Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Haoyang Cao

Publications and source records attributed to Haoyang Cao.

22 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Stationary Discounted and Ergodic Mean Field Games of Singular Control

We study stationary mean field games with singular controls in which the representative player interacts with a long-time weighted average of the population through a discounted and an ergodic performance criterion. This class of games finds natural applications in the context of optimal productivity expansion in dynamic oligopolies. We prove existence and uniqueness of the mean field equilibria, which are completely characterized through nonlinear equations. Furthermore, we relate the mean field equilibria for the discounted and the ergodic games by showing the validity of an Abelian limit. The latter allows also to approximate Nash equilibria of - so far unexplored - symmetric N-player ergodic singular control games through the mean field equilibrium of the discounted game. Numerical examples finally illustrate in a case study the dependency of the mean field equilibria with respect to the parameters of the games.

math.OC↗

Nonzero-sum stochastic games and mean-field games with impulse controls

We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibria (NEs) of the game. We then consider the limit situation of $N \to \infty$, that is, a suitable mean-field game (MFG) with impulse controls. We show that under appropriate technical conditions, the existence of unique NE solution to the MFG, which is an $ε$-NE approximation to the $N$-player game, with $ε=O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\right)$. As an example, we analyze in details a class of two-player stochastic games which extends the classical cash management problem to the game setting. In particular, we present numerical analysis for the cases of the single player, the two-player game, and the MFG, showing the impact of competition on the player's optimal strategy, with sensitivity analysis of the model parameters.

math.OC↗

MFGs for partially reversible investment

This paper analyzes a class of infinite-time-horizon stochastic games with singular controls motivated from the partially reversible problem. It provides an explicit solution for the mean-field game (MFG) and presents sensitivity analysis to compare the solution for the MFG with that for the single-agent control problem. It shows that in the MFG, model parameters not only affect the optimal strategies as in the single-agent case, but also influence the equilibrium price. It then establishes that the solution to the MFG is an $ε$-Nash Equilibrium to the corresponding $N$-player game, with $ε=O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt N}\right)$.

math.OC↗

Approximation of Mean Field Games to N-Player Stochastic Games, with Singular Controls

This paper establishes that $N$-player stochastic games with singular controls, either of bounded velocity or of finite variation, can both be approximated by mean field games (MFGs) with singular controls of bounded velocity. More specifically, it shows i) the optimal control to an MFG with singular controls of a bounded velocity $θ$ is shown to be an $ε_N$-NE to an $N$-player game with singular controls of the bounded velocity, with $ε_N = O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$, and (ii) the optimal control to this MFG is an $(ε_N + ε_θ)$-NE to an $N$-player game with singular controls of finite variation, where $ε_θ$ is an error term that depends on $θ$. This work generalizes the classical result on approximation $N$-player games by MFGs, by allowing for discontinuous controls.

math.OC↗