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Haoling Zhou

Publications and source records attributed to Haoling Zhou.

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OpenPCC: Open and Confidential LLM Serving on Commodity TEEs

Generative AI applications such as personal AI agents, image generators, and chat assistants offer advanced capabilities to improve user experience. Behind the scenes, Large Language Models (LLMs) that power these services require a massive amount of computation and are usually deployed in the cloud, available as APIs, meaning that a user's request has to be sent to a Cloud Inference Service (CIS) for processing. However, the strong capabilities of LLM also mean that user's requests now contain much more personal sensitive or enterprise confidential information, demanding equally strong protection in CIS. While early industry efforts such as Apple Private Cloud Compute (PCC) and Google Private AI Compute have emerged to show the potential of secure CIS, they are not adoptable for deployment by others due to their reliance on proprietary hardware and closed ecosystem. In addition, they all suffer from their own design glitches that can undermine the ambitious goal of bringing in true privacy protection to end users. In this paper, we present our analysis of the fundamental requirements of building a secure yet open CIS. We then present OpenPCC, a Confidential CIS framework that does not rely on proprietary hardware but instead uses commercially available TEEs. We implement an open-source prototype and characterize it end-to-end on a Llama-3 8B vLLM workload, separating OpenPCC's own cost from the underlying TEE hardware. Our analysis and evaluation demonstrated the feasibility and security of the system.

cs.CR

Too Private to Tell: Practical Token Theft Attacks on Apple Intelligence

Apple Intelligence is a generative AI (GenAI) service provided by Apple on its devices. While offering a similar set of features as other similar GenAI services, Apple Intelligence is claimed to be designed with an extra focus on user security and privacy through a two-stage authentication and authorization design using anonymous access tokens. In this paper, we present our investigation into this token issuance mechanism with a goal to reveal possible vulnerabilities using traffic analysis, reverse engineering, and cross comparison with Apple's public documentation. Specifically, we present the Serpent attack, the first practical cross-device token replay attack against Apple Intelligence that allows the attacker to steal the access tokens from the victim's device and utilise them on a different device, with all usage rate-limited against the victim. We have achieved successful attacks on the latest macOS 26 Tahoe and demonstrated that an attacker, who even has used up its own allowance, can immediately regain access to Apple Intelligence service. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to the vendors and received confirmation from Apple with CVE assigned and bounty given. Our results highlight a general lesson for built-in AI services: Anonymising identity does not by itself make the AI service secure; Enforcing non-transferability requires cryptographic binding to the rightful user.

cs.CR