arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Hans van Ditmarsch.
In this survey we review dynamic epistemic logics with modalities for quantification over information change. Of such logics we present complete axiomatizations, focussing on axioms involving the interaction between knowledge and such quantifiers, we report on their relative expressivity, on decidability and on the complexity of model checking and satisfiability, and on applications. We focus on open problems and new directions for research.
A gossip protocol is a procedure for sharing secrets in a network. The basic action in a gossip protocol is a pairwise message exchange (telephone call) wherein the calling agents exchange all the secrets they know. An agent who knows all secrets is an expert. The usual termination condition is that all agents are experts. Instead, we explore protocols wherein the termination condition is that all agents know that all agents are experts. We call such agents super experts. We also investigate gossip protocols that are common knowledge among the agents. Additionally, we model that agents who are super experts do not make and do not answer calls, and that this is common knowledge. We investigate conditions under which protocols terminate, both in the synchronous case, where there is a global clock, and in the asynchronous case, where there is not. We show that a commonly known protocol with engaged agents may terminate faster than the same commonly known protocol without engaged agents.
Public announcement logic(PAL) is an extension of epistemic logic (EL) with some reduction axioms. In this paper, we propose a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for PAL, which is an extension of that for EL with sequent rules adapted from the reduction axioms. This calculus admits cut and allows terminating proof search.
Various extensions of public announcement logic have been proposed with quantification over announcements. The best-known extension is called arbitrary public announcement logic, APAL. It contains a primitive language construct Box phi intuitively expressing that "after every public announcement of a formula, formula phi is true". The logic APAL is undecidable and it has an infinitary axiomatization. Now consider restricting the APAL quantification to public announcements of Boolean formulas only, such that Box phi intuitively expresses that "after every public announcement of a Boolean formula, formula phi is true". This logic can therefore called Boolean arbitrary public announcement logic, BAPAL. The logic BAPAL is the subject of this work. Unlike APAL it has a finitary axiomatization. Also, BAPAL is not at least as expressive as APAL. A further claim that BAPAL is decidable is deferred to a companion paper.
Quantification over public announcements shifts the perspective from reasoning strictly about the results of a particular announcement to reasoning about the existence of an announcement that achieves some certain epistemic goal. Depending on the type of the quantification, we get different formalisms, the most known of which are arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL), group announcement logic (GAL), and coalition announcement logic (CAL). It has been an open question whether the logics have the finite model property, and in the paper we answer the question negatively. We also discuss how this result is connected to other open questions in the field.
We introduce a class of neighbourhood frames for graded modal logic embedding Kripke frames into neighbourhood frames. This class of neighbourhood frames is shown to be first-order definable but not modally definable. We also obtain a new definition of graded bisimulation with respect to Kripke frames by modifying the definition of monotonic bisimulation.
We propose a multi-agent epistemic logic of asynchronous announcements, where truthful announcements are publicly sent but individually received by agents, and in the order in which they were sent. Additional to epistemic modalities the logic contains dynamic modalities for making announcements and for receiving them. What an agent believes is a function of her initial uncertainty and of the announcements she has received. Beliefs need not be truthful, because announcements already made may not yet have been received. As announcements are true when sent, certain message sequences can be ruled out, just like inconsistent cuts in distributed computing. We provide a complete axiomatization for this \emph{asynchronous announcement logic} (AA). It is a reduction system that also demonstrates that any formula in $AA$ is equivalent to one without dynamic modalities, just as for public announcement logic. A detailed example modelling message exchanging processes in distributed computing in $AA$ closes our investigation.
Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) reasons about how the knowledge of a set of agents changes after true public announcements and after arbitrary announcements of true epistemic formulas. We consider a variant of arbitrary public announcement logic called positive arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL+), which restricts arbitrary public announcements to announcement of positive formulas. Positive formulas prohibit statements about the ignorance of agents. The positive formulas correspond to the universal fragment in first-order logic. As two successive announcements of positive formulas need not correspond to the announcement of a positive formula, APAL+ is rather different from APAL. We show that APAL+ is more expressive than public announcement logic PAL, and that APAL+ is incomparable with APAL. We also provide a sound and complete infinitary axiomatisation.
Simplicial complexes are a versatile and convenient paradigm on which to build all the tools and techniques of the logic of knowledge, on the assumption that initial epistemic models can be described in a distributed fashion. Thus, we can define: knowledge, belief, bisimulation, the group notions of mutual, distributed and common knowledge, and also dynamics in the shape of simplicial action models. We give a survey on how to interpret all such notions on simplicial complexes, building upon the foundations laid in prior work by Goubault and others.
In this contribution we present arbitrary arrow update model logic (AAUML). This is a dynamic epistemic logic or update logic. In update logics, static/basic modalities are interpreted on a given relational model whereas dynamic/update modalities induce transformations (updates) of relational models. In AAUML the update modalities formalize the execution of arrow update models, and there is also a modality for quantification over arrow update models. Arrow update models are an alternative to the well-known action models. We provide an axiomatization of AAUML. The axiomatization is a rewrite system allowing to eliminate arrow update modalities from any given formula, while preserving truth. Thus, AAUML is decidable and equally expressive as the base multi-agent modal logic. Our main result is to establish arrow update synthesis: if there is an arrow update model after which phi, we can construct (synthesize) that model from phi. We also point out some pregnant differences in update expressivity between arrow update logics, action model logics, and refinement modal logic.
Distributed dynamic gossip is a generalization of the classic telephone problem in which agents communicate to share secrets, with the additional twist that also telephone numbers are exchanged to determine who can call whom. Recent work focused on the success conditions of simple protocols such as "Learn New Secrets" (LNS) wherein an agent a may only call another agent b if a does not know b's secret. A protocol execution is successful if all agents get to know all secrets. On partial networks these protocols sometimes fail because they ignore information available to the agents that would allow for better coordination. We study how epistemic protocols for dynamic gossip can be strengthened, using epistemic logic as a simple protocol language with a new operator for protocol-dependent knowledge. We provide definitions of different strengthenings and show that they perform better than LNS, but we also prove that there is no strengthening of LNS that always terminates successfully. Together, this gives us a better picture of when and how epistemic coordination can help in the dynamic gossip problem in particular and distributed systems in general.
We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium, and dominance, under uncertainty. We provide scenarios wherein the profiles of true preferences are the same but the equilibrium profiles are different, because the voters have different knowledge about other voters. We also model actions that change such uncertainty about preferences, such as a voter revealing her preference. We show that some forms of manipulation and equilibrium are preserved under such uncertainty updates and others not. We then formalize epistemic voting terminology in a logic. Our aim is to provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting rules that incorporate uncertainty.
A gossip protocol is a procedure for spreading secrets among a group of agents, using a connection graph. The goal is for all agents to get to know all secrets, in which case we call the execution of the protocol successful. We consider distributed and dynamic gossip protocols. In distributed gossip the agents themselves instead of a global scheduler determine whom to call. In dynamic gossip not only secrets are exchanged but also telephone numbers (agent identities). This results in increased graph connectivity. We define six such distributed dynamic gossip protocols, and we characterize them in terms of the topology of the graphs on which they are successful, wherein we distinguish strong success (the protocol always terminates, possibly assuming fair scheduling) from weak success (the protocol sometimes terminates). For five of these protocols strong (fair) and weak success are characterized by weakly connected graphs. This result is surprising because the protocols are fairly different. In the sixth protocol an agent may only call another agent if it does not know the other agent's secret. Strong success for this protocol is characterized by graphs for which the set of non-terminal nodes is strongly connected. Weak success for this protocol is characterized by weakly connected graphs satisfying further topological constraints that we define in the paper. One direction of this characterization is surprisingly harder to prove than the other results in this contribution.
We present four logic puzzles and after that their solutions. Joseph Yeo designed 'Cheryl's Birthday'. Mike Hartley came up with a novel solution for 'One Hundred Prisoners and a Light Bulb'. Jonathan Welton designed 'A Blind Guess' and 'Abby's Birthday'. Hans van Ditmarsch and Barteld Kooi authored the puzzlebook 'One Hundred Prisoners and a Light Bulb' that contains other knowledge puzzles, and that can also be found on the webpage http://personal.us.es/hvd/lightbulb.html dedicated to the book.
In this paper we introduce {\em global and local announcement logic} (GLAL), a dynamic epistemic logic with two distinct announcement operators -- $[ϕ]^+_A$ and $[ϕ]^-_A$ indexed to a subset $A$ of the set $Ag$ of all agents -- for global and local announcements respectively. The boundary case $[ϕ]^+_{Ag}$ corresponds to the public announcement of $ϕ$, as known from the literature. Unlike standard public announcements, which are {\em model transformers}, the global and local announcements are {\em pointed model transformers}. In particular, the update induced by the announcement may be different in different states of the model. Therefore, the resulting computations are trees of models, rather than the typical sequences. A consequence of our semantics is that modally bisimilar states may be distinguished in our logic. Then, we provide a stronger notion of bisimilarity and we show that it preserves modal equivalence in GLAL. Additionally, we show that GLAL is strictly more expressive than public announcement logic with common knowledge. We prove a wide range of validities for GLAL involving the interaction between dynamics and knowledge, and show that the satisfiability problem for GLAL is decidable. We illustrate the formal machinery by means of detailed epistemic scenarios.
A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy's logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements) to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts.
Arbitrary Arrow Update Logic is a dynamic modal logic that uses an arbitrary arrow update modality to quantify over all arrow updates. Some properties of this logic have already been established, but until now it remained an open question whether the logic's satisfiability problem is decidable. Here, we show that the satisfiability problem of Arbitrary Arrow Update Logic is co-RE hard, and therefore undecidable, by a reduction of the tiling problem.
We propose a multi-agent logic of knowledge, public and arbitrary announcements, that is interpreted on topological spaces in the style of subset space semantics. The arbitrary announcement modality functions similarly to the effort modality in subset space logics, however, it comes with intuitive and semantic differences. We provide axiomatizations for three logics based on this setting, and demonstrate their completeness.