arXiv subjects

Harpreet Singh Chawla

Publications and source records attributed to Harpreet Singh Chawla.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Adaptive and Efficient Dynamic Memory Management for Hardware Enclaves

The second version of Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX), or SGX2, adds dynamic management of enclave memory and threads. The first version required the address space and thread counts to be fixed before execution. The Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) feature of SGX2 has the potential to lower launch times and overall execution time. Despite reducing the enclave loading time by 28--93%, straightforward EDMM adoption strategies actually slow execution time down by as much as 58%. Using the Gramine library OS as a representative enclave runtime environment, this paper shows how to recover EDMM performance. The paper explains how implementing mutual distrust between the OS and enclave increases the cost of modifying page mappings. The paper then describes and evaluates a series of optimizations on application benchmarks, showing that these optimizations effectively eliminate the overheads of EDMM while retaining EDMM's performance and flexibility gains.

cs.OS↗

arXiv2023

Attack of the Knights: A Non Uniform Cache Side-Channel Attack

For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrated a new distance-based side-channel attack by timing the AES decryption operation and extracting part of an AES secret key on an Intel Knights Landing CPU. We introduce several techniques to overcome the challenges of the attack, including the use of multiple attack threads to ensure LLC hits, to detect vulnerable memory locations, and to obtain fine-grained timing of the victim operations. While operating as a covert channel, this attack can reach a bandwidth of 205 kbps with an error rate of only 0.02%. We also observed that the side-channel attack can extract 4 bytes of an AES key with 100% accuracy with only 4000 trial rounds of encryption

cs.CR↗