral traces, and demographic proxies---but also forecloses its proof. Disparate-treatment needs comparators; disparate-impact needs protected-class baselines; and *Iqbal*-era pleading needs specific factual allegations---doctrinal predicates that anonymous transactions never generate. The effects fall asymmetrically: those most vulnerable to discrimination are least able to afford the shield and, when harms remain, least able to prove them. The challenge for the law shifts from detecting and remedying algorithmic discrimination to governing agent-mediated anonymity as civil rights infrastructure: ensuring access to privacy-preserving agents, regulating abuse without forced identification, and deciding whether retailers may refuse to deal with agents at all.

cs.CY

Fluid Agency in AI Systems: A Case for Functional Equivalence in Copyright, Patent, and Tort

Modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems lack human-like consciousness or culpability, yet they exhibit fluid agency: behavior that is (i) stochastic (probabilistic and path-dependent), (ii) dynamic (co-evolving with user interaction), and (iii) adaptive (able to reorient across contexts). Fluid agency generates valuable outputs but collapses attribution, irreducibly entangling human and machine inputs. This fundamental unmappability fractures doctrines that assume traceable provenance -- authorship, inventorship, and liability -- yielding ownership gaps and moral "crumple zones." This Article argues that only functional equivalence stabilizes doctrine. Where provenance is indeterminate, legal frameworks must treat human and AI contributions as equivalent for allocating rights and responsibility -- not as a claim of moral or economic parity but as a pragmatic default. This principle stabilizes doctrine across domains, offering administrable rules: in copyright, vesting ownership in human orchestrators without parsing inseparable contributions; in patent, tying inventor-of-record status to human orchestration and reduction to practice, even when AI supplies the pivotal insight; and in tort, replacing intractable causation inquiries with enterprise-level and sector-specific strict or no-fault schemes. The contribution is both descriptive and normative: fluid agency explains why origin-based tests fail, while functional equivalence supplies an outcome-focused framework to allocate rights and responsibility when attribution collapses.

cs.CY

Beyond Pairwise Comparisons: A Distributional Test of Distinctiveness for Machine-Generated Works in Intellectual Property Law

Key doctrines, including novelty (patent), originality (copyright), and distinctiveness (trademark), turn on a shared empirical question: whether a body of work is meaningfully distinct from a relevant reference class. Yet analyses typically operationalize this set-level inquiry using item-level evidence: pairwise comparisons among exemplars. That unit-of-analysis mismatch may be manageable for finite corpora of human-created works, where it can be bridged by ad hoc aggregations. But it becomes acute for machine-generated works, where the object of evaluation is not a fixed set of works but a generative process with an effectively unbounded output space. We propose a distributional alternative: a two-sample test based on maximum mean discrepancy computed on semantic embeddings to determine if two creative processes-whether human or machine-produce statistically distinguishable output distributions. The test requires no task-specific training-obviating the need for discovery of proprietary training data to characterize the generative process-and is sample-efficient, often detecting differences with as few as 5-10 images and 7-20 texts. We validate the framework across three domains: handwritten digits (controlled images), patent abstracts (text), and AI-generated art (real-world images). We reveal a perceptual paradox: even when human evaluators distinguish AI outputs from human-created art with only about 58% accuracy, our method detects distributional distinctiveness. Our results present evidence contrary to the view that generative models act as mere regurgitators of training data. Rather than producing outputs statistically indistinguishable from a human baseline-as simple regurgitation would predict-they produce outputs that are semantically human-like yet stochastically distinct, suggesting their dominant function is as a semantic interpolator within a learned latent space.

cs.CY

Charting the Parrot's Song: A Maximum Mean Discrepancy Approach to Measuring AI Novelty, Originality, and Distinctiveness

Current intellectual property frameworks struggle to evaluate the novelty of AI-generated content, relying on subjective assessments ill-suited for comparing effectively infinite AI outputs against prior art. This paper introduces a robust, quantitative methodology grounded in Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) to measure distributional differences between generative processes. By comparing entire output distributions rather than conducting pairwise similarity checks, our approach directly contrasts creative processes--overcoming the computational challenges inherent in evaluating AI outputs against unbounded prior art corpora. Through experiments combining kernel mean embeddings with domain-specific machine learning representations (LeNet-5 for MNIST digits, CLIP for art), we demonstrate exceptional sensitivity: our method distinguishes MNIST digit classes with 95% confidence using just 5-6 samples and differentiates AI-generated art from human art in the AI-ArtBench dataset (n=400 per category; p<0.0001) using as few as 7-10 samples per distribution despite human evaluators' limited discrimination ability (58% accuracy). These findings challenge the "stochastic parrot" hypothesis by providing empirical evidence that AI systems produce outputs from semantically distinct distributions rather than merely replicating training data. Our approach bridges technical capabilities with legal doctrine, offering a pathway to modernize originality assessments while preserving intellectual property law's core objectives. This research provides courts and policymakers with a computationally efficient, legally relevant tool to quantify AI novelty--a critical advancement as AI blurs traditional authorship and inventorship boundaries.

cs.CY

Stochastic, Dynamic, Fluid Autonomy in Agentic AI: Implications for Authorship, Inventorship, and Liability

Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, exemplified by OpenAI's DeepResearch, autonomously pursue goals, adapting strategies through implicit learning. Unlike traditional generative AI, which is reactive to user prompts, agentic AI proactively orchestrates complex workflows. It exhibits stochastic, dynamic, and fluid autonomy: its steps and outputs vary probabilistically (stochastic), it evolves based on prior interactions (dynamic), and it operates with significant independence within human-defined parameters, adapting to context (fluid). While this fosters complex, co-evolutionary human-machine interactions capable of generating uniquely synthesized creative outputs, it also irrevocably blurs boundaries--human and machine contributions become irreducibly entangled in intertwined creative processes. Consequently, agentic AI poses significant challenges to legal frameworks reliant on clear attribution: authorship doctrines struggle to disentangle ownership, intellectual property regimes strain to accommodate recursively blended novelty, and liability models falter as accountability diffuses across shifting loci of control. The central issue is not the legal treatment of human versus machine contributions, but the fundamental unmappability--the practical impossibility in many cases--of accurately attributing specific creative elements to either source. When retroactively parsing contributions becomes infeasible, applying distinct standards based on origin becomes impracticable. Therefore, we argue, legal and policy frameworks may need to treat human and machine contributions as functionally equivalent--not for moral or economic reasons, but as a pragmatic necessity.

cs.CY

Agentic AI: Autonomy, Accountability, and the Algorithmic Society

Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) can autonomously pursue long-term goals, make decisions, and execute complex, multi-turn workflows. Unlike traditional generative AI, which responds reactively to prompts, agentic AI proactively orchestrates processes, such as autonomously managing complex tasks or making real-time decisions. This transition from advisory roles to proactive execution challenges established legal, economic, and creative frameworks. In this paper, we explore challenges in three interrelated domains: creativity and intellectual property, legal and ethical considerations, and competitive effects. Central to our analysis is the tension between novelty and usefulness in AI-generated creative outputs, as well as the intellectual property and authorship challenges arising from AI autonomy. We highlight gaps in responsibility attribution and liability that create a "moral crumple zone"--a condition where accountability is diffused across multiple actors, leaving end-users and developers in precarious legal and ethical positions. We examine the competitive dynamics of two-sided algorithmic markets, where both sellers and buyers deploy AI agents, potentially mitigating or amplifying tacit collusion risks. We explore the potential for emergent self-regulation within networks of agentic AI--the development of an "algorithmic society"--raising critical questions: To what extent would these norms align with societal values? What unintended consequences might arise? How can transparency and accountability be ensured? Addressing these challenges will necessitate interdisciplinary collaboration to redefine legal accountability, align AI-driven choices with stakeholder values, and maintain ethical safeguards. We advocate for frameworks that balance autonomy with accountability, ensuring all parties can harness agentic AI's potential while preserving trust, fairness, & societal welfare.

cs.CY

CAVIAR: Categorical-Variable Embeddings for Accurate and Robust Inference

Social science research often hinges on the relationship between categorical variables and outcomes. We introduce CAVIAR, a novel method for embedding categorical variables that assume values in a high-dimensional ambient space but are sampled from an underlying manifold. Our theoretical and numerical analyses outline challenges posed by such categorical variables in causal inference. Specifically, dynamically varying and sparse levels can lead to violations of the Donsker conditions and a failure of the estimation functionals to converge to a tight Gaussian process. Traditional approaches, including the exclusion of rare categorical levels and principled variable selection models like LASSO, fall short. CAVIAR embeds the data into a lower-dimensional global coordinate system. The mapping can be derived from both structured and unstructured data, and ensures stable and robust estimates through dimensionality reduction. In a dataset of direct-to-consumer apparel sales, we illustrate how high-dimensional categorical variables, such as zip codes, can be succinctly represented, facilitating inference and analysis.

econ.EM

AI Knowledge and Reasoning: Emulating Expert Creativity in Scientific Research

We investigate whether modern AI can emulate expert creativity in complex scientific endeavors. We introduce novel methodology that utilizes original research articles published after the AI's training cutoff, ensuring no prior exposure, mitigating concerns of rote memorization and prior training. The AI are tasked with redacting findings, predicting outcomes from redacted research, and assessing prediction accuracy against reported results. Analysis on 589 published studies in four leading psychology journals over a 28-month period, showcase the AI's proficiency in understanding specialized research, deductive reasoning, and evaluating evidentiary alignment--cognitive hallmarks of human subject matter expertise and creativity. These findings suggest the potential of general-purpose AI to transform academia, with roles requiring knowledge-based creativity become increasingly susceptible to technological substitution.

cs.AI

Heuristic Reasoning in AI: Instrumental Use and Mimetic Absorption

Deviating from conventional perspectives that frame artificial intelligence (AI) systems solely as logic emulators, we propose a novel program of heuristic reasoning. We distinguish between the 'instrumental' use of heuristics to match resources with objectives, and 'mimetic absorption,' whereby heuristics manifest randomly and universally. Through a series of innovative experiments, including variations of the classic Linda problem and a novel application of the Beauty Contest game, we uncover trade-offs between maximizing accuracy and reducing effort that shape the conditions under which AIs transition between exhaustive logical processing and the use of cognitive shortcuts (heuristics). We provide evidence that AIs manifest an adaptive balancing of precision and efficiency, consistent with principles of resource-rational human cognition as explicated in classical theories of bounded rationality and dual-process theory. Our findings reveal a nuanced picture of AI cognition, where trade-offs between resources and objectives lead to the emulation of biological systems, especially human cognition, despite AIs being designed without a sense of self and lacking introspective capabilities.

cs.AI

Silico-centric Theory of Mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowledge, to oneself and others, and to understand that these mental states can differ from one's own and from reality. We investigate ToM in environments with multiple, distinct, independent AI agents, each possessing unique internal states, information, and objectives. Inspired by human false-belief experiments, we present an AI ('focal AI') with a scenario where its clone undergoes a human-centric ToM assessment. We prompt the focal AI to assess whether its clone would benefit from additional instructions. Concurrently, we give its clones the ToM assessment, both with and without the instructions, thereby engaging the focal AI in higher-order counterfactual reasoning akin to human mentalizing--with respect to humans in one test and to other AI in another. We uncover a discrepancy: Contemporary AI demonstrates near-perfect accuracy on human-centric ToM assessments. Since information embedded in one AI is identically embedded in its clone, additional instructions are redundant. Yet, we observe AI crafting elaborate instructions for their clones, erroneously anticipating a need for assistance. An independent referee AI agrees with these unsupported expectations. Neither the focal AI nor the referee demonstrates ToM in our 'silico-centric' test.

cs.AI