Harry Lyu | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

Crashing Waves vs. Rising Tides: Findings on AI Automation from Thousands of Worker Evaluations of Labor Market Tasks

We characterize AI automation as a continuum between crashing waves, in which capabilities jump abruptly across narrow task sets, and rising tides, in which capabilities improve continuously and broadly. Using evidence from more than 6,000 text-based, LLM-addressable tasks derived from the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET taxonomy and over 60,000 evaluations by experienced workers, we find little evidence of crashing waves (contrary to existing views). Instead, rising tides are the primary form of AI progress. AI performance is high and improving rapidly across many tasks. In 2024-Q2, models completed text-based tasks that take humans about 1.5 hours to complete with roughly 60% success, rising above 70% by 2025-Q3. If recent trends in AI capability growth persist, frontier LLMs will be able to complete most text-based tasks at minimally sufficient quality with 88%-97% success by 2030.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Economics of Human and AI Collaboration: When is Partial Automation More Attractive than Full Automation?

This paper develops a unified framework for evaluating the optimal degree of task automation. Moving beyond binary automate-or-not assessments, we model automation intensity as a continuous choice in which firms minimize costs by selecting an AI accuracy level, from no automation through partial human-AI collaboration to full automation. On the supply side, we estimate an AI production function via scaling-law experiments linking performance to data, compute, and model size. Because AI systems exhibit predictable but diminishing returns to these inputs, the cost of higher accuracy is convex: good performance may be inexpensive, but near-perfect accuracy is disproportionately costly. Full automation is therefore often not cost-minimizing; partial automation, where firms retain human workers for residual tasks, frequently emerges as the equilibrium. On the demand side, we introduce an entropy-based measure of task complexity that maps model accuracy into a labor substitution ratio, quantifying human labor displacement at each accuracy level. We calibrate the framework with O*NET task data, a survey of 3,778 domain experts, and GPT-4o-derived task decompositions, implementing it in computer vision. Task complexity shapes substitution: low-complexity tasks see high substitution, while high-complexity tasks favor limited partial automation. Scale of deployment is a key determinant: AI-as-a-Service and AI agents spread fixed costs across users, sharply expanding economically viable tasks. At the firm level, cost-effective automation captures approximately 11% of computer-vision-exposed labor compensation; under economy-wide deployment, this share rises sharply. Since other AI systems exhibit similar scaling-law economics, our mechanisms extend beyond computer vision, reinforcing that partial automation is often the economically rational long-run outcome, not merely a transitional phase.

econ.GN↗