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Haris Aziz

Publications and source records attributed to Haris Aziz.

At least 109 records · Page 6Linked to original sources

A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to find an envy-free allocation based on queries from $n$ agents. The problem has received attention in computer science, mathematics, and economics. It has been a major open problem whether there exists a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol. We resolve the problem by proposing a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for any number of agents. The maximum number of queries required by the protocol is $n^{n^{n^{n^{n^n}}}}$. We additionally show that even if we do not run our protocol to completion, it can find in at most $n^3{(n^2)}^n$ queries a partial allocation of the cake that achieves proportionality (each agent gets at least $1/n$ of the value of the whole cake) and envy-freeness. Finally we show that an envy-free partial allocation can be computed in at most $n^3{(n^2)}^n$ queries such that each agent gets a connected piece that gives the agent at least $1/(3n)$ of the value of the whole cake.

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Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts

We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property of no (justified) envy. When matchings can be random, there are a number of natural stability / fairness concepts that coincide with stability / no envy whenever matchings are deterministic. We formalize known stability concepts for random matchings for a general setting that allows weak preferences and weak priorities, unacceptability, and an unequal number of agents and objects. We then present a clear taxonomy of the stability concepts and identify logical relations between them. Furthermore, we provide no envy / claims interpretations for some of the stability concepts that are based on a consumption process interpretation of random matchings. Finally, we present a transformation from the most general setting to the most restricted setting, and show how almost all our stability concepts are preserved by that transformation.

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Fractional Hedonic Games

The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. Fractional hedonic games thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games, but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of fractional hedonic games is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core.

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Equilibria in Sequential Allocation

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure equilibria, and Stackelberg strategies. We first demonstrate that, even for two agents, better responses can cycle. We then present a linear-time algorithm that returns a profile (which we call the "bluff profile") that is in pure Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, the outcome of the bluff profile is the same as that of the truthful profile and the profile is in pure Nash equilibrium for \emph{all} cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. We show that the outcome of the bluff profile is Pareto optimal with respect to pairwise comparisons. In contrast, we show that an assignment may not be Pareto optimal with respect to pairwise comparisons even if it is a result of a preference profile that is in pure Nash equilibrium for all utilities consistent with ordinal preferences. Finally, we present a dynamic program to compute an optimal Stackelberg strategy for two agents, where the second agent has a constant number of distinct values for the items.

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Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: a Probabilistic Social Choice Function

When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider participation as formalized by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) based on the stochastic dominance (SD) relation. We formulate a new rule called RMEC (Rank Maximal Equal Contribution) that satisfies the strongest notion of participation and is also ex post efficient. The rule is polynomial-time computable and also satisfies many other desirable fairness properties. The rule suggests a general approach to achieving ex post efficiency and very strong participation.

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A Polynomial-time Algorithm to Achieve Extended Justified Representation

We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are to be selected. In particular we focus on the axiomatic property called extended justified representation (EJR). Although a committee satisfying EJR is guaranteed to exist, the computational complexity of finding such a committee has been an open problem and explicitly mentioned in multiple recent papers. We settle the complexity of finding a committee satisfying EJR by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem. Our algorithmic approach may be useful for constructing other voting rules in multi-winner voting.

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Computational Complexity of Testing Proportional Justified Representation

We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are selected. Aziz et al. (2015) proposed two representation axioms called justified representation and extended justified representation. Whereas the former can be tested as well as achieved in polynomial time, the latter property is coNP-complete to test and no polynomial-time algorithm is known to achieve it. Interestingly, S{á}nchez-Fern{á}ndez et~al. (2016) proposed an intermediate property called proportional justified representation that admits a polynomial-time algorithm to achieve. The complexity of testing proportional justified representation has remained an open problem. In this paper, we settle the complexity by proving that testing proportional justified representation is coNP-complete. We complement the complexity result by showing that the problem admits efficient algorithms if any of the following parameters are bounded: (1) number of voters (2) number of candidates (3) maximum number of candidates approved by a voter (4) maximum number of voters approving a given candidate.

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The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria

The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important fair division mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor for allocating goods between two parties. It has been used in practice for divorce settlements and analyzing political disputes. Assuming truthful declaration of the valuations, it computes an allocation that is envy-free, equitable and Pareto optimal. We show that Adjusted Winner admits several elegant characterizations, which further shed light on the outcomes reached with strategic agents. We find that the procedure may not admit pure Nash equilibria in either the discrete or continuous variants, but is guaranteed to have $ε$-Nash equilibria for each $ε$ > 0. Moreover, under informed tie-breaking, exact pure Nash equilibria always exist, are Pareto optimal, and their social welfare is at least 3/4 of the optimal.

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The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality

We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local stability (introduced in this paper): A size-$k$ committee is locally stable in an election with $n$ voters if there is no candidate $c$ and no group of more than $\frac{n}{k+1}$ voters such that each voter in this group prefers $c$ to each committee member. We argue that Gehrlein-stable committees are appropriate for shortlisting tasks, and that locally stable committees are better suited for applications that require proportional representation. The goal of this paper is to analyze these notions in detail, explore their compatibility with notions of proportionality, and investigate the computational complexity of related algorithmic tasks.

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Participation Incentives in Randomized Social Choice

When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to identify outcomes that are Pareto optimal and to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process. We consider participation notions as formalized by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) and study how far efficiency and participation are achievable by randomized social choice functions in particular when agents' preferences are downward lexicographic (DL) or satisfy stochastic dominance (SD). Our results include the followings ones: we prove formal relations between the participation notions with respect to SD and DL and we show that the maximal recursive rule satisfies very strong participation with respect to both SD and DL.

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Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Preferences

The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with uncertainty leads to a number of interesting questions including the following ones. How to compute an assignment with the highest probability of being Pareto optimal? What is the complexity of computing the probability that a given assignment is Pareto optimal? Does there exist an assignment that is Pareto optimal with probability one? We consider these problems under two natural uncertainty models: (1) the lottery model in which each agent has an independent probability distribution over linear orders and (2) the joint probability model that involves a joint probability distribution over preference profiles. For both of the models, we present a number of algorithmic and complexity results.

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Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting

We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. However, it turns out that several prominent approval-based voting rules may fail to output such a committee. In particular, while Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) always outputs a committee that provides JR, Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV), a tractable approximation to PAV, does not have this property. We then introduce a stronger version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules we consider do not; indeed, EJR can be used to characterize PAV within the class of weighted PAV rules. We also consider several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between JR/EJR and core stability, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic problems.

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Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each agent, there is a probability distribution over linear preferences, (2) compact indifference model --- for each agent, a weak preference order is specified and each linear order compatible with the weak order is equally likely and (3) joint probability model --- there is a lottery over preference profiles. For each of the models, we study the computational complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with the highest probability of being stable. We also examine more restricted problems such as deciding whether a certainly stable matching exists. We find a rich complexity landscape for these problems, indicating that the form uncertainty takes is significant.

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Interdependent Scheduling Games

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.

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Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in the Random Assignment Setting with Indifferences

A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism that is an anonymous, neutral, Pareto optimal, and weak strategyproof mechanism when the preferences are considered with respect to stochastic dominance. The result holds when agents have strict preferences over individual objects. It has been an open problem whether there exists a mechanism that satisfies the same properties when agents may have indifference among the objects. We show that for this more general domain, there exists no extension of PS that is ex post efficient and weak strategyproof. The result is surprising because it does not even require additional symmetry or fairness conditions such as anonymity, neutrality, or equal treatment of equals. Our result further demonstrates that the lack of weak SD-strategyproofness of the extended PS mechanism of Katta and Sethuraman (2006) is not a design flaw of extended PS but is due to an inherent incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness of PS in the full preference domain.

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A Discrete and Bounded Envy-free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer science, mathematics, and economics. Although, the elegant Selfridge-Conway envy-free protocol for three agents has been known since 1960, it has been a major open problem for the last fifty years to obtain a bounded envy-free protocol for more than three agents. We propose a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for four agents.

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Approximation Algorithms for Max-Min Share Allocations of Indivisible Chores and Goods

We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections but differences as well. We prove that like in the case for goods, an MmS allocation does not need to exist for chores and computing an MmS allocation - if it exists - is strongly NP-hard. In view of these non-existence and complexity results, we present a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for MmS fairness for chores. We then introduce a new fairness concept called optimal MmS that represents the best possible allocation in terms of MmS that is guaranteed to exist. For both goods and chores, we use connections to parallel machine scheduling to give (1) an exponential-time exact algorithm and (2) a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing an optimal MmS allocation when the number of agents is fixed.

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