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Hannah Li

Publications and source records attributed to Hannah Li.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

When Representative Samples Produce Worse Outcomes: Scale-up Decisions and Testing in Small-Budget RCTs

Small randomized controlled trials are often used to screen interventions before running larger follow-up studies. This is a critical phase of experimentation, as missing effective interventions or scaling up harmful ones can be very costly. A common proposal to mitigate these errors is to recruit samples that are representative of the target population, but this is often challenging in resource-constrained pilots. We challenge the narrative that representative samples are always superior by showing that when statistical significance testing determines whether interventions receive further study, the pilot trial composition that maximizes the downstream expected improvement in outcomes depends critically on its budget size. In the large-budget limit, the optimal pilot design converges to a sample that is representative of the target population. However, in the small-budget regime, the pilot designer maximizes expected impact by sampling only from a single homogeneous sub-population, chosen in a manner that depends on sampling costs and the designer's prior beliefs about heterogeneous treatment effects. Our proof of the small-budget result applies more generally when an RCT and significance test are used to decide whether to receive any non-adaptive downstream payoff, a result that may be applicable to other settings with constrained experimentation budgets.

stat.ME

Deployment of AI-Assisted Interventions: Capacity Constraints and Noisy Compliance

AI tools increasingly guide targeted interventions in healthcare, education, and recruiting. Algorithms score individuals, trigger outreach to those above a threshold (e.g., high-risk or high-value), and encourage them to request service; then providers deliver service to those who request. Standard practice sets the threshold and selects the algorithm to maximize predictive accuracy, assuming that better predictions yield better outcomes. We show that this approach is suboptimal when limited service capacity and probabilistic behavioral responses influence who receives service. In such settings, the optimal score threshold must balance two effects: ensuring all capacity is filled (utilization) and ensuring high-value individuals are served despite competition between requests (cannibalization). We characterize the optimal threshold and prove that policies based solely on predictive accuracy are generally suboptimal. Further, because optimal thresholds vary with service capacity, algorithm selection metrics like AUC, which weight all thresholds equally, are misaligned with operational performance. We introduce a new metric--Operational AUC (OpAUC)--and show it leads to optimal algorithm selection. Finally, we conduct a case study on sepsis early warning data and illustrate the magnitude of improvement that can be achieved from improved threshold and algorithm selection.

stat.ME

Digital Twins as Funhouse Mirrors: Five Key Distortions

Scientists and practitioners are increasingly moving to deploy digital twins--LLM-based models of real individuals--across social science and policy research. We conduct 19 pre-registered studies spanning 164 diverse outcomes (e.g., attitudes toward hiring algorithms, intentions to share misinformation), comparing human responses to those of their corresponding digital twins, which are trained on each individual's prior responses to over 500 questions. We establish an empirical benchmark for digital twin performance: their predictions are only modestly more accurate than those of a homogeneous base LLM and exhibit weak correlation with human responses (average $r = 0.20$). To inform future development, we identify five systematic distortions in digital twin behavior: (i) insufficient individuation, (ii) stereotyping, (iii) representation bias, (iv) ideological bias, and (v) hyper-rationality. Finally, we release our full dataset and code as a standardized testbed for evaluating and improving digital twin methodologies. Together, our findings caution against premature deployment while laying the groundwork for a transparent, replicable, and iterative science of responsible digital twin development.

cs.CY

Discretion in the Loop: Human Expertise in Algorithm-Assisted College Advising

In higher education, many institutions use algorithmic alerts to flag at-risk students and deliver advising at scale. While much research has focused on evaluating algorithmic predictions, relatively little is known about how discretionary interventions by human experts shape outcomes in algorithm-assisted settings. We study this question using rich quantitative and qualitative data from a randomized controlled trial of an algorithm-assisted advising program at Georgia State University. Taking a mixed-methods approach, we examine whether and how advisors use context unavailable to an algorithm to guide interventions and influence student success. We develop a causal graphical framework for human expertise in the interventional setting, extending prior work on discretion in purely predictive settings. We then test a necessary condition for discretionary expertise using structured advisor logs and student outcomes data, identifying several interventions that meet the criterion for statistical significance. Accordingly, we estimate that 2 out of 3 interventions taken by advisors in the treatment arm were plausibly ``expertly targeted'' to students using non-algorithmic context. Systematic qualitative analysis of advisor notes corroborates these findings, showing a pattern of advisors incorporating diverse forms of contextual information--such as personal circumstances, financial issues, and student engagement--into their decisions. Finally, we document heterogeneity in advising styles, finding that one style elicits more holistic information about students and is associated with improved graduation rates. Our results offer theoretical and practical insight into the real-world effectiveness of algorithm-supported college advising, and underscore the importance of accounting for human expertise in the design, evaluation, and implementation of algorithmic decision systems.

cs.CY

Wikipedia Contributions in the Wake of ChatGPT

How has Wikipedia activity changed for articles with content similar to ChatGPT following its introduction? We estimate the impact using differences-in-differences models, with dissimilar Wikipedia articles as a baseline for comparison, to examine how changes in voluntary knowledge contributions and information-seeking behavior differ by article content. Our analysis reveals that newly created, popular articles whose content overlaps with ChatGPT 3.5 saw a greater decline in editing and viewership after the November 2022 launch of ChatGPT than dissimilar articles did. These findings indicate heterogeneous substitution effects, where users selectively engage less with existing platforms when AI provides comparable content. This points to potential uneven impacts on the future of human-driven online knowledge contributions.

cs.HC

When Does Interference Matter? Decision-Making in Platform Experiments

This paper investigates decision-making in A/B experiments for online platforms and marketplaces. In such settings, due to constraints on inventory, A/B experiments typically lead to biased estimators because of *interference* between treatment and control groups; this phenomenon has been well studied in recent literature. By contrast, there has been relatively little discussion of the impact of interference on decision-making. In this paper, we analyze a benchmark Markovian model of an inventory-constrained platform, where arriving customers book listings that are limited in supply. We focus on the commonly used frequentist hypothesis testing approach for making launch decisions based on data from customer-randomized experiments, and we study the impact of interference on (1) false positive probability and (2) statistical power. We obtain three main findings. First, we show that for *sign-consistent* treatments -- i.e., those where the treatment changes booking probabilities in the same direction relative to control for all states of inventory availability -- the false positive probability of a test statistic using the standard difference-in-means estimator with a corresponding na\"ive variance estimator is correctly controlled. Second, we demonstrate that for sign-consistent treatments in realistic settings, the statistical power of this na\"ive approach is higher than that of any similar pipeline using a debiased estimator. Taken together, these two findings suggest that platforms may be better off *not* debiasing when treatments are sign-consistent. Third, using numerics, we investigate false positive probability and statistical power when treatments are sign-inconsistent, and we show that in principle, the performance of the na\"ive approach can be arbitrarily worse in such cases.

stat.ME

Operational Dosage: Implications of Capacity Constraints for the Design and Interpretation of Experiments

We study RCTs that evaluate the impact of service interventions, for example, teachers or advisors conducting proactive outreach to at-risk students, medical providers giving medication adherence support by calling or texting, or social workers that conduct home visits. A defining feature of service interventions is that they are delivered by a capacity-constrained resource -- teachers, healthcare providers, or social workers -- whose limited availability creates causal inference complications. Because participants share a finite service capacity, adding more participants can reduce the timeliness or intensity of the service that others receive, introducing interference across participants. This generates hidden variation in the treatment itself, which we term operational dosage. We provide a mathematical model of service interventions using techniques from queueing theory and study the impact of capacity constraints on experimental outcomes. Our main insight is that treatment effects are both capacity- and sample-size-dependent, as well as decreasing in sample size once a critical threshold is exceeded. Interestingly, an implication is that statistical power of service intervention RCTs peaks at intermediate sample sizes -- directly contradicting conventional power calculations that assume monotonically increasing power with sample size. We instantiate our insights using simulations calibrated to a real-world trial evaluating a behavioral health intervention for tuberculosis patients in Kenya. Our simulation results suggest that a trial with high service capacity but limited sample size can obtain the same statistical power as a trial with lower service capacity but large sample size. Taken together, our results highlight the importance of capacity selection in experiment design and provide a mechanism for why experiments may fail to replicate or perform at scale.

stat.ME

Measuring Strategization in Recommendation: Users Adapt Their Behavior to Shape Future Content

Most modern recommendation algorithms are data-driven: they generate personalized recommendations by observing users' past behaviors. A common assumption in recommendation is that how a user interacts with a piece of content (e.g., whether they choose to "like" it) is a reflection of the content, but not of the algorithm that generated it. Although this assumption is convenient, it fails to capture user strategization: that users may attempt to shape their future recommendations by adapting their behavior to the recommendation algorithm. In this work, we test for user strategization by conducting a lab experiment and survey. To capture strategization, we adopt a model in which strategic users select their engagement behavior based not only on the content, but also on how their behavior affects downstream recommendations. Using a custom music player that we built, we study how users respond to different information about their recommendation algorithm as well as to different incentives about how their actions affect downstream outcomes. We find strong evidence of strategization across outcome metrics, including participants' dwell time and use of "likes." For example, participants who are told that the algorithm mainly pays attention to "likes" and "dislikes" use those functions 1.9x more than participants told that the algorithm mainly pays attention to dwell time. A close analysis of participant behavior (e.g., in response to our incentive conditions) rules out experimenter demand as the main driver of these trends. Further, in our post-experiment survey, nearly half of participants self-report strategizing "in the wild," with some stating that they ignore content they actually like to avoid over-recommendation of that content in the future. Together, our findings suggest that user strategization is common and that platforms cannot ignore the effect of their algorithms on user behavior.

cs.CY

Matching of Users and Creators in Two-Sided Markets with Departures

Many online platforms of today, including social media sites, are two-sided markets bridging content creators and users. Most of the existing literature on platform recommendation algorithms largely focuses on user preferences and decisions, and does not simultaneously address creator incentives. We propose a model of content recommendation that explicitly focuses on the dynamics of user-content matching, with the novel property that both users and creators may leave the platform permanently if they do not experience sufficient engagement. In our model, each player decides to participate at each time step based on utilities derived from the current match: users based on alignment of the recommended content with their preferences, and creators based on their audience size. We show that a user-centric greedy algorithm that does not consider creator departures can result in arbitrarily poor total engagement, relative to an algorithm that maximizes total engagement while accounting for two-sided departures. Moreover, in stark contrast to the case where only users or only creators leave the platform, we prove that with two-sided departures, approximating maximum total engagement within any constant factor is NP-hard. We present two practical algorithms, one with performance guarantees under mild assumptions on user preferences, and another that tends to outperform algorithms that ignore two-sided departures in practice.

cs.GT

Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias

We develop an analytical framework to study experimental design in two-sided marketplaces. Many of these experiments exhibit interference, where an intervention applied to one market participant influences the behavior of another participant. This interference leads to biased estimates of the treatment effect of the intervention. We develop a stochastic market model and associated mean field limit to capture dynamics in such experiments, and use our model to investigate how the performance of different designs and estimators is affected by marketplace interference effects. Platforms typically use two common experimental designs: demand-side ("customer") randomization (CR) and supply-side ("listing") randomization (LR), along with their associated estimators. We show that good experimental design depends on market balance: in highly demand-constrained markets, CR is unbiased, while LR is biased; conversely, in highly supply-constrained markets, LR is unbiased, while CR is biased. We also introduce and study a novel experimental design based on two-sided randomization (TSR) where both customers and listings are randomized to treatment and control. We show that appropriate choices of TSR designs can be unbiased in both extremes of market balance, while yielding relatively low bias in intermediate regimes of market balance.

stat.ME

Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms

Two-sided marketplace platforms often run experiments to test the effect of an intervention before launching it platform-wide. A typical approach is to randomize individuals into the treatment group, which receives the intervention, and the control group, which does not. The platform then compares the performance in the two groups to estimate the effect if the intervention were launched to everyone. We focus on two common experiment types, where the platform randomizes individuals either on the supply side or on the demand side. The resulting estimates of the treatment effect in these experiments are typically biased: because individuals in the market compete with each other, individuals in the treatment group affect those in the control group and vice versa, creating interference. We develop a simple tractable market model to study bias and variance in these experiments with interference. We focus on two choices available to the platform: (1) Which side of the platform should it randomize on (supply or demand)? (2) What proportion of individuals should be allocated to treatment? We find that both choices affect the bias and variance of the resulting estimators but in different ways. The bias-optimal choice of experiment type depends on the relative amounts of supply and demand in the market, and we discuss how a platform can use market data to select the experiment type. Importantly, we find in many circumstances, choosing the bias-optimal experiment type has little effect on variance. On the other hand, the choice of treatment proportion can induce a bias-variance tradeoff, where the bias-minimizing proportion increases variance. We discuss how a platform can navigate this tradeoff and best choose the treatment proportion, using a combination of modeling as well as contextual knowledge about the market, the risk of the intervention, and reasonable effect sizes of the intervention.

stat.ME

Dropping Standardized Testing for Admissions Trades Off Information and Access

We study the role of information and access in capacity-constrained selection problems with fairness concerns. We develop a statistical discrimination framework, where each applicant has multiple features and is potentially strategic. The model formalizes the trade-off between the (potentially positive) informational role of a feature and its (negative) exclusionary nature when members of different social groups have unequal access to this feature. Our framework finds a natural application to policy debates on dropping standardized testing in admissions. Our primary takeaway is that the decision to drop a feature (such as test scores) cannot be made without the joint context of the information provided by other features and how the requirement affects the applicant pool composition. Dropping a feature may exacerbate disparities by decreasing the amount of information available for each applicant, especially those from non-traditional backgrounds. However, in the presence of access barriers to a feature, the interaction between the informational environment and the effect of access barriers on the applicant pool size becomes highly complex. Furthermore, we consider an extension with two schools and costly tests, where strategic students decide whether to take the test or not. Our theoretical results reveal that the students' test-taking behavior can be non-monotonic. We characterize the two-school policy equilibria and show that each school's optimal decision to drop the test critically depends on the other school's test policy. Finally, using calibrated simulations, we demonstrate the presence of practical instances where the decision to eliminate standardized testing improves or worsens all metrics.

cs.CY

Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation

An online labor platform faces an online learning problem in matching workers with jobs and using the performance on these jobs to create better future matches. This learning problem is complicated by the rise of complex tasks on these platforms, such as web development and product design, that require a team of workers to complete. The success of a job is now a function of the skills and contributions of all workers involved, which may be unknown to both the platform and the client who posted the job. These team matchings result in a structured correlation between what is known about the individuals and this information can be utilized to create better future matches. We analyze two natural settings where the performance of a team is dictated by its strongest and its weakest member, respectively. We find that both problems pose an exploration-exploitation tradeoff between learning the performance of untested teams and repeating previously tested teams that resulted in a good performance. We establish fundamental regret bounds and design near-optimal algorithms that uncover several insights into these tradeoffs.

cs.LG

Decentralized Certificate Authorities

The security of TLS depends on trust in certificate authorities, and that trust stems from their ability to protect and control the use of a private signing key. The signing key is the key asset of a certificate authority (CA), and its value is based on trust in the corresponding public key which is primarily distributed by browser vendors. Compromise of a CA private key represents a single point-of-failure that could have disastrous consequences, so CAs go to great lengths to attempt to protect and control the use of their private keys. Nevertheless, keys are sometimes compromised and may be misused accidentally or intentionally by insiders. We propose splitting a CA's private key among multiple parties, and producing signatures using a generic secure multi-party computation protocol that never exposes the actual signing key. This could be used by a single CA to reduce the risk that its signing key would be compromised or misused. It could also enable new models for certificate generation, where multiple CAs would need to agree and cooperate before a new certificate can be generated, or even where certificate generation would require cooperation between a CA and the certificate recipient (subject). Although more efficient solutions are possible with custom protocols, we demonstrate the feasibility of implementing a decentralized CA using a generic two-party secure computation protocol with an evaluation of a prototype implementation that uses secure two-party computation to generate certificates signed using ECDSA on curve secp192k1.

cs.CR

Horcrux: A Password Manager for Paranoids

Vulnerabilities in password managers are unremitting because current designs provide large attack surfaces, both at the client and server. We describe and evaluate Horcrux, a password manager that is designed holistically to minimize and decentralize trust, while retaining the usability of a traditional password manager. The prototype Horcrux client, implemented as a Firefox add-on, is split into two components, with code that has access to the user's master's password and any key material isolated into a small auditable component, separate from the complexity of managing the user interface. Instead of exposing actual credentials to the DOM, a dummy username and password are autofilled by the untrusted component. The trusted component intercepts and modifies POST requests before they are encrypted and sent over the network. To avoid trusting a centralized store, stored credentials are secret-shared over multiple servers. To provide domain and username privacy, while maintaining resilience to off-line attacks on a compromised password store, we incorporate cuckoo hashing in a way that ensures an attacker cannot determine if a guessed master password is correct. Our approach only works for websites that do not manipulate entered credentials in the browser client, so we conducted a large-scale experiment that found the technique appears to be compatible with over 98% of tested login forms.

cs.CR